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Executive Summary 
1  The enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (the CEECs) is  perhaps the greatest challenge facing  the EU and  the 
CEECs in the next decade.  Among the sectors where mutual adjustments will  be most 
needed,  and  have  the largest  benefits,  in  both the EU and  the CEECs is  agriculture. 
However,  adjustments  need  careful  preparation  to  ensure  that  they  are  mutually 
consistent.  The  absence  of foresight,  or of the  will  to  act  in  advance  to  forestall 
problems,  could  seriously jeopardize the process of integrating the CEECs back into 
Western Europe. This report is an attempt to lay out the options facing the CEECs and 
the EU as the issues of agriculture come into focus.  It concentrates on the six CEECs 
which have Association Agreements with the EU. 
2.1  In the CEECs,  agriculture is  large relative to other sectors of the economy.  When the 
CEECs join the EU, overaU  GDP of the Union will  increase by  around 3 per cent, but 
agriculture will expand by around one third. Hence agricultural issues will become more 
important in the enlarged EU. 
2.2  CEEC agriculture has been under an  enormous economic stress since transition  began 
and  output  has  declined  significantly.  It is  sometimes  assumed  that  this  decline  is 
irreversible.  Yet,  the downturn in  CEEC agricultural  production can be explained by  a 
number  of factors,  most  of which  are  closely  related  to the fundamental  adjustments 
taking place during transition. The majority of  these factors are of  a transitory nature. 
2.3  There is a good chance that CEEC agriculture will recover once the process of  transition 
approaches  completion.  One  indication  is  the  fact  that  agriculture  has  proven  more 
robust than industry in the turbulence of  transition. 
3  Agricultural  policies  in  the  CEECs  have  kept  changing  since  transition  began.  In 
particular,  the  Visegrad  countries  have  gradually  moved  towards  higher  levels  of 
agricultural  support  and  protection.  They  all  now  have  more  or  less  rigid  price 
guarantees for core agricultural products, though at a level substantially below that of  the 
EU.  These  policies  have  been  in  response  to  the  economic  difficulties  in  agriculture 
during transition.  In future,  a clear priority for CEEC agricultural policies should be to 
improve  competitiveness  in  agriculture  and,  in  particular,  in  the  upstream  and 
downstream sectors. Measures which interfere heavily with market forces cannot achieve 
this aim.  Priorities for  policies  in  the immediate future include market  stability,  social 
security  in  rural  regions,  better  employment  opportunities,  and  environmental 
sustainability.  Major constraints on CEEC agricultural policies are the need for  macro-VI 
economic  stabilization,  including  fiscal  restraint,  the  limited  purchasing  power  of 
consumers, existing international trade agreements, in  particular the GATT Agreement 
on Agriculture, and the need to avoid wrong expectations of  market participants. 
4  Among CEEC farmers  the CAP  is  often seen as  a  panacea.  In those product sectors 
where the CAP provides firm price support, CEEC agricultural producers would benefit 
from inclusion in the CAP.  However, in  other sectors, such as e.g.  pork and  poultry, 
CEEC farmers  need  to be rather efficient  in  order to compete successfully  with EU 
farmers.  Most important, though, is the need to improve competitiveness in  the food 
industry before accession to the EU. The EU food industry is a particularly competitive 
sector by international standards, and the CEEC food industry will not benefit from any 
form of  protection once a single market is established between the CEECs and the EU. 
CEEC  governments  should  not  assume  that  the acquis  communautaire  of the  CAP 
remains  unchanged  until  eastward  enlargement of the EU.  As  part of the  process  of 
making the CEECs "pre-members" of  the EU, engaged in a policy dialogue with the EU, 
mutual policy adjustments can be discussed. However, in financial terms the CEECs will 
not be covered by the CAP before accession, and this has decisive implications for their 
policies.  An important issue to be discussed between the CEECs and the EU in the near 
future is the treatment of  the CEECs under CAP supply controls on accession. Incentives 
to establish "property rights" to CAP quotas in the CEECs should be avoided. 
5.1  One of  the central issues in CEEC agricultural policies for the years to come is the choice 
of an appropriate level of support and  protection.  As current levels of support are still 
below those under the CAP, there is the issue of  whether and when to align CEEC prices 
with the CAP. 
5.2  One option would be a rapid price alignment.  This strategy might be welcome in  some 
parts of CEEC agriculture, but it would harm other sectors, in agriculture as well  as  in 
the food industry and the overall economy. Real incomes of consumers would suffer and 
government budgets would have to bear a high burden. 
5.3  A less unrealistic option is a gradual price alignment with the EU, to reach CAP prices 
in,  say, the year 2000.  A quantitative analysis of the implications of this policy strategy 
for the Visegrad countries suggests that it would result in substantial surplus production 
of some agricultural  products.  For the  products  included  in  the  quantitative  analysis 
presented here, export subsidies required to dispose of  these surpluses would amount to 
some 4.3 billion ECU in  the Visegrad countries. More budget expenditure would result 
from other elements of  market policies needed to pursue this strategy. Total expenditure 
on agricultural market policies would be around 9 billion ECU in the Visegrad countries. 
Budget spending for  agriculture at  that  level  is  beyond that which  is  compatible with  _  1 w 
macro-economic requirements in the CEECs. Moreover price alignment with the CAP by 
2000 would be inconsistent with the commitments the Visegrad countries have accepted 
under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in the GATT. 
5.4  As a conclusion from these considerations, the preferable strategy for the CEECs, from 
their own domestic point of  view, is to keep price support low until accession to the EU. 
Another advantage of  this strategy is that it is not yet clear what the level of  CAP prices 
will actually be by 2000. Hence it is best for the CEECs not to create wrong expectations 
among their farmers. 
6.1  In  the years to come,  the  outlook for  the  CAP  will  be conditioned  by  a  number  of 
pressures.  Rising  budget costs will  soon exhaust the guideline for FEOGA spending. 
Environmental concerns and issues of  income distribution will affect the political climate 
in which the CAP is pursued. The EU's GATT obligations are unlikely to have a marked 
impact, but will guard against slipping back in the process of CAP reform. Enlargement 
to include EFT  A countries may influence the political balance in  CAP decision making. 
The main threat to the stability of  the CAP is accession by the CEECs. 
6.2  A  voiding action in this changing environment and waiting until a crisis occurs is the least 
preferable  option  for  the  CAP.  Most  importantly,  it  would  essentially  preclude  the 
extension of  the CAP to the new entrants from  Central and Eastern Europe. With all  six 
CEECs included in an unreformed CAP, FEOGA guarantee expenditure would increase 
by around 20 billion ECU, i.e. by more than one third. At the same time, GDP of  the EU, 
i.e.  the basis of the guideline for FEOGA spending, would grow by only three per cent. 
Also,  the Union's  GATT commitments would  probably  not  allow the extension of an 
unreformed CAP to the CEECs. A modest continuation of the MacSharry reform of the 
CAP, to include more products and  to eliminate shortcomings in the current regime of 
compensation  payments  and  set-aside,  would  improve  things,  but  would  not 
fundamentally change the agricultural policy environment to which the CEECs accede. It 
would  not  sufficiently  solve  the  problems  that  CEEC  accession  would  create for  the 
CAP.  The preferred strategy for  the EU therefore is  to complete the process of CAP 
reform,  by  reducing  support  prices  to  close  to  world  market  levels,  decoupling 
compensation payments completely from production, making payments transferable, and 
by handing financial  responsibility for  decoupled payments over to the member states, 
with appropriate adjustments to their contributions to the EU budget. In the process of 
eastward enlargement, the EU anyhow needs to reconsider its approach to agricultural 
compensation  payments.  The  policy  changes  indicated  here  can  be implemented  in  a 
gradual fashion and do not need to be regarded as a "reform ofthe reform". Vlll 
6.3  If  the CAP opts for  inaction until provoked by  crisis,  the delayed policy  changes will 
either go in the proper direction, in which case the delay will have been costly,  or they 
will be of a less desirable nature.  In particular, more reliance on supply control would 
distort  the  allocation  of resources  and  make  EU  agriculture  less  internationally 
competitive and more reliant on government policies. A completion of  CAP reform along 
the lines indicated would lay the foundation for a competitive agriculture for a Union of 
about  twenty  countries.  A  CAP  made  viable  only  by  quotas  is  a  recipe  for 
non-competitive, segmented agricultural markets. 
7.1  In previous  rounds  of EU enlargement,  different  approaches  have  been  adopted  for 
transitional arrangements.  After creation of the Single Market, transition arrangements 
which would  have  allowed  for  a gradual  transition  on  agricultural  markets  were not 
considered appropriate in  EU enlargement to include EFT  A countries.  In a borderless 
Europe  it  would  not  have  been  acceptable  to  use  accession  compensatory  amounts 
granted or collected at the border. 
7.2  When it  comes to eastward enlargement of  the EU, a number of options for transitional 
arrangements  can  be  considered.  One  option  would  be to exclude  CEEC  agriculture 
altogether from  the Single Market in  the EU.  For the  enlarged  Union,  sacrificing the 
principle  of the  Single  Market  would  be  a  serious  economic  disadvantage.  For the 
CEECs,  this  option would constitute "second-class citizenship".  Less pronounced,  but 
similar  in  nature  would  be  the  problems  created  by  a  long  transition  period  for 
agricultural prices in the CEECs. Border controls would have to be maintained between 
the new entrants and the rest of  the EU, just for the sake of  avoiding inevitable decisions 
in  agricultural markets.  A third option would be to establish a "single market" with the 
CEECs,  but to avoid the budgetary and trade implications of extending an  unreformed 
CAP  to  the east by  subjecting  CEEC  agriculture to firm  supply  controls.  This  option 
would not allow CEEC farmers to compete on an equal footing with farmers in the rest 
of the EU.  It would  also  be  a particular irony  to suggest  that  countries which  have 
recently escaped from central planning should move all the way back to state controls in 
agriculture at the very time of  joining the EU. For all these reasons, the preferred option 
is a rapid transition of  the CEECs to common CAP prices on accession, on a truly Single 
Market without border controls. However, this option is feasible only if CAP reform has 
been completed fully by the time of  accession, along the lines indicated above. 
7.3  The  choice  of an  approach  for  transition  also  has  implications  for  trade  with  third 
countries and  for budgetary arrangements with the new entrants.  A decision has to be 
taken whether there should be an a priori limit to net transfers to the new members.  If 
such a limit is not imposed, as in earlier rounds of  enlargement, then incentives to expand 1X 
agricultural  production  in  the  CEECs  could  be  distorted.  Potential  problems  can, 
however, be reduced if  CAP prices are sufficiently close to world market prices. 
8.1  CEEC agricultural policies for the immediate future should complement a strategy of  low 
support and protection. To improve stability on agricultural markets, the scope for action 
by  private  market  participants  should  be  widened,  for  example  by  better  price 
information, easier access to storage capacity and short term credit, and support for the 
establishment of  commodity exchanges and futures markets. 
8.2  In order to overcome liquidity problems in agriculture, it is important that rural banking 
in  the CEECs is  improved,  land registration is  speeded up and the functioning of land 
markets is strengthened. Farmers and farm workers need to have access to a reasonable 
social  safety net.  Regional  policies  can  help  to improve  employment  opportunities  in 
rural  regions.  Monitoring systems should  provide better information  on economic and 
social conditions in agriculture. 
8.3  The CEECs should  work towards the establishment of a  common agricultural  market 
amongst themselves,  which would have  a number of important  economic and  political 
advantages.  The EU could  support such a move by  allowing preferential quotas under 
the Association Agreements to be jointly utilized by all CEECs. 
9.1  The  EU  should  increase  its  financial  and  technical  assistance  to  CEEC  agriculture 
substantially. Major areas where increased EU support would be useful are improvement 
of agricultural  institutions  and  infrastructure  in  the  CEECs~  support  for  training 
programmes  for  displaced  agricultural  workers~ assistance  to  agro-business  and  food 
processing industries; help to establish the institutional and legal conditions necessary to 
implement the CAP. 
9.2  In the area of  agricultural trade, it has sometimes been suggested that the EU should no 
longer subsidize exports to the CEECs,  so  as  to avoid  a further deterioration of their 
agricultural  balance  of trade  and  price  depression  on  domestic  CEEC  agricultural 
markets. As trade data show, EU export subsidization has probably had less influence on 
rising CEEC agricultural and food imports than is sometimes assumed. It would be more 
useful for the CEECs if the EU were to reduce its subsidized exports to third country 
markets to which the CEECs export, in particular in the former Soviet Union.  The EU 
could assist the CEECs in their efforts to gain better access to those export markets by 
offering export credits and credit guarantees to the CEECs. 
9.3  Under the Association Agreements with the CEECs the EU should expand preferential 
quotas for  agricultural  and  food  products.  The implementation  of agricultural  quotas X 
under the Association Agreements could be greatly improved, such that benefits flow to 
the CEECs rather than to EU importing  companies.  Such  amendments  to the  quota 
implementation would help the CEECs without doing harm to EU farmers. 1  Introduction 
The  enlargement  of the  European  Union  (EU)  to  include  the  Central  and  Eastern 
European  countries  (CEECs)  is  perhaps  the  greatest  challenge  facing  the EU in  the  next 
decade. That it is also the most worthwhile development from both a political and an economic 
viewpoint makes the challenge even more important. Among the elements in that challenge is 
the impact that CEEC accession will have on ~xisting policies in the EU. Whe_re these pol~cies 
require adjustment to make them  compatible with the new  shape of the Union this  should 
ideally be done with foresight.  Where the acceding countries can in tum anticipate problems 
and  make  adjustments  in  the five  or more  years  before  membership  this  should  also  be 
encouraged. 
One of the sectors in  which these mutual  adjustments during the pre-accession period 
will be most needed and  have the greatest benefits is  agriculture. With adequate preparation, 
keeping in mind longer term objectives, this process can be productive. It is in the interests of 
both existing and new members to strive for a Union agricultural sector that is competitive and 
profitable  without  excessive  government  intervention  in  either  marketing  or  production 
decisions.  To achieve this requires that agricultural policies of the CEECs be put on a path 
which will lead towards this objective. I will  also mean modifications to the present Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  of the  EU.  These  mutually  consistent  adjustments  need  careful 
preparation.  The absence of foresight,  or of the will  to act  in  advance to forestall  problems, 
could seriously jeopardize the process of  integrating the CEECs back into Western Europe. 
The report submitted here is an attempt to lay out the options facing the CEECs and the 
EU as  the  issues  of agriculture  come  into  focus.  CEEC  agriculture  has  gone  through  a 
traumatic change in  the last five  years,  as  have other sectors in  the economies in  transition. 
Farmers and governments alike are searching for a foundation of stability on which to build. 
The present CAP offers high farm policies and market stability in the short run but not a high 
degree of policy certainty in the medium run.  The CAP itself has undergone an impressive but 
partial reform, moving significantly in the direction of  delinking market price management from 
farm  income  support.  Farmers in  the present EU are  also  seeking  a  stable basis  for  future 
policy, without the constant uncertainty which comes from being in the spotlight of  budget and 
trade negotiations. A viable CAP is therefore a necessary cornerstone for both the present EU 
agriculture and that of the CEECs. The options considered here are aimed at putting in place 
that cornerstone before the edifice collapses. 
The  report begins  by  discussing  reasons  for  the  decline  of agricultural  output  in  the 
CEECs since transition began, with a view to their implications for future agricultural potential 2 
in the CEECs (Chapter 2).  It then considers priorities and  constraints for future agricultural 
policies in the CEECs (Chapter 3) and  some fundamental issues related to integrating CEEC 
agriculture  with  the  EU  (Chapter  4).  Against  this  background,  alternative  options  for 
pre-accession  agricultural  support  and  trade policies  in  the  CEECs  are  discussed,  with  an 
emphasis on different approaches to price alignment with the CAP (Chapter 5). Turning to EU 
policies, the report then considers alternative options for the CAP in the pre-accession period 
(Chapter 6). Assessment of  alternative policy options for both the CEECs and the EU depends, 
among  others,  on  which  post-accession  transitional  arrangements  are  considered  feasible 
(Chapter 7). After treatment of  such policy options for the medium term, the report then makes 
a  number  of suggestions  for  policy  action  in  the  immediate  future,  for  both  the  CEECs 
(Chapter 8) and the EU (Chapter 9). 
This report, commissioned by DG I of  the European Commission, had to be drafted in a 
short  period  of time,  and  its  scope  is  therefore  limited.  It  deals  exclusively  with  the  six 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe which at this time have Association Agreements with 
the European· Union,  i.e.  Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  and  the 
Slovak Republic. 1 At  some points, the analysis is confined to the four Visegrad countries, i.e. 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and  the Slovak Republic. Because of  the limited scope 
of  the study, differences among the individual CEECs were taken less into account than would 
have  been  desirable.  No  firm  assumption  is  made  concerning  the  exact  date  at  which  the 
CEECs  could  accede to  the  Union,  though  the  implicit  assumption  is  that accession  could 
occur within the coming ten years.  Also,  it  is  not  assumed that all  CEECs would necessarily 
join the Union at the same time.  The report concentrates on policy adjustments which may be 
made, or should be made, before accession takes place. 
1  In this report, the tenn "the CEECs" refers to these six countries. 3 
2  Agriculture in the CEECs: Issues and Prospects 
2.1  The Importance of CEEC Agriculture 
The countries in Central and Eastern Europe differ widely in nearly all  aspects of their 
historical,  cultural,  political,  economic and  social  situation.  For example,  in terms of basic 
economic indicators such as GDP, or more generally standard of  living, they occupy different 
positions  in  the  continuum  between  less  developed  and  industrialized  economies.  While 
Romania's GDP per caput is similar to that of  middle-income developing countries, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary enjoy incomes closer to those of  the poorer EU member states. It is for 
such reasons that few general statements can be made, with any degree of  accuracy, about the 
s~tuation in "the" CEECs. Equally it would be misleading to treat agriculture in "the" CEECs as 
if there  were  no  fundamental  differences  between  individual  countries  regarding  natural 
conditions,  yield  levels,  output  composition,  ownership  patterns,  factor  prices,  institutional 
framework,  policy  instruments,  and  all  the  other  structural  factors  which  characterize  the 
situation  of agriculture  in  a  given  country.  However,  in  spite  of this  highly  differentiated 
situation,  there  are  some  features  which  agricultural  conditions  in  most  CEECs  have  in 
common.  These have mainly to do  with the effects which  past agricultural  policies under the 
centrally  planned  system  have  had,  and  with  developments  which  have  taken,  and  are  still 
taking, place during the process of  transition. 
One of these features is the fact that agriculture in the CEECs was,  and to some extent 
still is, large relative to other sectors in the economy. As can be seen from Table 2.1, the share 
of agriculture in both GDP and employment is much higher than on average in the EU-12. In 
part this is related to the level of  economic development, as is clear from comparing the EU  -12 
average with the member states at the lower end of the GDP scale in the EU. However, there 
may also be an element of policy induced overexpansion of agriculture in the CEECs, related 
to the particular role which agriculture was made to play under the centrally planned system to 
provide abundant supplies to meet local needs. This policy induced feature may be particularly 
apparent in the high share of agriculture in overall employment. To the extent that there was 
indeed overexpansion of  agriculture in the past, the CEECs are likely to see a "natural" decline 
of the relative importance of their agricultural  sectors in  future,  in  particular a reduction  in 
employment  opportunities  in  agriculture.  Some  part  of the  difficult  and  painful  process  of 
structural adjustment from which CEEC agriculture is  now suffering may be due to precisely 
this  factor.  This  has  important implications  for  future  policies,  as  will  be  discussed  below. 
However, independent of  future trends, the fact that agriculture is still such an important sector 4 
in the CEECs makes it important to think very carefully about the role of  agriculture within the 
overall  society  and  economy  in  Central  Europe  when  it  comes  to  preparing  for  CEEC 
accession to the EU. 
Table 2.1:  Share of  Agriculture in Total GDP and Employment, 1991 
Share of  agriculture in 
GDP  Employment 
Bulgaria  15.0%  19.0% 
Czech Republic  7.4%  8.2% 
Hungary  9.9%  15.8% 
Poland  6.2%  27.3% 
Romania  19.0%  28.9% 
Slovak Republic  6.6%  11.0% 
EU-12  2.8 °/o  6.2% 
Portugal  4.7%  17.5% 
Greece  16.1%  21.5% 
Ireland  8.1%  13.8% 
Source: Jackson and S\\'lnnen (1994) for CEEC~  European Comnuss10n (1993) for the EU. 
CEEC agriculture is large not only relative to other sectors in CEEC economies, it is also 
large relative to agriculture in the EU-12.  As shown in Table 2.2, depending on the indicator 
chosen, the size of CEEC agriculture is roughly one third of the size of EU-12 agriculture. In 
other words, if  all six CEECs were to join the Union now, the importance of  agricultural issues 
would increase substantially.  On the other hand,  given the still  low level of overall income in 
the CEECs, the size of  the overall economy of  the EU would grow by only slightly more than 
three per cent if the six CEECs were to join the Union now.  Hence, when they accede to the 
Union, the CEECs enlarge EU agriculture much more than they enlarge the overall economy in 
the EU. A very obvious implication is that in the EU the agricultural consequences of  Eastern 
enlargement require priority consideration. 
2.2  Transition Problems 
However,  any  debate  about  the  future  of agriculture  in  the  CEECs  is  enonnously 
complicated by  the fundamental  changes through which CEEC agriculture is  going since the 
beginning  of the  transition  process.  Of course,  change  is  taking  place  everywhere  in  the 
CEECs.  Yet,  it  may  appear  on the  surface that  agriculture  is  one  of those  sectors  where 5 
adjustments are particularly severe in the process of  transformation, and that this is the case in 
essentially all CEECs. One of  the many indications of  this fundamental process of  adjustment in 
CEEC agriculture is the pronounced decline of agricultural output which has occurred in  all 
CEECs, as illustrated in  Graph 2.1. The drop in  output has varied among different products, 
but has generally been most pronounced for livestock products.1 
Table 2.2:  The Size of  Agriculture in the Six CEECs Relative to the EU-12, 1993 
.. 
Indicator  CEEC-6 as per cent of 
EU-12 
Arable land  37.6% 
Employment  112.2% 
Cereals production  37.2% 
Pork production  31.0% 
Milk production  23.0 o/o 
Beef  production  15.4% 
Overall GDP  3.5 o/o 
.  . 
Sources:  OECD (1994c); Zl\.1P (1994); European Conuruss10n (1993) . 
At the same time, exports of agricultural and food products have decreased, and imports 
have  increased.  To some  extent  this  was  a  corollary  of the  decline  in  agricultural  output, 
though domestic consumption of agricultural products has also  declined  during transition.  In 
any case, weak export performance and rising imports have tended to result in a worsening of 
the balance of  trade in agricultural and food products in most of  the CEECs (see Graph 2.2). 
1  The reasons for the more pronounced decline of livestock production are discussed by Jackson and Swinnen 
(1994), pp. 57ff. 6 
Graph 2.1:  Gross Agricultural Output in the CEECs During Transition 
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Graph 2.2:  Trade Balance (Export Value minus Import Value) in Agricultural 
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This study cannot provide a detailed analysis of  the many factors which have been behind 
the downturn in  agricultural production in  the transition economies.  2 However,  some of the 
more important elements of the adjustment process going on in  CEEC agriculture must  be 
mentioned in order to prepare the ground for a discussion of prospects for the future,  and of 
the policies which may  help  to prepare for  accession to the EU by the CEECs.  The major 
factors  to  be  considered  here  can  be grouped  in  the five  categories  of privatization  and 
restructuring; decreasing agricultural policy support; decline in market demand for agricultural 
products;  difficulties  in  upstream  and  downstream  sectors;  and  problems  with  financing 
agricultural activities. In addition, weather played a role. 
The structure of  agriculture has differed widely among the CEECs, with respect to farm 
sizes, property rights, management organization, and division of labour among different types 
of farms.  As  a result of these different starting conditions, but also  due to different political 
priorities in  the transition  process,  privatization and  restructuring  have  been  pursued  along 
different lines  in  the individual  CEECs.  For example,  because most of agriculture had  never 
been  collectivized  in  Poland,  privatization  and  restructuring  means  something  completely 
different  in  Polish  agriculture from  what  it  means  in  Romania where  essentially  no  private 
agriculture had remained after collectivization. As another example, physical restitution of  land 
to previous owners in Bulgaria is a process very much different from the Hungarian approach 
of auctioning  land  to,  among  others,  holders  of coupons  denominated  in  traditional  gold 
crowns. However, in spite of  the rather different approaches to privatization and restructuring 
adopted,  the  process  of fundamental  structural  change  has,  wherever  it  occurred,  made  it 
difficult  if not  impossible  to  continue  production  along  traditional  lines.  Farms  have  been 
physically split; boundaries of  fields were redrawn; acreage traditionally used to produce feed 
has been separated from livestock herds; barns could not easily be subdivided when land was 
returned to previous owners; farm  assets were sold  or distributed;  old  farm  managers  were 
sacked and  new ones did  not always have the same knowledge and experience; on the other 
hand, where farm managers from the old period continued to operate the farm,  they were not 
always  prepared  to  cooperate friendly  with  the  new  owners;  ownership  of land  and  assets 
remained unclear in many cases; members of collectives needed to find  agreement on how to 
proceed; etc.  . It cannot come as a surprise that output should decline in an agricultural sector 
which has to undergo so far reaching structural change, involving so many uncertainties. 
At the same time, governments of  countries in Central Europe were persuaded to reduce 
agricultural  support  and  protection  drastically,  as  part  of their  efforts  to  achieve  macro-
2  For a more detailed discussion of the fundamental  changes going on in agriculture during the transition 
process and in particular of the reasons for  the decline  in  agricultural  output see  Jackson  and  Swinnen 
(1994) and the references cited there. 8 
economic  stabilization.  For example,  as  an  aggregate  measure  of government  support  to 
agriculture, the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) in Hungary's agriculture had been 34 per 
cent ofthe value of  agricultural production in 1988, and was reduced to 8 per cent in 1992.3 In 
Poland, the PSE declined from  24 in  1988  to 16 in  1993.4  With this  decline in  government 
support, incentives to produce weakened. 
Structural change and declining government support were accompanied by a dramatic 
drop in demand for agricultural products in the CEECs. Domestic food consumers were hit by 
rising  food  prices  as  governments eliminated  the  huge food  subsidies  which  used  to be  a 
general feature of policies in  the CEECs.  At the same time,  cuts in  other subsidies,  overall 
inflation and rising unemployment reduced real consumer incomes in general, and added to the 
drop in food demand.  Moreover, new consumer products became available on markets in the 
CEECs, and  attracted consumer expenditure, away from food  expenditure. In  some cases, it 
became a fashion to consume processed foods from Western Europe, rather than domestically 
produced  foods.  On  top  of this  decline  in  domestic  demand  came  the  breakdown  of the 
CJ\1EA, and the resulting drop in agricultural exports to other countries in Eastern Europe, and 
in  particular  to  the  fonner  Soviet  Union.  This  large  decline  in  both  domestic  and  export 
demand for agricultural products in the CEECs added to the reduction in government support, 
and resulted in a pronounced downturn of agricultural producer prices, relative to other prices 
in the CEEC economies (see Graph 2.3).  There is  no doubt that this decline in  real  producer 
prices  exerted  significant  economic  pressure  on  CEEC  agriculture,  and  discouraged 
production. 
Moreover,  a  number  of economic  difficulties  in  upstream  and  downstream  industries 
around agriculture added to the problems faced by farmers in the CEECs. In the past, many of 
these industries had been allowed to operate at low levels of  efficiency, and to produce inferior 
qualities.  Under soft budget constraints (i.e.  government coverage for financial  losses),  there 
was not much of  an incentive to avoid technical and economic inefficiencies. Marketing efforts 
were not really  required  of food  industries  operating essentially like state agencies,  often in 
monopoly structures.  Outdated equipment and lack of concern for consumer preferences got 
into the way of producing better qualities.  When privatization and  restructuring of the input 
and food industries began, efficiency, market orientation and quality could not be expected to 
improve overnight. Indeed, this process is far from  over. Though progress differs significantly 
among the CEECs, privatization of  the food and input industries is far from being c.omplete. 
J 
3  OECD (1994a), p.  192. 
4  OECD (1994b),  Annex 1, p. 70. 9 
Graph 2.3:  Real Producer Prices•> in CEEC Agriculture 
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In  many  cases,  "privatization"  has  so  far  meant  to  change  the  legal  status  of the 
companies  concerned  (e.g.  to joint stock format),  but not yet  to  sell  the  shares  to  private 
owners.  In  some  cases,  public  monopolies  have  been  turned  into  private  monopolies. 
Improvement of  technical efficiency and product quality often requires new investments, which 
is difficult to finance in a fragile market situation. All this is not to say that remarkable progress 
has not been made anywhere.  In some cases, successful enterprises have been created, which 
begin  to  operate  competitively  even  on  international  markets.  In  many  instances,  foreign 
investors have entered the food and input industries, bringing all  their know how, technology 
and capital. However, on aggregate the food and agricultural input industry in the CEECs still 
needs time to become competitive by international comparison. Until that time, processing and 
marketing margins in the food industry of  the CEECs are higher than in Western countries, and 
qualities  produced  have  difficulties  competing  successfully.  As  a  result,  prices  received  by 
farmers  are less than what they could be.  At the same time,  input industries working below 
optimal efficiency charge farmers more than necessary in the long run.  As another element of 
the  upstream  and  downstream  sector,  market  infrastructure,  market  institutions,  price 
information etc.  are still  far from  being fully  developed,  and this adds to farmers'  difficulties 
with selling their products at attractive prices. 
Finally, agricultural credit and finance is still a serious bottleneck in the CEECs. To some 
extent the credit problem is  a generic feature in  economies with high  rates of inflation,  with 10 
governments  hard-pressed  to engage  in  macro-economic  stabilization,  and  with  a  banking 
system which lacks the traditions, experiences, managerial capacities and infrastructure existing 
in market economies. In agriculture, however, these difficulties are reinforced by at least two 
additional factors.  With privatization not yet completed and serious administrative difficulties 
in  land registration and issuing titles, there are still  uncertainties regarding property rights in 
agriculture. New land owners often have difficulties proving their ownership, and land markets 
are only beginning to emerge. As a consequence in many cases collateral cannot effectively be 
used to underpin  credit in  agriculture.  Moreover,  with  many  new small  farms  coming into 
existence, the old infrastructure of banks is  often insufficient to deal with this new clientele. 
These specific difficulties in agriculture combine to make banks often reluctant to engage more 
thoroughly in giving credit to farmers. The result is a serious shortage of  finance in agriculture, 
such that farmers find it difficult to finance current inputs and investments. 
In addition to these transition factors, recent changes in agricultural output of  the CEECs 
have  been  affected  by  weather.  1992  was  a  drought  year  for  most  CEECs,  and  crop 
production, in particular output of cereals, has been below "normal" levels.  In  1993  (and also 
in 1994), Hungary and the Slovak Republic have again suffered from a serious drought. 
Given all  these difficulties in  CEEC agriculture it  cannot come as a surprise that there 
was a significant decline in agricultural output since the transition process began. Also,  as the 
process of  transformation is far from being completed, there are more difficulties ahead, and it 
is  not inconceivable that  output of some  agricultural  products in  some  of the  CEECs may 
further decline for some time. For an analysis of  the implications of  future accession to the EU, 
however, one important question is whether the new lower level of agricultural activity in the 
CEECs is likely to be typical of the agricultural potential in  the CEECs or whether there is a 
probability that output may increase again. If  the CEECs should turn out not to have dynamic 
agricultural  sectors  with  potential  for  substantial  growth  of output,  then  the  agricultural 
implications of  eastern enlargement of  the EU would be much less dramatic. 
2.3  Potential for Growth 
In order to get a better impression of  the future agricultural potential of  the CEECs it  is 
useful  to make an  attempt at  interpreting the recent  decline  of agricultural  output in  these 
countries, trying to. understand whether the factors which may explain that decline are likely to 
be  permanent  or transitory.  However,  before  asking  that  question  it  is  necessary  to  put 
developments in agriculture in perspective by comparing them to what has happened in the rest 
of CEEC economies.  After all,  transition has  affected  all  sectors severely,  and  fundamental 
changes are going on everywhere in  the CEECs. As a result of the adjustments taking place, II 
and in the new macro-economic climate which characterizes the CEECs, output has dropped in 
essentially all sectors of  the CEECs. 
Surprising as  it  may  be given the large  decline  in  agricultural  output,  agriculture  has 
fared relatively well in this process.  In  particular, industrial output has fallen  even more than 
output in  agriculture,  in  most of the CEECs.  As shown in  Graph  2.4,  from  I989 to  1993 
agricultural output rose relative to industrial output in all  six CEECs, with the exception of 
Hungary in  I993. Indeed, in  some cases relative agricultural output is  now fifty  per cent or 
more above what it used to be. From this perspective it appears that agriculture in the C~ECs 
has  proven  a  remarkably  robust  sector,  buffering  the  forces  of fundamental  change more 
successfully  than  industry.  This  relative  success  in  agriculture  can  be  interpreted  as  an 
indication  of strength  and  stability  in  CEEC  agriculture,  providing  a  good base for  future 
recovery. 
Moreover, because of  the possibility of statistical errors in both the pre-transition period 
(when  output was probably  over-reported)  and  the  post-transition  period  (where  output  is 
probably under-reported), the absolute decline of agricultural output may in reality have been 
less  than  official  statistics  suggest. 5  Of course,  such  statistical  errors  are  likely  to  affect 
reported industrial production as well, and it is probably impossible at this time to say whether 
the relative performance of  agriculture in comparison with, say, industrial output was better or 
worse than  official  statistics suggest.  In  any  case,  developments in  CEEC agriculture during 
transition have probably been less  dramatic than the absolute decline in  recorded agricultural 
output would suggest. 
Factors behind  recent  CEEC  agricultural  developments  which  are clearly transitory in 
nature  are  those  directly  related  to  changes  in  the  structure  of enterprises  resulting  from 
transition to a private market economy. Privatization and restructuring, both in agriculture and 
in  the upstream and downstream sectors, will  at  some stage be completed. It will take some 
time  until  this  is  achieved,  and  the  speed  of this  process  will  differ  significantly  among 
individual CEECs. It is  difficult to make any projections of the time it will  take to complete 
transition in any individual country, not the least because the political process behind transition 
is far from linear. However, at some stage the dust of  transition will settle, and a privatized and 
restructured  agricultural  sector  and  agro-industry  will  have  emerged.  With  new  enterprise 
structures,  with  enhanced  human  capital  among  the  new  entrepreneurs,  and  with  a  more 
productive physical  capital  stock there is  a  real  chance that output will  be higher,  product 
qualities  will  be  better  and  marketing  will  be  more  successful.  Western  countries,  and  in 
5  See the enlightening discussion of this issue in Jackson and Swinnen (1994). 12 
particular the EU can do a lot, and probably more than is already being done, to speed up this 
process. 
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At the same time,  as ownership patterns become clearer in  agriculture and  as  property 
rights are settled and clearly documented, incentives to engage more effectively in  agricultural· 
activities, to improve production technologies and to make investments will  strengthen.  Also, 
with  better  defined,  documented  and  enforceable  property  rights  there  are  improved 
opportunities for financing agricultural activities and investments. In parallel with this process, 
the structure of  the banking sector will improve, and  rural credit will  be more easily available. 
Lower rates of  inflation and a more secure macro-economic climate will make it easier to take 
investment decisions.  An  improved marketing infrastructure,  better market transparency and 
more easily accessible market information will make it easier to gear agricultural production to 
market conditions.  This will eliminate some of the need to invest activities into unproductive 
search procedures on not yet fully functioning markets. With better product qualities and more 
experience in  marketing, the food industry in the CEECs will  be better able to compete with 
imports, and be more successful on export markets.  At the same time, improved efficiency in 
upstream and downstream industries will allow for lower marketing and processing margins in 
these sectors, and some resulting economic gains will materialize in the form of  better sectoral 
terms of  trade for farmers in the CEECs. 13 
How market demand for CEEC agricultural output will develop is less clear. The decline 
m  domestic  food  consumption  which  occurred  during  transition  may  tum  out  to  be  a 
permanent feature.  Food consumption in the CEECs prior to transition was high  relative to 
food consumption in Western countries at comparable levels of living standards. Clearly, with 
rising consumer incomes there will again be some growth in food consumption. However, this 
demand growth may concentrate on products which are not primarily produced in the CEECs, 
such as tropical fruit and beverages, and highest quality dairy products. Moreover, the change 
in price relativities resulting from de-subsidization in the food sector is likely to be permanent, 
leaving  prices  of livestock  products  high  relative  to  those  of food· products  based  on 
crops.  6Hence there may  be only  limited  growth of domestic demand  in  the CEECs.  Future 
demand on export markets may be equally limited. Agricultural trade among the CEECs will be 
constrained as long as tariff barriers among them remain as high as they are currently. Exports 
to countries of the former  Soviet Union have already begun to recover somewhat, and what 
used to be mainly  barter trade immediately  after the breakdown of the CMEA is  gradually 
being  transacted  in  convertible  currencies  again.  However,  given  the  massive  economic 
difficulties in nearly all of  the CIS, prospects for agricultural exports to that region may not be 
very promising for some time to come.  Potential1y attractive markets for agricultural exports 
from  the CEECs exist  in  the EU.  The  extent to which  the CEECs will  find  these  markets 
accessible depends entirely on future EU trade policies under the Europe Agreements, and on 
the CAP in general. Some major issues in this area will be discussed below. 
A factor which,  at least at first  glance,  appears permanent, rather than transitory, is the 
massive  decline  in  agricultural  support  which  occurred  during  transition  in  the  CEECs. 
However, even in this regard the situation is less clear-cut than some analyses would suggest, 
for  at  least  two reasons.  First,  it  is  not  really  clear to  what  extent  agriculture  was  indeed 
subsidized  under  the  old  regime,  and  hence  whether  the  apparent  decline  in  government 
support to CEEC agriculture during transition was really as pronounced as sometimes stated. 
The major empirical basis on which it has been argued that agriculture was supported before 
transition,  and  is  much  less  supported  now,  are  estimates  of producer  subsidy  equivalents 
(PSEs) for  the CEECs which have  been  produced by  various institutions.  These estimates, 
carefully  as  they  may  have  been  made,  are  potentially  subject  to  various  methodological 
problems when applied to non-market economies,  and their results must therefore interpreted 
with much caution.  7 Second, after the rather low levels of agricultural support  an~ protection 
to which the CEECs have moved  at the beginning of the transition process, higher levels of 
import protection  and  an  increasing  number of domestic  support measures  have  later been 
6  See Jackson and Swinnen (1994), pp. 43 ff. 
7  See Jackson and Swinnen (1994),  pp. 51 ff, and Tangermann (1993b). 14 
introduced at least in the Visegrad countries, and most recent developments indicated that this 
process has not yet come to a halt. 8 
How the process of agricultural policy making in  the CEECs may evolve in the future 
will be one of  the main topics for the rest of  this study. Expectations regarding accession to the 
EU, and preparations for adopting the CAP after accession, will  be among the major driving 
forces  in  this  process.  Whether  agricultural  policies  in  the  CEECs  will  eventually  be 
characterized by high support and tight protection, or whether agriculture in the CEECs will 
continue to operate under moderate levels of  support and protection will not the least depend 
on the signals the EU sends to the CEECs. These signals will therefore also determine the rates 
of  future output growth in CEEC agriculture. 
In  spite of all  the difficulties faced  by agriculture in the CEECs,  and partly because of 
these current difficulties, there is reason to believe that the CEECs have a good potential for 
agricultural growth. The decline in  CEEC agricultural output during transition,  to the extent 
that it has really occurred, can well be explained by the dramatic turbulence through which the 
CEECs have endured in the last five years.  This turbulence has shaken the foundations of the 
production system during the early stages of  transition, and it is still far from being over. What 
is surprising is not so much the decline in agricultural production which may have taken place 
in  this  period,  but  the  fact  that  this  decline  was  not  even  more  pronounced.  Relative  to 
industrial production in the CEECs, agriculture has done remarkable well,  and compared with 
what  might  have  happened  in  the  more  sophisticated  and  therefore  possibly  less  robust 
agricultural systems of Western countries under a similar stress,  CEEC agriculture has so  far 
proven rather strong.  Once more stable conditions can be created,  both institutionally in  the 
agricultural sector and economically in the rest of  the economy, there is a potential for growing 
levels of production in  CEEC agriculture.  This is  not to say  that assistance is  not needed  in 
CEEC agriculture. There is certainly a lot that can be done to make it easier for farmers in the 
CEECs to use their productive potential.  However,  once that potential is  better used,  much 
care must be devoted to finding  a proper answer to the question of how much support and 
protection should be granted to CEEC agriculture.  This question is important for the CEECs 
from  their  own  domestic  perspective.  However,  it  is  also  extremely  important  from  the 
perspective of finding  an  appropriate balance between Eastern and Western Europe when it 
comes to integrating the CEEC agriculture with that of  the EU. 
8  See for example OECD (1994c) and Munch (1994). 15 
3  Priorities and Constraints for Agricultural Policies in the CEECs 
Given all  the stress which agriculture in the CEECs has had to survive since transition 
began,  and  in  view of the  economic difficulties  farmers  in  the  CEECs are  still  facing  it  is 
tempting to argue that one of  the major tasks for agricultural policies in the CEECs is now to 
provide some stability and support for agriculture,  and to make sure that low-price imports 
which other countries have dumped on the world market cannot make life even more difficult 
for domestic farmers.  Indeed, this is what agricultural policies in  some CEECs have begun-to 
do, in particular in the Visegrad countries. 
Levels of  support and protection in agriculture now differ noticeably among the CEECs. 
On average,  agricultural support in  the CEECs is  still  low compared with the EU and many 
other Western countries.  However,  it  has been  on  the increase  in  recent years,  after it  had 
generally been rather low at the beginning of the transformation process. There are significant 
pressures on governments in  the CEECs,  stemming from their agricultural constituencies, to 
raise the level of protection and  support.  As  in  other couQtries,  CEEC governments do not 
always find  it  easy to resist these pressures, and they have repeatedly given in to them.  This 
process has started as early as  1991  (with the introduction, e.g., of higher tariffs in  Poland). 
More recently,  market  regimes  have been  institutionalized for  some agricultural  products in 
some CEECs, and  it has frequently  been observed that  some CEECs are about to introduce 
"CAP-like" policies. This process is still continuing. Instances of  most recent increases in levels 
of  protection are the introduction of extra import levies (somewhat misleadingly referred to as 
"countervailing duties") on a number of agricultural products in Poland in  summer 1994, and 
the significant  increase  in  import  duties  on  279  agricultural  and  food  items  in  Hungary on 
November 1,  1994.9 
As a result of  this process of  raising support and protection in agriculture, some CEECs 
now have a more or less  comprehensive system of agricultural  market and  trade policies in 
place.  This is particularly true for the Visegrad countries. For core agricultural products they 
all have some form of  more or less rigid price guarantees, generally implemented through some 
variant of  intervention buying. For a surprisingly large number of  agricultural products there is 
now  the  possibility,  occasionally  used  in  practice,  to  grant  export  subsidies.  Tariffs  on 
agricultural imports have generally been raised in  recent years,  and have in  some cases been 
9  These new higher tariffs introduced by Hungary, on items where tariffs were previously not yet bound in the 
GATT,  are  identical  to  those  which  Hungary  has  bound  under  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on 
Agriculture. In other words, rather than introducing these tariffs on January  1,  1995 (the beginning of the 
implementation  period  under  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement),  Hungary  has  brought the  introduction  of 
these tariffs forward by two months. 16 
complemented by additional charges which in part can be, and have been, varied over time so 
as to allow defence of  a given level of  domestic market prices even if  world prices fluctuate. 
In this situation there is,  at least for the Visegrad countries, no need to argue that these 
countries should now begin to establish some form of  market price stabilization. 10  This has 
already happened. Moreover, the level of price support granted in the Visegrad countries is 
such that it already exceeds the level  recommended  by some authors,  based  on what they 
believe are "hard core" production costs.tl As can be seen from Table 3.1, intervention prices 
(or their equivalents, i.e.  some form of more or less rigid price guarantee) for wheat in ~he 
Visegrad countries, while being below the EU level, are generally around the level of 100 US $ 
per ton, except in the case of  Hungary where they are in the order of  magnitude of90 US$ per 
ton.12 
Wheat  is  not  the  only  product  where  price  stabilization  already  takes  place  in  the 
Visegrad  countries.  As  summarized  in  Table  3  .2,  various  major  agricultural  products  are 
covered  by  some form  of domestic  market  interventions and  trade policies  in  the Visegrad 
countries,  all  of which are intended  to stabilize,  if not support,  domestic  market prices  and 
protect domestic producers against foreign competition. 13 
10  This is the main argument behind the recommendations ofNallet and van Stol.k (1994). 
11  Nallet and van Stol.k (1994) suggest that "hard core" costs of cereal production in the CEECs are 75  to 85 
US S per ton (p.  13), and use a figure of 85  US  S per ton in their illustrative example of a price support 
system for cereals in the CEECs. No sources are given for this estimate, nor is reference made to the well 
know difficulties of  estimating production costs. 
12  "Intervention prices" as  given in this table are not strictly comparable across countries,  for a number of 
reasons.  For  example,  in  Hungary  the  "guaranteed"  price  is  guaranteed  only  for  a  given  maximum 
production per fann (2.4 tons per hectare).  Also,  while the intervention price in the EU is granted at the 
wholesale level, "intervention prices" in the Visegrad countries are generally "guaranteed" at the fann gate 
level. 
13  By  necessity, the extremely abbreviated summary of agricultural market and trade policies pursued in the 
Visegrad countries presented in this table misses many details, and uses expressions which are not always a 
good description of the actual policy implementation. For example, the term "intervention buying" does not 
really mean the same thing in the CEECs as it means in the EU. Table 3.1: 
Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
EU 
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Intervention Prices (or their Equivalents) for Wheat in the Visegrad 
Countries and the EU 
Intervention Price in US $ per ton 
1992/93  1993/94  1994/95 
104  100  108 
104  n.a.  n.a. 
- 84  86 
99  108  107 
256  166  158 
World Market Price (fo.b. Hungary)  104  n.a.  n.a. 
Sources:  OECD (1994a and  1994c)~ East Europe Agriculture and Food, var.  issues~ Mlinch (1994), IMF, var. 
issues. 
The situation is  different in  Bulgaria and  Romania,  where prices of many  agricultural 
products are still very low. In these two countries, there are still export restrictions in place for 
some products, such that domestic market prices are kept below the international market level. 
Given  this  situation,  the issue is  not  whether the Visegrad  countries  should  introduce 
some form of  price stabilization, but rather how they should manage their existing market and 
trade policies in the future, and whether they should continue to raise the level of support and 
protection in agriculture as they have done in recent years. To some extent one can understand 
the  political  pressures  that  are  being  brought  to  bear on  agricultural  policy  makers  in  the 
CEECs, and also the way in which they have responded to these pressures. However, it would 
be  good to have  an  idea of the  extent  to which  the more  recent  adjustments  which  some 
CEECs have  made to their agricultural  policies  are  based  on a longer run  strategy.  Such  a 
strategy should be based on a clear view of  the priorities for future economic developments in 
the countries concerned, and it has to take account of  the constraints under which agricultural 
policies can be pursued. 18 
Table 3.2:  Nature of  Domestic Market Intenrentions and Trade Policies for 
Selected Agricultural Products in the Visegrad Countries, 1993-94 
Product  Policies  Poland  Hungary 
Wheat  domestic  intervention buying at  intervention buying at 
measures  predetermined prices  predetermined prices, 
limited quantity per ha 
trade  ad valorem tariff,  ad valorem tariff, 
measures  occasionally adjusted, de  restrictive export 
facto export subsidies  licensing, export subsidies 
a) 
Coarse  domestic  intervention buying at  intervention buying at 
grains  measures  predetermined prices (rye)  predetermined prices, 
limited quantity per ha 
(com) 
trade  ad valorem tariff  ad  valorem tariff, 
measures  occasional adjusted, de  restrictive export 
facto export subsidies  licensing, export subsidies 
a) 
Oil seeds  domestic  intervention buying 
measures 
trade  ad valorem tariff,  ad valorem tariff, 
measures  occasionally adjusted  restrictive e:xllort 
licensing, e:x,ort subsidies 
Sugar  domestic  intervention buying at  intervention buying 
measures  predetermined prices 
trade  ad valorem tariff,  ad valorem tariff, export 
measures  minimum import price,  subsidies 
export subsidies 
Milk  domestic  guaranteed minimum  guaranteed minimum 
measures  price at farrngate level,  prices at farrngate level, 
intervention buying at  intervention buying at 
predetermined prices of  predetermined prices of 
butter and skimmed milk  butter and skimmed milk 
powder  powder 
trade  ad valorem tariffs for  ad valorem tariffs for 
measures  dairy products, import  daii)' products. restrictive 
licensing of  butter,  import licensing for daii)' 
minimum import price of  products, export subsidies 
butter and skimmed milk 
powder, de facto e>."POrt 
subsidies (butter) 
Beef  domestic  - occasional intervention 
measures  buying at predetermined 
prices 
trade  ad valorem tariff  ad valorem tariff, 
measures  restrictive export 
licensing, e:xllort subsidies 
Pork  domestic  occasionally intervention  occasional intervention 
measures  buying  buying at predetermined 
prices 
trade  ad valorem tariff,  ad valorem tariff, 
measures  occasionally adjusted  restrictive export 
licensing, export subsidies 
a)  ..  Export subsidies can be granted, though this has not yet happened 
Source: Mtinch (  1994) 
Czech Republic 
intervention buying at 
predetermined prices 
ad valorem tariff, export 
subsidies 
-
ad valorem tariff 
-
ad valorem tariff plus 
specific tariff, 
occasionally adjusted 
intervention buying at 
predetermined prices 
ad valorem tariff , e>."POrt 
subsidies 
guaranteed minimum 
price at farmgate level, 
intervention buying at 
predetermined prices of 
butter, whole and 
skimmed milk powder, 
some cheeses and casein 
ad valorem tariffs. for 
butter plus specific tariff. 
occasionally adjusted, 
export subsidies 
intervention buying at 
predetermined prices 
ad valorem tariffs plus 
specific tariff, 
occasionally adjusted, 
export subsidies 
occasional intervention 
buying at predetermined 
prices 
ad valorem la!ifi', export 
subsidies 19 
An important consideration in this context regards the position which agriculture should 
be given in the overall economy and society. Policy support for any individual sector requires 
resources which have to be earned somewhere in the economy. This insight is well founded in 
economic  theory  and  empirical  research,  and  there  is  now  a  large  and  growing  body  of 
evidence,  resulting  from  general  equilibrium  analysis,  which  clearly  demonstrates  these 
economic  linkages  across  sectors.  If one  particular  sector  is  granted  more  than  average 
support, this necessarily imposes an economic burden on other parts of  the economy. 
There can be a number of  reasons why specific policy support to individual sectors may 
be justified. In particular, if  it should be the case that agriculture suffers more during transition 
than other  se~ors in  the economy,  then there may  be a  reason to argue that support for 
agriculture is justified. For example, if structural changes during transition are more severe in 
agriculture than  on average  in  the rest of the economy,  then  it  may  be necessary to help 
agriculture to create a healthier base for future economic success, allowing fanners to compete 
on an equal footing with other sectors of  the economy once the dust of  transition has settled. 
However, it is doubtful whether there is a good empirical base for this argument in the CEECs. 
As  shown above (Chapter 2),  agriculture  in  the CEECs,  in  spite of all  the difficulties  it  is 
facing, has suffered less of a decline in  output than industry.  Against this background one has 
to  consider  that  any  above  average  support  granted  to  agriculture  makes  recovery  more 
difficult for the rest of  the economy. 
Looked at from another perspective one could ask whether agriculture in the CEECs is 
likely  to  have  a  comparative  advantage,  and  whether  there  is  reason  to  believe  that 
governments need to assist fanners in  their efforts to make effective use of that comparative 
advantage.  Some of the  views  advanced  in  Chapter  2  above  may  appear  to  suggest  that 
agriculture in the CEECs has a potential comparative advantage. In particular, the expectation, 
expressed above, that there is a good potential for a growing agricultural output in the CEECs 
could be interpreted as suggesting that agriculture can develop into a particularly successful 
sector in the CEECs. However, this interpretation is  not really warranted. There may well be 
reason to believe that there is potential for an  absolute increase of agricultural output in  the 
CEECs, but this does not necessarily say that agriculture has a comparative advantage over 
other sectors of the economy.  As  a  matter of fact,  at this  stage it  is  extremely difficult  to 
analyze the comparative advantage of  individual sectors in the CEECs empirically. As a result 
of the  structural  changes  going  on,  productivity  is  changing  in  all  sectors  of the  CEEC 
economies, and it is hard to say by how much they are likely to change in which sectors. Once 
transition is completed the picture will become much clearer, but until that time any forecast of 
comparative advantages for individual sectors is largely a matter of  speculation. 20 
More fundamentally, though, the question has to be asked what governments can do, if 
anything at all, in order to assist individual branches of  the economy to develop their potential 
fully.  Overall policy support to a given sector is not really the answer, and it may make things 
worse rather than better. In particular, price support and protection against competition from 
foreign  producers  is  likely  to be counterproductive  in  this  context.  Western  industrialized 
countries have  learned this  lesson the hard  way.  Price support for  agriculture and  policies 
which shield domestic farmers against competition from abroad has helped agriculture in many 
Western countries to maintain a structure which lacks international competitiveness. The result 
has been a vicious circle of low competitiveness, consequent requests for more goveriunent 
assistance to farmers, and even less competitiveness maintained in the cosy world of  domestic 
support and market protection. Only recently have governments of  western countries begun to 
recognize the fallacy of  their past agricultural policy ~pproaches, and they are now involved in 
the  painful  process  of retreating  gradually  from  misconceived  policies.  Agricultural  policy 
reforms which are now being implemented in many western countries provide ample evidence. 
The CEECs are  still  in  a position to avoid  such policy  errors.  Levels of support  and 
protection  in  these  countries  are  still  low  compared  with the policies  from  which  western 
countries are trying to evolve.  More support and  protection for farmers  in  the CEECs may 
appear to make  it  easier for  them  to get  over their  current  economic  and  financial  stress. 
However, not only would such a policy impose a burden on the rest of the economies of the 
CEECs. By delaying adjustments which anyhow cannot be avoided in the longer run,  such an 
agricultural  policy  approach  would  also  reduce  the  chances  of the  CEECs  creating  a 
competitive agricultural sector. Whatever the future political and economic context may  be in 
which  CEEC  agriculture  has  to  operate,  one  of the  most  important  priorities  for  CEEC 
agricultural policies should be to gain, retain and improve competitiveness in agriculture, both 
vis-a-vis farmers in  other countries and vis-a-vis other sectors in the domestic economy.  The 
foundations for that competitiveness, or the lack of  it, are being laid during the current process 
of adjusting to the new conditions created in the transition process.  Any policy error made at 
this time is bound to have serious implications for the future. 
Another important priority for the CEECs is to develop a competitive food industry.  In 
developed western economies, the food industry is  economically much more significant than 
agriculture,  measured  in  terms  of its  contribution  to  GDP  and  employment.  Hence  in 
policy-making the food  industry  should  be  given  at  least  as  much  attention  as  agriculture, 
though this has not traditionally been the case in many countries. Moreover, a competitive food 
industry is one of  the major prerequisites for the development of a healthy agricultural sector. 
After all,  most of  what farmers produce has to go through the food industry before it reaches 
the market place.  If the  food  industry  in  a given  country is  not internationally competitive, 
farmers in that country find it difficult to compete with farmers in the rest of  the world. On the 21 
other hand, government policies geared to affecting the situation at the farm level unavoidably 
have  implications  for  the  food  industry.  High  price  support  for  farmers  makes  life  more 
difficult  for  the  food  industry.  Western  countries  have  therefore  often  felt  forced  to 
complement their agricultural policies with compensating measures for the food industry.  The 
EU's  elaborate  system  of import  levies,  export  subsidies  and  domestic  aids  for  the  food 
industry, to compensate it for high raw material costs in the EU, is a telling example. However 
sophisticated such a compensating policy system for the food industry, it is bound to result in 
distortions in that sector, making enterprises in the food industry either secondary beneficiaries 
or victims of  agricultural policy support. Governments in the CEECs may want to avoid falling 
in that same trap. 
Competitiveness, in both agriculture and agro-industry, is a policy priority with a long-
run perspective. However, there are also important concerns of a more immediately pressing 
nature in  CEEC agriculture.  Agricultural  markets in  the CEECs have occasionally exhibited 
rather wide price fluctuations,  both over time  and  across regions.  Some farms  are suffering 
from economic and financial  stress as a result of the downturn in  real producer prices during 
transition.  As  a  consequence,  real  incomes  of farmers  and  farm  workers  have  declined, 
sometimes substantially. Many agricultural enterprises in  the CEECs carry a heavy burden of 
indebtedness.  In some of the CEECs there is  high  overall  unemployment,  in  both urban and 
rural regions. In a rapidly changing institutional and economic environment, there is the threat 
that  rural  communities  may  lose  their  coherence.  There  are  cases  where  environmental 
problems have accumulated  and  where solutions to these problems have to sought urgently. 
These are only some of the more pressing immediate concerns which agricultural policies are 
facing  in the CEECs.  In a situation like that,  policy priorities can not only reflect longer run 
requirements, but they also have to take account of the need to create political and economic 
stability, to avoid social hardship and to keep social structures intact. 
While  it  is  easy  to  agree  to  such  priorities,  it  is  much  more  difficult  to  design  the 
appropriate policy responses.  There  are  two major trade-offs which  need  to be considered. 
First,  most policy measures which try to respond to an  immediately  pressing economic and 
social problem in  one particular sector of the economy and  society involve a fair  amount of 
income  redistribution  among  sectors.  For  example,  measures  designed  to  improve  social 
conditions  in  agriculture  in  the  short  run,  i.e.  not  leaving  farm  income  improvements  to 
originate from higher productivity in the fanning industry, tend to tackle the perceived social 
problem in agriculture at the expense of incomes in the rest of  society. It is an optical illusion 
to believe that incomes in one sector can, in the short run, be improved through policies which 22 
do not lower incomes in other sectors.l4 In order to be fully acceptable, such policies have to 
pass  the test of social  equity  across  the  whole  nation.  Second,  there  is  often  a  very  real 
trade-off between short run improvements and  longer run  problems created by  the policies 
concerned.  For example,  attempts at  improving  economic conditions in  agriculture through 
credit subsidies involve the danger that investments are made whose productivity is less than it 
could be from other uses of  capital in the economy, both in agriculture and in other sectors. As 
a result, credit subsidies run the very real danger of  reducing productivity in the longer run. 
These comments are not meant to say that there is nothing which can be done to tackle 
some of  the immediate problems. However, it is necessary to design such policies with a clear 
view of the overall  and  the longer run  priorities for the CEECs.  Typically this means that 
optimal  policies  meant  to  respond  to  immediately  pressing  problems  should  not  include 
measures which interfere heavily with market forces.  Moreover, it is advisable to make these 
policies consistent with the longer run orientation of market and trade policies for agriculture 
in the CEECs. It is for these reasons that the next few Chapters of  this study will concentrate 
on agricultural market and trade policies in the CEECs, having their longer run aim of  acceding 
to the EU in  mind.  Policies for the more immediate future will be discussed later (in Chapter 
8). 
With all  these priorities for future agricultural policies in the CEECs in  mind,  what are 
some of the major constraints under which  these policies must be pursued? To some extent 
these  constraints  result  from  the  priorities  for  other  sectors of the  CEEC  economies.  One 
important consideration in this regard is the burden which food  consumers have to bear.  Food 
consumption still  makes up  for a relatively  large share of total  consumer expenditure in  the 
CEECs, for the average consumer one quarter in Hungary, around one third in Bulgaria, the 
Czech  Republic  and  Poland,  and  as  much  as  58  per  cent  in  Romania. 15  For low  income 
consumers,  the  shares  are  substantially  higher.  For example,  households  of pensioners  in 
Poland are spending more than 60 per cent of  their incomes on food consumption. 16 With such 
high shares of consumer expenditure going to food,  and with serious social  problems among 
14  For example, import tariffs, which may improve the income situation among producers competing with low 
priced imports,  reduce real  incomes of consumers and of producers in other sectors of the economy.  In a 
small  economy  which  cannot  influence  world  market  prices  it  would  be  wrong  to  think  that  tariffs 
redistribute incomes away from foreign producers towards domestic producers in the protected sector.  The 
political attractiveness of introducing higher tariffs results from the fact that income reductions among users 
of the products concerned are thinly spread over a large number of individuals and therefore less noticeable, 
while income improvements for  producers of the products concerned are more concentrated on a smaller 
number of people and therefore more visible. 
15  Jackson and Swinnen (1994}, p. 39. 
16  Glwony Urazad Statystycny (1993). 23 
low-income urban households, there is an obvious constraint to the level of  food prices in the 
CEECs. 
Another constraint on  agricultural  policies  results from  the need  for  macro-economic 
stabilization.  Inflation is  still  a serious problem in  some of the CEECs,  and  policy measures 
which  lead to higher prices in  any  individual  sector tend to conflict with the overall aim  of 
reducing rates of inflation.  At the same time,  CEEC governments need to keep their public 
budget deficits under control in  order to stabilize macro-economic developments.  They have 
made  serious  efforts  to do  so,  and  de-subsidization  in  food  and  agriculture  has  been  an 
important element of  these efforts.  On the other hand,  more recently there has again been -an 
increase in public expenditure on agricultural policies in some of  the CEECs. For example, in 
Hungary total budgetary outlay on agricultural and food policies in  1988 amounted to six per 
cent of GDP.  By  1992 that expenditure had  decreased to merely one per cent of GDP.  In 
1993, however, it increased again to two per cent of GDP, and planned expenditure for  1994 
amounts  to  two  per  cent  of GDP  as  well. 17The  more  urgent  the  need  is  to  secure 
macro-economic  stability,  the  more  important  it  is  to  limit  fiscal  exposure  resulting  from 
agricultural policies. 
Constraints on agricultural  policies also  result from  trade agreements the CEECs have 
concluded,  or may  conclude  in  future.  At  the  most  general  level  there  are  commitments 
accepted  under the  GATT.  In  particular,  signatories  of the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on 
Agriculture  have,  in  addition  to  any  more  general  GATT  disciplines,  accepted  specific 
quantitative  commitments  regarding  tariffs,  export  subsidies  and  domestic  support.  These 
commitments apply to all  six  CEECs with  the exception of Bulgaria.  Bulgaria is  still  in  the 
process of negotiating accession to the GATT/WTO,  and  once those negotiations have been 
concluded successfully it will have to honour commitments of  a similar nature. The quantitative 
implications  of the  commitments  accepted  under  the  Agreement  of Agriculture  will  be 
discussed in  somewhat more detail below  in  relation to adoption of the CAP by  the CEECs 
(Chapter 5,  see also  Appendix II). However, it  is  important to note that potentially the most 
binding element of  the Agreement on Agriculture is the fact that there are strict limitations on 
the extent  to which  exports can  be  subsidized.  In  particular,  export  subsidies  must  not  be 
introduced for products which were not subsidized in the past and are therefore not included in 
the respective part of  the GATT Schedule of  the country concerned. 
In addition to these multilateral  commitments under the GATT,  constraints can  result 
from  bilateral  trade agreements.  For the  CEECs,  the most important among these bilateral 
trade  agreements  are  the  trade-related  parts  of their  Association  Agreements  (Europe 
17  World Bank (1994). 24 
Agreements) with the EU. In  agriculture,  these agreements require the CEECs to maintain 
preferential access to CEEC markets for EU exports, for a specified list of  products, generally 
for limited quantities. In addition there are trade agreements with the EFT  A countries, which 
will have to be somehow embodied into the Europe Agreements once the four EFT  A countries 
concerned have joined the EU.  Amongst themselves,  the Visegrad countries have concluded 
the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFT  A), although this does not provide for free 
trade in agriculture. However, some preferential reductions of  tariffs for specified agricultural 
and food products are envisaged under that agreement, and this also acts as some form of a 
constraint on agricultural trade policies. While commitments to apply preferential tariffs under 
these bilateral trade arrangements impose less rigid policy limits than the GATT Agreement on 
Agriculture, they have to be considered carefully in designing future policies. The higher MFN 
tariffs  (i.e.  tariffs  vis-a-vis  non-preferred  exporters)  are,  the more there is  the danger  that 
imports corning in  under preferential tariffs  distort trade and undermine the effectiveness of 
tariff protection. This is particularly true where preferential tariffs are set in absolute terms, but 
it  is  also the case where preferences take the form  of given  percentage reductions from  the 
applicable MFN tariffs (as is more often the case in the bilateral agreements concluded by the 
CEECs). 
Among the many other constraints on agricultural policies in the CEECs, one more shall 
be  mentioned here.  Policies have an  effect not only through their direct impact on economic 
variables.  They also generate expectations among people affected by these policies. This has a 
number of consequences. In  particular, it is  often rather difficult to retreat from policies once 
introduced, and even a scaling down of  given policy measures can be politically painful. Hence 
policies  introduced  under  the  pressure  of the  day  often  become  permanent.  Rather  than 
creating more freedom  for  a government  which  hoped to eliminate  current pressures,  these 
policies then reduce the scope for future policy action. Given the many uncertainties regarding 
future economic and agricultural developments in the CEECs it would be wise to maintain as 
much policy flexibility as  possible.  Moreover, through affecting expectations, current policies 
can  also  trigger economic  developments  which  are  irreversible  in  the future.  For example, 
entrepreneurs make careful decisions as to where to locate the industries they invest in.  Once 
these decisions have been made they cannot be revised for a long time. If agricultural policies 
in some CEECs create an  economic climate which makes investments in their food industries 
appear unattractive, for example because of high  raw material  costs, these investments go to 
other  countries.  It  is  then  later  very  difficult  to  change  the geographic  location  of these 25 
industries.18  In other words, today's policies can have impacts which extend far  beyond the 
time horizon for which they were designed. 
One important expectation among people in the CEECs concerns accession to the EU. It 
is no longer in the hands of  CEEC governments, nor in those of  EU politicians, to change the 
basic thrust of  these expectations. The general public in the CEECs firmly expects accession to 
take place in the foreseeable  future.  Indeed,  it is  hard  to overestimate the intensity of this 
expectation. A large and growing number of day-to-day activities in the CEECs are geared to 
preparing for this decisive element in future life. To an extent, eventual membership in the EU 
is seen as the light at the end of the long tunnel of transformation. In CEEC agriculture, the 
perceived advantages of  the CAP are looked at with much anticipation. It will be an important 
task  for  CEEC  governments,  but  also  for  the EU,  to  make  sure  that  such  expectations 
regarding future agricultural conditions after accession to the EU do not become unrealistic. 
18  For an excellent discussion of the relationship between policies and location decisions, and of the resulting 
long run irreversibilities for the geographic pattern of economic activities, see Baldwin (1994), pp. 3-22 ff. 26 
4  Integrating CEEC Agriculture with the EU: Chances and Issues for the CEECs 
Several  countries  have  gone  (and  the  EFT  A  countries  are  in  the  process  of going) 
through the experience of  having to integrate their agriculture with that of  the European Union 
when they joined the family  of member states. Depending on the structure of their farming 
industries and the nature of  their past policies this was a more or less comfortable experience. 
However, none of  the past and current rounds of  EU enlargement was comparable to what will 
be involved when countries from Central and Eastern Europe join the EU.·In particular, never 
have preparations for accession started in  a situation where the state of affairs in agriculture 
(and the rest of the economy) was as fluid  as it  currently is  in the CEECs. Also, and closely 
related to this, never have countries acceded to the EU where farmers have so much felt that 
accession to the CAP may solve so many of  their current problems. It appears that in much of 
Central and Eastern Europe the CAP is seen as a panacea. If only they could begin to benefit 
from that policy, then their fate would be much less uncertain: this is what many farmers in the 
CEECs appear to feel.  These feelings are one of  the driving forces behind the trend to establish 
"CAP-like" policies in some ofthe CEECs. 
From the perspective of  EU farmers,  such aspirations among their colleagues in the East 
may be somewhat surprising. After all, many EU farmers have never been quite happy with the 
CAP,  and  after the MacSharry reform  they  are  even  less  happy  with  it.  However,  one can 
understand why farmers in  the CEECs feel  differently about the CAP. From their perspective, 
the level  of support granted by  the CAP  is  generous.  The CAP offers support prices which, 
even after completion of  the Mac Sharry reform, are substantially above those in the CEECs for 
most products. In addition there are compensation payments under the CAP whose level per 
hectare, in  the case of cereals, is  of the same order of magnitude as total current per hectare 
revenue in many CEECs. It cannot come as a surprise that under such conditions many farmers 
in the CEECs would be happy to accede to the CAP.  On the other hand, there are also fears 
regarding  competitiveness.  Even though  parts of EU agriculture are not competitive at the 
international  level,  agriculture is  a  rather  sophisticated  business  in  some sectors of the EU 
farming industry, and farming enterprises in the CEECs which are still  struggling to establish 
themselves firmly are sceptical about their ability to compete with well financed western farms 
operating with the latest technology in farming systems, machinery and equipment. 
Which  of these two  seemingly  contradictory  views  is  right?  How competitive would 
agriculture  in  the  CEECs  have  to  be  before  it  can join  the  EU?  The  answer  is  far  from 
straightforward.  The best  that  can be  said  in  short  is  that  things  differ  very  much  among 
commodity  sectors.  To  take just  one  example,  consider  the  situation  in  the  dairy  sector. 
Producer prices for milk in the CEECs are way below those in the EU. In Poland, for example, 27 
they are a third, in Hungary and the Czech Republic they are around 60% of  those in the EU. 
In the EU there is  rather firm  price support for milk.  Farmers do  not necessarily need to be 
competitive in order to produce milk. If  they manage to produce at costs which are below the 
supported price than they are in the business (though in the EU only as long as they have quota 
rights).  It would  appear that  milk  producers  in  the  CEECs  should  not  find  it  difficult  to 
produce at costs below the CAP support price. After all they are currently producing at prices 
substantially below that level.  Hence one should think that CEEC dairy farmers  could easily 
stand "competition" with EU dairy fanners. In the end this is probably true. However, the case 
is less obvious than it may appear. Price support for milk under the CAP does not come at. the 
farm level, but at the level of processed commodities, mainly through intervention buying of 
butter and skim milk powder. The farm gate price for milk then depends on the efficiency of 
the dairy factories. To the extent that dairy factories in the CEECs are less efficient than those 
in the EU, CEEC milk producers would receive lower producer prices than those in the EU. 
Moreover, a good part of  the production cost of  milk goes for feed.  Feed prices in the CEECs, 
i~ particular cereals prices are now below those which may apply once the CEECs have joined 
the EU. Hence costs of  milk production at the farm level may increase as the CEECs adopt the 
CAP.  Taken everything together the benefits of  joining the EU for CEEC milk producers may 
therefore be less than what they appear to be at the first glance. 
More generally, the situation depends, among others, on the nature of  the CAP market 
regime for the product concerned. Where price support is relatively firm,  as for example in the 
cases of cereals,  sugar and  milk,  competition among farmers  in  the (enlarged) EU is  limited. 
Clearly, the level of farm income derived from that price support depends on the efficiency at 
which farmers produce. However, survival in competition is  not so much an issue.  For other 
products, there is  essentially no  domestic price support.  This is,  for example, the case in  the 
grain  based  livestock  sector  (pork,  poultry,  eggs).  EU  producers  of these  products  are 
protected against competition from third countries through high (essentially prohibitive) import 
levies.  However,  within the EU there is  essentially unfettered competition.  Farmers who are 
not sufficiently competitive (either through efficient production methods or through low factor 
prices and  opportunity costs) will  not  be able  to continue  production.  In addition  to these 
factors,  competitiveness of the processing and  marketing sector is  an  essential  ingredient of 
agricultural success, as illustrated above in the case of  milk. 
Keeping all this in mind it is not easy to say in general how competitive an  agricultural 
sector must be before it can successfully join the EU. Different sub-sectors of agriculture will 
make different experiences when they integrate into the common EU market, and this explains 
why different producer groups in the CEECs may feel  differently about the extent to which the 
CAP will  be a panacea for them.  However, it is  important to remember that accession to the 
EU is  a simultaneous process for all  sectors. One cannot join the EU in  the milk  sector, but 28 
stay outside for pork. From that perspective it is the potentially least competitive sector which 
determines the point in time at which accession is possible without major problems. Moreover, 
it must be remembered that competitiveness is not a purely technology-related phenomenon. It 
has much to do with factor prices, and in particular with the opportunity cost of labour. Low 
labour cost, or to put it differently low income expectations, can make up for a lot of  technical 
disadvantage. 
While  the  issue of competitiveness  needed  to join the  EU successfully  is  somewhat 
ambiguous in agriculture, it is very clear-cut in the food industry. Apart from measures thought 
to compensate the EU food industry for high raw material costs under the CAP (which in some 
cases achieve overcompensation in  practice) there  is  no  substantial  fonn of protection and 
support for that sector in the EU. Indeed, there are indications that the EU food industry is a 
particularly  competitive  sector  by  international  comparison.  Generally,  technologies  used 
represent the state of the art,  equipment is  modem and well  maintained,  product quality and 
diversity match highest international standards, marketing activities are sophisticated, financial 
conditions are sound. Moreover, competition on the EU market is very intense,  and  only the 
most successful companies survive. As a response to the creation of  the Single Market, the EU 
food  industry  has  made  any  conceivable  effort  to become  even  more  competitive.  At  the 
international  level,  the  Union's  food  industry  has  proven  to  be  a  highly  successful  export 
sector, while food industries from third countries have found it difficult to market successfully 
in the EU. 
Against this background it  is  clear that the food  industry in  the CEECs will  have to be 
very strong when open markets are established with the EU. When CEEC agriculture joins the 
EU, many of its product sectors immediately come under the shield of protection and  support 
provided by the CAP. Yet, there is no form of  EU protection from which the food industry in 
the CEECs can benefit on accession. The icy winds of  keen competition will fully hit the CEEC 
food industry at the time trade with the EU is fully  liberalized in  a single market between the 
CEECs  and  the EU.  It is  for  this  reason  that  improving  the  competitiveness  of the  food 
industry is a prime priority for the CEECs in preparing for accession to the EU. 
In agriculture,  another important consideration in  preparing for  accession to the CAP 
relates to the fact that the future of  the CAP itself may be less certain than what is sometimes 
assumed in the CEECs. As a consequence of  the decisions taken in  1992, the CAP is currently 
undergoing a substantial, though partial reform.  This may not be the last major change to be 
made to the CAP before accession by the first  CEECs takes place.  The prospect of eastern 
enlargement itself may trigger further reforms.  These issues will  be discussed  below.  In any 
case, when preparing for accession to the EU and  adoption of the CAP, the CEECs need to 
consider that they are shooting at a moving target. Hence much of  the aspiration to participate 29 
in the wonders of  the CAP may not be warranted if it is based on the assumption that the CAP 
remains what it has been so far. 
In this context it is important to give thought to the significance of  existing EU policies 
during the process of enlargement. In previous rounds of EU enlargement it has always been 
maintained that the new member states had to accept the full  body of existing legislation and 
policies in the EU (i.e. the "acquis communautaire").  The theory was that the entrants had to 
adjust to the EU rather than the other way round.  Accession  negotiati~ns therefore revolved 
around the speed  and  method by  which  the new member  states had .to .adopt existing EU 
legislation, and not whether the EU was going to adjust some of  its policies in the process of 
enlargement.  Practice was  never  quite  as  pure  as  that theory,  but  essentially  the  onus  of 
adjustment always  rested primarily on the entrants.  There is  no  reason to assume that this 
principle will be abandoned when it comes to eastern enlargement of  the Union. However, it is 
not  inconceivable  that a  somewhat  more  flexible  approach  may  be  adopted  in  practice.  In 
particular,  it  may  well  be  that  the  EU  may  consider  it  wise  to  change  the  acquis 
communautaire before actual accession negotiations begin, or to continue to do so unilaterally 
while  those  negotiations  are  being  pursued.  As  argued  below,  there  are  good  reasons  to 
consider  this  more  flexible  approach  in  the  area  of agricultural  policies  in  view  of future 
accession by the CEECs.  For policy planning  in  the CEECs this  may  mean  that the acquis 
communautaire  should  be  considered  less  solid  than  was  the  case  in  past  rounds  of EU 
enlargement. 
At the same time this may  mean that the distinction between being and  not yet being a 
member state of  the EU may be somewhat less significant on this occasion. To some extent the 
EU has already invited thi CEECs to become "pre-members", by suggesting that they engage 
in  various  sorts of political  "dialogue"  with the  EU,  including joint meetings  with the EU 
Council of Ministers and joint summit meetings.  If these suggestions are more than a purely 
political gesture and  an  opportunity for the CEECs to become acquainted with EU political 
procedures, they make particular sense if  they are used for a debate about mutual adjustments 
of  policies which could make it easier to prepare for accession and enlargement, on both sides. 
However,  in  spite  of such  a  deepened  status  of "pre-membership"  many  important 
distinctions among members and non-members will  remain. In the area of  agricultural policies 
these distinctions are extremely significant. As far as economics go, one of  the most important 
distinctions  results  from  the budgetary implications  of the CAP.  As one of its constituent 
"pillars" the CAP has always been based on the principle of "financial solidarity". This principle 
means that all revenue generated by the CAP (such as import levies collected by the customs 
authorities of  the member states) flows to the common budget, and all expenditure made under 
CAP market regimes (such as  export subsidies  and  intervention prices paid  out by  member 30 
state authorities)  is  financed  from  the common budget.  The economic  implications of that 
principle are indeed an integral element of  a common agricultural market and trade policy, and 
it would be difficult to think of  a free flow of  agricultural products among member states if  that 
principle  were  not  adhered  to.t9  At  the  same  time  the  common  financing  of CAP  market 
regimes  has  important and  problematic implications for  economic incentives in  the member 
states. For any individual member state, the economic value (the shadow price) of  one unit of 
agricultural produce is close to the domestic EU market price, while for the EU on aggregate it 
is the much lower world price.  2°F or existing member states the system of common financing 
therefore results in  distortions of incentives: expanding agricultural production is much. more 
attractive for any individual member state than it is for the Union on aggregate. 
For future member states preparing for accession these considerations have extremely 
important implications. The economic profitability of  agricultural production has to be assessed 
on the basis of  current world market prices as long as accession to the Union has not yet taken 
place.  On the first  day  of full  membership,  however,  the  situation  changes  drastically.  The 
profitability of agricultural production then suddenly depends on the domestic EU price. 21The 
economic  change which takes place on the day  of accession  is  most obviously  seen  if one 
assumes  that  an  entrant  country  had  already  aligned  its  support  prices  to the CAP  before 
accession.  Any surplus which this country produces has to be exported with export subsidies 
(as long as the CAP price is above the world market price). Before accession to the Union the 
country  concerned  has  to finance  these  export  subsidies  out  of its  domestic  budget.  After 
accession the Union budget suddenly accepts financial responsibility. 
One  implication  of this  fundamental  change  which  membership  brings  about  in 
agricultural  policies is  that,  as  long as  they are not yet members,  potential  entrants have  to· 
consider their priorities in  agricultural market policies in  a way which differs very much from 
the perspective of existing member states.  The fact  that existing member states may  happily 
accept the market implications of  the CAP must not mislead future entrants to believe that the 
same policies are desirable for themselves.  It is a great difference whether one has to finance 
ones market regimes out of  the national budget or whether the Union budget takes care of  that 
19  In this context it is extremely important to  make a careful conceptual distinction between common market 
and trade policies on the one hand and structural and direct income policy measures on the other hand. For 
example, structural policies have always been pursued in the EU under joint financing between the Union 
and member states, and this is perfectly feasible. Equally, it is conceivable that decoupled income support is 
co-financed between the Union and the member states, or financed completely by member states. This issue 
will be taken up again below. 
20  See Koester (1977). 
21  This assumes that common  CAP  prices are adopted  by the  new  member state on  accession.  If there  is  a 
transition period during which prices are gradually aligned the relevant shadow price is the transition price. 31 
expenditure.  This issue will  be discussed  again  below in  relation to alternative  options for 
CEEC agricultural market and trade policies before accession. 
The issues raised here become more complicated if  one considers the time dimension and 
dynamic adjustments.  Assume a given country reckons that once a member of the Union and 
financially covered by the CAP it is economically profitable to produce considerably more of  a 
given agricultural product.  Should that country begin to boost its production already before 
membership, such that it is in full  speed at the time it becomes a member state? In most cases 
the answer will probably be in the negative, because it does usually not take too much time to 
expand agricultural production once producers receive the appropriate incentives.  The CAP, 
however, has some features which may suggest a different answer. In particular, where supply 
controls are used under the CAP, the level of  allowed production has traditionally based on a 
past reference period. This was the case when quotas for sugar production were issued (and 
later  reallocated),  and  it  was  also  true  when  milk  quotas  were  introduced.  Most  recent 
examples of  that nature were the establishment of  base acreage for compensation payments and 
set-aside requirements,  and  the allocation  of acreage for oilseed  production among member 
states. For agricultural policy makers in the CEECs this traditional practice in the EU means an 
incentive to expand their production as much as  possible before entry, such that they create a 
good  base  for  receiving  production  rights,  and  possibly  compensation  payments,  once 
membership  in  the  Union  is  reached.  Experience  with  earlier  rounds  of EU  enlargement, 
including the current round of EFT  A enlargement,  sends the same signal  to the CEECs and 
may  suggest to them that there is  a point in  establishing "property rights" to CAP quotas as 
early as possible. 
From this perspective it would make sense, and indeed is urgent, for both the EU and the 
CEECs, to find  early  agreement  on how the base  should be established for  any  production 
quotas and other supply controls which may exist under the CAP at the time of accession.  In 
order to avoid wrong incentives it  may be appropriate to agree on a method for establishing 
base numbers which do  not depend  on  future production developments in  the CEECs.  This 
does not  mean  that  numbers  have  to be  based  on actual  past  production  or resource  use. 
However,  it should  not be possible to  affect  the  base through future  production decisions. 
Alternatively, and preferably, the EU may reconsider its own approach to supply controls, and 
change the CAP such that they are no longer necessary. 32 
5  Alternative Policy Options for the CEECs: Support Levels and Trade Policies for the 
Medium Run 
5.1  Basic Choices 
There  is  a  wide  variety  of policy  measures  which  can  be  brought  to  bear  on -the 
agricultural and food sector. Typically, the agricultural policy mix chosen by any country is a 
complex combination of  many different instruments. However, one basic choice to be made by 
all  countries,  with  fundamental  implications  for  the. whole  structure  of agricultural  policy 
instruments adopted, relates to the overall level of  support and protection granted to domestic 
farmers.  Any decision made in this regard has far reaching implications for the development of 
agriculture,  and  it  cannot be revised  in  a short period of time.  Hence choice of the level  of 
support and protection in agriculture is a typical example of  a fundamental policy decision of a 
medium to long term nature. To make the appropriate choice in this regard is one of  the central 
issues  for  agricultural  policy  design  in  the  CEECs  for  the  years  to  come.  Indeed,  the 
agricultural  policy  debate  in  the  CEECs  in  recent  years  has  very  much  emphasized  the 
importance of  this choice. Various domestic pressures, as discussed above, tend to suggest that 
there should be more protection against competition from other countries, and a higher level of 
support for domestic agriculture. The most obvious factor pointing in this direction is the low 
level  of profitability  and  the resulting  financial  difficulties  currently  faced  by  large  parts of 
agriculture  in  the  CEECs.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  several  domestic  constraints,  also 
mentioned above, which make it difficult to provide more protection to farmers in the CEECs. 
These contradicting domestic forces create serious problems for agricultural policy makers in 
the CEECs.  It is for this reason that the basic choice of an  appropriate level  of support and 
protection is discussed here first, before other agricultural policy measures are considered later 
(in Chapter 8 below). 
For the CEECs, one way of  looking at the appropriate level of support and protection in 
agriculture is to consider how best to align agricultural support and protection to that of the 
CAP, given the prospect of  joining the EU in the foreseeable future.  Should the CEECs align 
their agricultural prices to the CAP as  soon as  possible?  Would  it  be better to align  prices 
gradually, along a trajectory which reaches CAP prices in a given number of  years? Or is it best 
to postpone adjustment to CAP  prices as  long as  possible? These alternative options will  be 
discussed below,  in  a manner which necessarily is  somewhat schematic.  The nature of these 
options can be illustrated as  in  Graph  5. 1,  where option  1 describes a rapid  price alignment 33 
with the CAP,  option 2  stands for a gradual price alignment,  while  option 3 represents the 
strategy of  keeping prices at current levels until accession. 
Graph 5.1:  Aligning CEEC Prices with the CAP: Alternative Options 
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Much of  the relevance of how best to align CEEC prices to the CAP depends on the size 
of  the gap which currently exists between agricultural prices in the CEEC and those in the EU. 
If  that gap is small there is no need to be concerned about price alignment, and vice versa. It is 
difficult to say very much in general because agricultural prices differ significantly among the 
CEECs,  due  to the different  agricultural  price,  market  and  trade  policies  pursued by  these 
countries. However, in general prices in the Visegrad countries are below the current level  of 
CAP prices. Graph 5.2 provides information on price gaps for the Visegrad countries, for some 
major agricultural products.1 1993  prices in the CEECs are shown relative to 1993 EU prices 
(which are set equal to 100).2 Roughly speaking, agricultural prices in the Visegrad countries 
are  around  one third below those in  the EU.3  It is  also  interesting to note that price ratios 
1  The wheat price in Poland in 1993  is not  fully  representative of the current price level of wheat in that 
country, as the 1993 price was heavily affected by the shortfall of the 1992 crop due to drought. In 1994, the 
wheat price in Poland was 26 per cent below the 1993 price in real terms. 
2  Price comparison is made at the wholesale level as it is that level at which CAP price support is provided. 
Where wholesale prices were not available for the CEECs, farm  gate prices were used,  and adjusted by 
adding a marketing margin, generally adopted from the OECD estimates of  PSEs for Hungary and Poland. 
3  The weighted average of domestic wholesale prices for six major products,  i.e. wheat, barley, sugar, beef, 
pork and poultry, in Poland is about 40%,  in Hung31)'  about 30% and in the Czech Republic about  20o/o 
lower than in the EU. 34 
between individual agricultural products in some of the Visegrad countries differ very much 
from those prevailing in the EU. Though not included in this graph, prices in  Bulgaria and 
Romania tend to be lower on average than those in the Visegrad countries. 
Graph 5.2:  Prices of Major Agricultural Products in the Visegrad Countries, in 
the EU, and on World Markets 
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Past prices in  the EU, though,  are  not a  good benchmark for price alignment  in  the 
CEECs. After all,  CAP reform as decided in  1992 will result in  some further price cuts in the 
EU, with the final tranche ofthese price cuts to be implemented in 1995. Moreover, even if no 
further explicit reforms to the CAP were to be decided in the EU, there will be reductions in 
real CAP prices resulting from some overall inflation in the EU to which CAP prices are not 
likely to be fully  adjusted.  As a  result, CAP prices in,  say,  the year 2000 will  be lower than 
1993  prices.  The gap to be closed through price alignment is therefore less than that which 
existed in  1993. Hence CAP prices which may prevail, without any further CAP reform, in the 
year 2000 have also been included in  Graph 5  .2. 4  In most cases,  even those possible future 
CAP prices are well above current prices in  the Visegrad countries. It is price alignment to 
4  In forecasting these CAP prices for the year 2000, price reductions already decided under CAP reform have 
been included, and the assumption has been made that there will be a real  decline of agricultural prices in 
the EU, mainly due to inflation, of 1% per cent per year between 1995 and 2000. 35 
close this gap between current Vise  grad prices and future (  unrefonned) CAP prices which will 
be discussed in the following. 
5.2  Option 1: Rapid Price Alignment with the CAP 
One option for the CEECs is to align their agricultural prices very rapidly to CAP prices, 
say within the coming two years. Many CEEC fanners might be happy to see this occurring as 
it would help them to overcome their current economic difficulties.  However,  even among 
CEEC fanners such a rapid price rise may  not be universally welcome.  CEEC governments 
would  probably  not want,  and  not  be  able,  to raise  all  agricultural  prices  simultaneously 
through market policies. In particular, prices for some livestock products, above all pork and 
poultry products, are very difficult to support at a high level without massive state interference 
and in  the absence of large budget appropriations.  As  a result,  prices of basic crops, mainly 
cereal  prices,  would  be  likely  to  rise  faster  than  prices  of livestock  products.  Livestock 
producers would then be hit by rising feed costs which would not be matched by simultaneous 
price increases for livestock products. Hence livestock production, which may in the longer run 
tum out to have  a  competitive potential  in  the CEECs,  would  have to go through a  very 
difficult period, even more difficult than the recent past which has already seen a particularly 
pronounced decline of  livestock production in the CEECs. 
However, there are more reasons which caution against the option of a rapid alignment 
to  CAP  prices.  Real  consumer  incomes  in  the  CEECs  have  declined  drastically  during 
transformation,  and  they are only slowly recovering from  that decline.  A rapid  alignment to 
CAP  prices would  push  up  food  prices immediately,  and  would  therefore tend  to eliminate 
most, if  not all, of  the potential growth in real consumer incomes which can be hoped for in the 
next few years in  the CEECs.  This effect would be particularly pronounced as  the share of 
food in total consumer expenditure is  still rather high.  Consumers, who now begin to see the 
chances of  enjoying the fruits of  economic transformation, would be frustrated. 
Assuming a rapid transmission of higher farm gate prices to higher food  prices implies 
that the food industry and the marketing chain in the CEECs are not able to absorb some of  the 
increase in raw material prices through a reduction in processing and marketing margins. This 
assumption is fairly realistic, to say the least. Indeed, higher farm gate prices, resulting from a 
rapid alignment of CEEC policies to the CAP, would make the difficult situation of the food 
industry and marketing enterprises in the CEECs even worse. One of  the particularly important 
priorities for agricultural policy in the CEECs, as was argued above, is to strengthen the food 
industry and the marketing sector. Without a more efficient,  competitive and  profitable food 
industry, the CEECs will find it difficult to stem the tide of  processed food imports, to expand 36 
their agricultural and food exports, to create better market chances for their farmers,  and to 
compete effectively with the EU's sophisticated food industl)' after accession. A policy-induced 
rapid increase of  prices for agricultural raw materials, as would result from an attempt to align 
policies to the CAP too soon, would greatly reduce prospects for a healthy development of  the 
food industry and the marketing sector in the CEECs.  A prolonged crisis of  that downstream 
sector would ensue, with potentially damaging longer run consequences for CEEC agriculture. 
Another serious problem which would result from a rapid increase in agricultural price 
support  in  the  CEECs is  the high  burden  which  it  would  place  on  government  budgets. 
Aligning  prices  rapidly  with the CAP  would be  possible only  through massive government 
interference with market forces in the CEECs. Intervention buying would have to occur at a 
much  more extensive  level  than  currently  is  the  case.  Where  produce is  exported,  export 
subsidization would have to increase massively.  Indeed, there would be a tendency for more 
surpluses to originate, given the low tolerance of consumers for higher food prices, and some 
stimulation of higher output in  agriculture.  All  the additional agricultural exports would have 
to be  subsidized,  at rising levels of subsidy per unit with a larger gap between domestic and 
international prices. With only slowly recovering GDP growth in the CEECs, and hence a still 
rather weak tax base, it would be extremely difficult,  if possible at all, to finance such a rapid 
increase  in  agricultural  policy  expenditure.  Moreover,  there  are  so  many  demands  on  the 
government budgets in  the CEECs during the transformation  process,  and  so  many  macro-
economic  constraints to be  considered  by  the  governments,  that  a  more  than  proportional 
increase in agricultural policy expenditure would be very difficult to defend. 
Within agriculture, not only would livestock producers likely be hit hard but a rapid rise 
in  price support would send the wrong signals to CEEC farmers  in general.  Since this rising 
farm  price  support  would  be  "domestically  produced"  (as  opposed  to  a  price  adjustment 
resulting  from  actual  accession  to the EU) it  would  create the illusion  among farmers  that 
domestic agricultural policy in the CEECs is  capable of doing anything it wants. Rather than 
working towards becoming more economically independent of  government policies, and more 
competitive  on  domestic  and  international  markets,  farmers  would  develop  a  habit  of 
entrusting their fate to the government, and  then possibly become equally dependent on the 
state as they were in the past. The end result of  the process triggered by such a policy would 
be an agricultural sector which lacks efficiency and competitiveness, depending on government 
support rather than its own strength. 
For all  these reasons  a rapid  alignment of CEEC prices with the CAP is  not a viable 
option. Fortunately this is well understood in the CEECs. Even though there is  some pressure 
to raise agricultural price support further, governments of  the CEECs appear to accept that the 37 
current level of CAP prices is beyond both the possibilities and the needs of  their countries in 
the immediate future. 
5.3  Option 2: Gradual Price Alignment with the CAP 
A  more  tempting  policy  option  for  CEEC  governments  is  a  gradual  alignment  of 
agricultural price support with the CAP.  Given the expectation that accession to the EU will 
take place in the foreseeable future,  and the assumption that the CAP will  fully  apply to the 
CEECs once they have become members of  the Union, a plausible strategy might be to begin 
price alignment soon, and to plan for it to be completed by the time of expected accession to 
the Union.  Reasonable  arguments  can  be  advanced  in  favour  of  this  option.  The  whole 
agricultural sector, including the food  industry and  consumers,  it could be argued,  needs to 
adjust to the conditions which will govern agricultural markets and prices after accession to the 
EU.  Gradually  approaching  future  CAP  prices  may  allow  such  adjustments  to take  place 
smoothly. It takes time to make the investments, and possibly also disinvestments, required to 
operate efficiently in a CAP environment, and a gradual alignment with CAP prices is one way 
to deal with the timing problem.  The public institutions required to implement the CAP (such 
as intervention agencies etc.) could get used to their duties, not only in terms of  how they need 
to operate but also  in  terms of gradually beginning to administer quantities and  prices at the 
levels to be expected once membership in  the Union is  reached.  Arguments like these could 
make the option of  a gradual price alignment appear attractive. 
The most straightforward implementation of this option would be to embark soon on a 
time path for agricultural price support in  the CEECs which follows a straight line trajectory 
between their current price levels and the level of CAP price support expected to prevail at the 
time  ~ccession to the Union  may  take place.  For example,  the CEECs could  work on  the 
assumption that accession is conceivable in the year  2000~ they could forecast CAP prices for 
that  year~ they could  decide to start price alignment  in  the year,  say,  1996; and they could 
move their agricultural prices towards those future CAP prices. Each year between 1996 and 
2000, one fifth of  the gap between their current prices and CAP prices in the year 2000 would 
be closed. In a way this strategy would resemble transition arrangements as adopted in earlier 
rounds of EC enlargement, for example in  the case of accession by Spain and Portugal. The 
difference,  though,  would be that price  alignment  in  the CEECs along such lines would  be 
pursued as their sovereign domestic policies,  rather than as  an element of accession treaties 
agreed  with  the  Union.  Hence  the  policies  required  to  implement  such  a  gradual  price 
alignment would have to be implemented,  and  financed,  by  the CEECs themselves,  and EU 
policies would not directly be affected during the process of  price alignment. 38 
An  assessment  of this  option very  much  depends  on the  quantitative  implications  it 
would have for agricultural markets, trade, consumers, and government budgets, in each of  the 
CEECs. An analysis of  these implications forecasts over a period of several years, with all the 
uncertainties inherent in agricultural developments to be expected in the CEECs in the years to 
come. In particular, it is difficult to predict how supply of  and demand for agricultural products 
may change in the medium term in the CEECs, since the dust which was stirred up during the 
early phases of  the transformation process has not yet settled. A number of  studies exist which 
have tried to analyse the implications of  adopting the CAP in the CEECs. Among these studies 
is our own analysis, based on a quantitative model which forecasts market trends in the EU and 
other countries over the coming years,  under alternative assumptions  on future  agricultural 
market  policies,  macro-economic  conditions  and  productivity  trends.  For the  time  being, 
among  the  CEECs  only  the  Visegrad  countries  are  included  in  that  model.  Hence  our 
quantitative model estimates are limited to those countries.  Some results of this analysis are 
presented in Annex I, for a gradual price alignment in the CEECs to reach CAP prices by the 
year 2000.  In that analysis,  the assumption has been made that the CAP  remains  essentially 
unchanged in the shape it will have once the Mac  Sharry reform is completed. Only some of  the 
more important results are briefly reported here. 
Even though CAP  prices in  real  terms will  further  decline  between now and  the year 
2000,  prices for most products in  the Visegrad  countries would  have to rise  significantly  in 
order to be aligned to the CAP.  As one result of this price increase,  and  as  a consequence of 
productivity growth to be expected, output of most agricultural products can be expected to 
rise noticeably.  At the same time,  price alignment with the CAP would dampen the growth of 
demand  for  agricultural  products  which  otherw-ise  would  result  from  the  expected 
improvement of standards of living.  The market balance in  agriculture would, therefore, tend 
to change.  For a number of agricultural products there would be a tendency for surpluses to 
build up.  With alignment to CAP prices in the year 2000, the Visegrad countries on aggregate 
are likely to have a surplus of  cereals in the order of magnitude of 8 million tons and a sugar 
surplus  of about  1. 8  million  tons.  The  exportable  surpluses  of livestock  products  in  the 
Visegrad countries may also be significant,  around 0. 6 million tons of beef,  1 million tons of 
pork, and 0.4 million tons of  butter. 
At the first glance a rise in  agricultural exports from  the CEECs may  appear welcome 
since it adds to foreign exchange earnings. However, agricultural exports stimulated by price 
support are  a  rather expensive way  of earning  foreign  exchange.  Agricultural  prices  to be 
adopted by the CEECs if they were to align to the CAP by the end of this decade would be 
above world market prices, to varying degrees for the different agricultural products. Domestic 
market  surpluses  can  therefore  be  exported  only  if export  subsidies  are  granted.  Export 
subsidies have already now become a feature of  agricultural policies in most CEECs, and they 39 
are beginning to cause a headache for fiscal  stabilization. With price alignment to reach CAP 
prices by the end of  this decade, export subsidy expenditure in agriculture would have to grow 
significantly. Not only would the surpluses to be disposed of  grow. The gap between domestic 
and  world  market  prices  would  also  expand.  As  a  consequence,  expenditure  on  export 
subsidies would increase progressively. 
For the  Visegrad  countries  on  aggregate,  for  the  products  included  in  our analysis, 
annual export subsidies (net of  import levies) may reach the order of magnitude of 3.3 billion 
ECU (in  1993  prices)  by  the  year  2000.  In  addition  to this  expenditure  there  would be 
expenditure on other elements of market policies,  such as intervention buying,  storage aids, 
subsidies  for  domestic  surplus  disposal,  and  administration  of market  policies. s Based  on 
experience in the EU, this additional expenditure could be another 1.4 billion ECU per year. 
Moreover, there would be expenditure on market policies for other products not taken into 
account here, such as fiuit and vegetables, wine, tobacco and  sheep. For these products, as a 
rough  estimate  another  4. 3  billion  ECU  of annual  expenditure  could  be  required  in  the 
Visegrad countries with price alignment to the CAP by the end of this decade. In total, by the 
year 2000 the Visegrad countries alone may have to incur an_ annual expenditure in the order of 
magnitude of 9 billion ECU (in  1993  prices) for  agricultural  market policies if they were to 
adopt the strategy of aligning gradually to CAP prices. On top of this expenditure for market 
policies  would  come the  spending  on  other policies,  such  as  structural  policies,  investment 
aids, and social policies. 
At  the level  of individual  Visegrad  countries,  Poland's expenditure on export subsidies 
(net of revenue on import levies) for the products included in  our analysis might be around 2 
billion  ECU  by  the year  2000.  Taken  together with  spending  on  other elements  of market 
policies, and for products not included in our analysis, total expenditure on agricultural market 
policies in the year 2000 may be as much as  5. 5 billion ECU in  Poland.  This would be more 
than 60 times the expenditure on agricultural market policies in  Poland in  the year 1993.6  In 
Hungary,  expenditure on agricultural  export subsidies (net of  import levy  revenue) for  the 
products included in  our analysis  may  reach 0.8  billion ECU by 2000.  With expenditure on 
other market policies and  other products, a total of around 2.2 billion ECU may  result.  This 
s  In the scenario reported  here,  we  have assumed that compensation payments,  as granted in the EU  for 
cereals, oilseeds, pulses, cattle and sheep are not yet  made in the CEECs.  Clearly, if  such payments were 
introduced as an element of aligning with the CAP,  ex-penditure would increase massively.  The issue of 
such compensation payments, and the financial magnitudes involved, will be taken up below. 
6  Expenditure on  agricultural  market policies  in Poland  so  far comes  mainly  in the form  of government 
contributions to the activities of the Agency for Agricultural Markets (ARR). In 1993 that contribution was 
1907.4 billion Zlot)", equivalent to around 80 million ECU. 40 
sum is more than 7 times the level of  corresponding expenditure in Hungary in  1993.7 For the 
Czech and Slovak Republics taken together, total expenditure on agricultural market policies 
in the year 2000 under this option is estimated to be somewhat less than in Hungary. 
Budgetary expenditure  on  agricultural  market  policies  at  these  levels  in  the  CEECs 
would cause serious fiscal  problems and macro-economic difficulties,  and would probably be 
unsustainable.  In addition,  agricultural  prices  at the CAP  level  would  impose  a  significant 
burden on food consumers. A gradual price increase, as considered under this option, may face 
somewhat less  opposition from  consumers than a  rapid  price  rise  as  implied  in  the policy 
option discussed above, and it may be more palatable because it would tend to go in parallel 
with  rising  spending  power of consumers.  However,  even  with  optimistic  assumptions  on 
macro-economic growth in the CEECs for the rest of  this decade, disposable incomes in most 
of  the CEECs would still be below the current level of  incomes in the poorest member states of 
the EU-12. High food prices would, therefore, be an undesirable feature in the CEECs even at 
the end of  this decade. Moreover, high food prices would divert spending power of consumers 
from  other economic activities which  could  make a better contribution to overall  economic 
growth which is  so much needed in  order to bridge the income gap between the CEECs and 
the  EU.  In  other words,  for  a  number of domestic  reasons,  even  the  option of  gradually 
aligning CEEC agricultural prices to the CAP cannot be recommended, and may not even be 
sustainable. 
At the same time,  CEEC governments will  want to consider the trade implications  of 
their future agricultural policies. In particular, those CEECs which are (or will  be) signatories 
of  the GATT, or in future the WTO, must not neglect the commitments they have accepted in 
agriculture as a result of the Uruguay Round (or the equivalent commitments which they will 
make during their negotiations on accession to the GATTIWTO).  The extent to which these 
commitments will  constrain future  policies  in  the  CEECs is  again  a matter for  quantitative 
analysis. The mere fact that tariffs are bound, that export subsidization must not exceed certain 
limits and that domestic support has to remain below a given commitment does not in itself say 
that there is no scope for raising agricultural support and protection. After all,  GATT bindings 
for agriculture are generally based on a past reference period (1986 to 1988 or 1990), and not 
on current actual  policies. 8  Through  policy  changes  which  have  taken  place  since  the base 
period, and through the quantitative parameters chosen for establishing base period numbers, 
countries can have (implicitly)  created scope for  future increases in  support and  protection, 
7  Expenditure on intervention and expon subsidies in Hungar~y was 32.383 billion Forint in 1993, see World 
Bank (1994), p.  35. This sum is equivalent to 0.29 billion ECU. 
8  This is  not  necessarily true for countries which accede to  the GA TI after the Uruguay Round (such as, 
among the CEECs, Bulgaria). In the following only those countries will be considered which have already 
participated in the Uruguay Round negotiations. 41 
relative to current policies. In the EU, for example, this is the case for most tariff bindings in 
agriculture, which would allow for an increase of protection from current levels,  rather than 
forcing  protection  further  down.  9  In  the  CEECs,  so  many  things  have  changed  so 
fundamentally  since the Uruguay Round base period that a  careful  analysis  of their current 
situaion is required in order to see how binding their agricultural commitments are. Moreover, 
as neither quantities nor prices in the CEECs during the Uruguay Round base period had the 
same economic meaning as they have in  market economies, the CEECs have in some cases 
been allowed to specify  commitments which are essentially determined  synthetically,  rather 
than being mechanically calculated on the basis of  reference period numbers. This means that in 
the  absence  of a  quantitative  analysis  it  is  even  less  clear,  a  priori,  how  binding  their 
commitments are relative to current policies. 
In  order to get some impression of the extent to which their GATT commitments will 
constrain future policies in the Visegrad countries, we have analysed their GATT Schedules, 
concentrating  on  major  agricultural  products.  The  results  of this  analysis  are  presented  in 
Appendix II and  only briefly summarized here.  A number of rather interesting and important 
conclusions emerge from this analysis. 
First,  both  the  methods  adopted  for  establishing  commitments  and  the  quantitative 
implications  of the  Schedule  commitments  differ  very  significantly  among  the  Visegrad 
countries. For example, Poland has bound tariffs which are generally based on those bound by 
the EU, emphasized by the fact that Polish Schedule tariffs are expressed in ECU rather than in 
Zloty. Hungary and the Czech and  Slovak Republics have generally bound ad valorem tariffs, 
at levels often far above tariffs currently applied, but generally below the equivalents of  tariffs 
bound by Poland and the EU.  As another example, Poland has bound both domestic support 
and  export subsidy outlay in  terms of US  dollars,  while Hungary and the Czech and  Slovak 
Republics have made their bindings in domestic currencies. As a result of such differences, the 
extent to which future  policies  are  constrained,  and  in  particular the extent to which  these 
constraints may  prevent  the  CEECs from  aligning  their agricultural  policies  with  the CAP 
differs very much from country to country. 
Second, in  all  Visegrad countries, the tariffs bound in  the Uruguay Round are higher, 
often  significantly,  than  needed  to defend  current  levels  of price  support  (with  very  few 
exceptions, see Appendix IT). However, in most cases the tariffs bound are not high enough to 
allow for a strategy of  gradual price alignment with the CAP by the year 2000. The exception 
is Poland, with tariff bindings modelled after those of  the EU. 
9  This does not apply to  cereals, for  which a  maximum duty-paid price, determined in relation to  the EU 
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Third, domestic support commitments are likely to create a major headache in Hungary 
and the Czech and Slovak Republics, under any policy scenario. Because these countries have 
bound domestic support in their national currencies,  and because all  commitments under the 
GATT Agreement on Agriculture had to be expressed in nominal terms, the massive inflation 
which has occurred in these countries since the GATT base period has completely eroded all 
scope  for  providing  domestic  support.  As  a  result  the  actual  1993  AMS  (aggregate 
measurement of  support) in Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics has already exceed 
the bound AMS for 1995 by far.l0 Hence there is no scope for further increase in support for 
these countries, let alone for a gradual price alignment with the CAP. These countries (and 
other GATT signatories in a similar situation) are likely to request the GATT Committee on 
Agriculture to allow them to resort to Article 18:4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which 
suggests that "due consideration [shall be given] to the influence of  excessive rates of  inflation 
on the ability of  any Member to abide by its domestic support commitments". It remains to be 
seen  how  the  Committee  on  Agriculture  will  deal  with  such  cases.  However,  even  if the 
Committee  should  allow  these  countries  to  exceed  their  legally  bound  domestic  support 
commitments because of  their past high inflation, it may well be that the Committee will want 
to maintain the strongly binding power of  the commitments, and would not allow countries to 
utilize  past inflation  as  a justification for  future  increases  in  the level  of domestic  support. 
Hungary  and  the  Czech  and  Slovak Republics  might  then  find  that their  domestic  support 
commitments, even if adjusted for past inflation, are such strong constraints that they exclude 
the  option  of gradual  price  alignment  with  the  CAP  by  the  year  2000.  Poland's  domestic 
support binding  in  US  dollars,  on the other hand,  does  not  appear to create a problem for 
current levels  of support.  However,  should Poland wish  to align  its  prices  with the CAP,  it 
would exceed its AMS binding significantly. 
Fourth,  the  extent  to which  export  subsidy  commitments  may  turn  out  to  constrain 
policies  differs  extremely  among  individual  products and  countries.  There are  a  number  of 
products  in  each  of the  Visegrad  countries  where  export  subsidy  commitments  under  the 
GATT would probably be violated if prices were gradually aligned with the CAP. There is no 
consolation from  the fact  that there is  some slack  in  export subsidy commitments for  other 
products.  The  GATT commitments on  export  subsidies  come  strictly  at  the  product  level. 
"Savings"  on one product cannot be transferred to another product. Hence if a given policy 
strategy tends to violate export subsidy commitments for some products, that strategy is not in 
its entirety feasible.  Moreover, under the GATT Agreement on Agriculture signatories have 
agreed not to introduce export subsidies for products whose exports were not subsidized in the 
lO  An additional problem for the Czech and Slovak Republics is that their base period AMS does not include 
any  price support element.  With administered prices for a number  of products now  in place,  the current 
AMS for these two countries exceeds the domestic support commitment even more. 43 
base period. This is a strongly binding  commitme~t which would create serious difficulties in 
the Visegrad countries if they were to raise their prices to the CAP level.  Such higher support 
prices  would  stimulate  surplus  production  of a  number  of products  where  the  Visegrad 
countries have in effect zero export subsidy commitments. 
As an overall conclusion from this analysis of the GATT commitments in the Visegrad 
countries it appears that these commitments are such that they do not in general allow these 
countries to adopt a strategy of  aligning their prices with the CAP before accession. A different 
matter is the issue of how the GATT would handle an extension of the CAP to the CEECs 
once they  have become members of the EU.  The GATT provision relevant to this issue  is 
Article XXIV:6 of  the GATT, which essentially will require the EU to negotiate commitments 
for the enlarged Union with its GATT partners (as this has been the case in  earlier rounds of 
EC  enlargement).  This  is  not  the  place  to  speculate  about  the  possible  outcome  of such 
negotiations.  However,  it  should  be pointed  out that enlargement of the Union to comprise 
relatively  large  countries  (in  agriculture)  which  enter with  GATT  commitments  often  very 
much below those of  the existing EU cannot automatically be assumed to proceed smoothly in 
the GATT, without policy adjustments in the existing Union. 
In  sum,  the implications which  a strategy of gradually aligning  CEEC  prices with  the 
CAP  would  have  are  such  that  this  strategy  appears  undesirable,  and  even  not  feasible.  It 
would 
•  place a massive burden on CEEC consumers and taxpayers; 
•  result in an unacceptable fiscal exposure and the consequent macro-economic problems~ 
•  violate the GATT commitments of  the CEECs. 
Governments of the CEECs appear to be generally aware of these facts.  It is for these 
reasons that the third option of keeping price support in the CEECs low until accession to the 
EU merits, and is being given, priority attention. 
5.4  Option 3: Low Support Until Accession 
As argued in the previous two Sections, any large increase of support and protection, be 
it rapid or gradual, is likely to result in  serious economic and financial  difficulties, and would 
probably be inconsistent with commitments under the GATT. Indeed, current levels of support 
and  protection in the Visegrad countries have already reached a point where they may  imply 
economic and financial  costs which place an  undesirable burden on the overall economy (see 44 
above, Chapter 3). For those Visegrad countries which have already reached a relatively high 
level of  support, and for those products where this is the case, it may indeed be appropriate to 
consider a reduction, rather than a further increase of support and protection. More intensive 
state interference with market forces through more rigid measures of  support, protection and 
stabilization implies the danger of creating an agricultural sector which considers itself to be, 
and finally is,  dependent on government support, rather than being competitive internationally. 
In the longer run, such an agricultural sector would have less and less to contribute to overall 
economic well-being in the CEECs, but would essentially depend on transfers from the rest of 
the economy.  This is  exactly what the EU has  experienced  as a  result  of the high  level· of 
protection and support provided by the CAP (see below, Chapter 6). 
There  is  one  more  reason  why  keeping  the level  of support  low  until  the  time  of 
accession  to  the  EU,  rather  than  beginning  price ·alignment  with  the  CAP  soon,  is  the 
recommended strategy in the CEECs. Price alignment with the CAP requires an assumption on 
where the CAP will  be at the time of accession by  the CEECs.  In the previous Section the 
analysis presented was based on the working hypothesis that the CAP will not change in future, 
except for the changes which are already in  the pipeline due to completion of the MacSharry 
reform.  While  this  hypothesis  may  be  useful  for  analytical  purposes,  it  is  not  necessarily 
realistic.  Completion of the MacSharry  reform  may  not  suffice  to solve  most  of the  major 
problems which the CAP has created. There are domestic reasons in the European Union why 
more changes should be made to the CAP.  Moreover, as accession by the CEECs to the EU 
becomes more and  more likely,  and as the time at which accession may take place gets closer, 
the  need  will  be felt  to  reconsider  some  basic  elements  of the  CAP.  The  following  two 
Chapters of  this study will explain why this is the case. 
It is  not  certain  how agricultural  policy in  the EU will  respond to these pressures for 
further changes to the CAP. However, it may well be that significant adjustments are made to 
the CAP in  the years to come. If this happens, the direction of change will  likely be towards 
lower levels of  price support and market protection. Hence at the time of  CEEC accession the 
level of  support and protection under the CAP may be closer to where it is now in the CEECs 
than to what it is currently in the EU. It would be tragic if  at that time the CEECs had moved 
to the current level of  CAP support, and would then have to revert to where the came from in 
the  mid-1990's.  As  the  EU experience  has  amply  shown,  it  is  much  more  difficult,  both 
politically and economically, to reduce a high level of agricultural support than to keep it low 
level in the first place. 
For all these reasons it appears that keeping a low level of  support and protection in the 
CEECs is the preferable strategy among the three options considered above.  Also, given the 
fact that most of  the CEECs have already introduced policies to stabilize domestic markets and 45 
to protect domestic producers against excessively low world market prices, there is no reason 
to suggest now that completely new systems of  agricultural market policies should generally be 
introduced  in  the  CEECs.  There  are  still  occasional  wide  price  fluctuations  on  domestic 
markets, which are sometimes given as a reason to revise market policies in the CEECs. 11 Price 
fluctuations  are,  to  some  extent,  a  natural  phenomenon  on  agricultural  markets.  Some 
additional  stabilization measures may be necessary (see below,  Chapter 8).  But to eliminate 
price fluctuations  altogether would mean to suppress necessary market signals,  without the 
certainty that governments are better able  to detennine appropriate  prices than the market 
place.  In  particular,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  the  conceptual  and  practical  distinction 
between the stabilization of  prices on the one hand and price support on the other hand.  Price 
stabilization by definition would at best cut off  some particularly pronounced price drops. Price 
support, on the other hand, intends to raise the level of  prices on average, usually by keeping 
them  even above the level  they might  otherwise have  in  short  periods of fluctuations  with 
momentarily high prices. The EU has made the experience, at high cost, that price stabilization 
can easily turn into price support, simply because there is  a tendency to raise the floor price 
higher and higher over time.  The CEECs should be aware of  the danger that this could happen 
to their own price policies as well. 
All  this is  not meant  to say  that  certain improvements cannot be made to agricultural 
policies in the CEECs.  Some such improvements will be discussed below in Chapter 8.  These 
policy adjustments considered below should also help to make a low price stragegy politically 
feasible in the CEECs. Moreover, there are still  cases where domestic market prices of some 
products are currently kept below the international  price level,  in  particular in  Bulgaria and 
Romania  where  export  restrictions  interfere  with  market  price  formation.  In  these  cases, 
revisions  should  be  made  so  that  domestic  producers  are  not  disadvantaged  relative  to 
international  market  prices.  Where  low  consumer  prices  (e.g.  for  bread)  are  considered  a 
priority, limited consumer subsidies, or even better social safety net policies, are preferable to 
artificially low market prices. 
The  arguments  advanced  here  have  been  on  a  fairly  general  level,  and  not  much 
distinction has been made between individual CEECs. Is it true that all  CEECs should pursue 
the same policies?  As  a  matter of fact,  agricultural  market  and  trade policies already  differ 
significantly among the CEECs, both with respect to the instruments employed and the levels 
of support  and  protection  granted.  Implicitly  an  advice  that  support  levels  should  be 
maintained at their current levels, rather than being raised, would mean that this differentiation 
among individual countries would continue to prevail. To the extent that past policy decisions 
in  individual  countries  reflect  their  different  economic  and  social  conditions  this  policy 
11  See Nallet and van Stolk ( 1994  ). passim, for such an argument. 46 
differentiation may have good reasons. On the other hand, not all (implicit) decisions on levels 
of support  and  protection  in  the  past  may  have  been  made  with  full  insight  into  all  the 
implications. It could well be argued that some levels of support in  some CEECs are already 
higher than is in their own best interest, and should therefore be lowered. Hence in a way one 
could suggest that a more uniform  policy with low support and  protection levels across all 
CEECs would be better than the current differentiation. One major additional argument against 
a continued policy diversity is that it makes it difficult to create more liberal agricultural trade 
among the CEECs. This point will be taken up below in Chapter 8. Again it has, though, to be 
emphasized that there are other policies which can and  should complement the fundamental 
decision  regarding the level  of support and  protection.  Such  other policies  can  and  should 
differ among countries, in accordance with their specific economic and social conditions. Some 
of  these policies will also be discussed in Chapter 8. 47 
6  Policy Options and Constraints for the CAP: Medium Term 
6.1  A. Medium Run Outlook for the CAP 
The ease with which the CEECs can be assimilated into the CAP will depend crucially on 
the development of  the CAP over the next six years. This medium tenn outlook is the subject 
of this Chapter.  The outlook is  likely to be conditioned by  four  different  sets of pressures. 
First,  the  budget  costs  of the  CAP  will  continue  to  be  controlled  by  an  overall  budget 
constraint which is unlikely to be relaxed.  Second, the constraints imposed on the CAP as a 
result of  the Uruguay Round agreement will put strict limits on price developments under the 
CAP,  and  help  to  shape the instruments  used.  Third,  the  accession  of some  of the  EFT  A 
countries, and the progress toward membership of the CEECs will  change the market balance 
for the EU and influence both the budget cost and the political support for the CAP.  Fourth, 
the CAP will continue to be subject to pressures linked to broader rural and societal aims such 
as environmental, health and distributive objectives. All these factors will in turn be influenced 
by internal trends in  technical progress (such as the increase in  cereal yields)  and  in  external 
factors (such as world market prices).  In the face of so  many variables,  no-one can say with 
any  certainty what the CAP  will  look like when  the CEECs join the EU.  One can  however 
indicate  which  set  of policy  responses  gives  the  best  chance  of a  satisfactory  docking  of 
Central and Western European agricultures. 
The EU has  experienced a period of five  years when budget costs for agriculture. have 
been subject to limits,  based on the proportion of total spending.  The extra payments needed 
for CAP reform have strained these limits. Evidence of  mounting budget pressures can be seen 
already.  Graph  6.1  shows  the  growth  in  budget  in  the  past  five  years.  Even  without  the 
influence  of new  members  on  the budget (see  below)  it  is  likely  that  current  policies  will 
exhaust the budget allocation in the very near future. 
The response of  the Union to these budget pressures will determine in large part the CAP 
that  the CEECs join.  If the  response  is  to  reduce  prices  then  this  will  be  consistent  with 
eventual accession of the CEEC: if the reaction of the Union is to tighten supply control and 
remove productive capacity this will make accession more difficult.  Any  attempt" to shift the 
burden  to consumers will  run  into  problems with the GATT  Agreement  (see below).  One 
possible way out would be to shift the financial burden back to the individual member-states. If 48 
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the states took over any  responsibility for  price support, this would cause political  problems 
and  threaten  the unity  of the  market.  It would  however be  possible,  with  other balancing 
budgetary  adjustments,  to  take  over  some  part  of the  compensation  payments,  properly 
disconnected from production incentives, as national  obligations.  This would not only  reduce 
FEOGA spending but make the budget burden easier for new members to accept. 
Even if the limits  on budget  shares  were not to keep  the CAP  spending within  strict 
limits, there is now for the first time an effective external constraint on the CAP. The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture, if it goes into effect as planned, will  have implications for 
the CAP from  1995 until 2000.  As mentioned in  the preceding Chapter, the Agreement calls 
for a conversion of all  non-tariff trade barriers (including variable levies)  into tariffs,  which 
would then be reduced on a given schedule.  Export subsidy expenditure is  constrained,  and 
reduced on a given schedule.  The volume of exports benefiting from  subsidies is  also  to be 
reduced, and export subsidies cannot be introduced on other products. Domestic support  in 
those cases where prices are administered is  also reduced by schedule. Though the degree of 
liberalization is not dramatic, there will be additional pressures before the end of  the decade to 
negotiate a continuation to the Agreement in order to liberalize agricultural trade further. 
The  GATT  commitments  in  agriculture  accepted  by  the  EU are  unlikely  to  have  a 
marked impact on EU agriculture in the next two years. Agreement was made possible by the 
slight  decline  in  some CAP  prices (expressed however in  tenns of a  strengthening "green" 49 
ECU) over the years  since the Uruguay Round  started,  and  more particularly  by  the bold 
Reform decided in 1992.  As a result, the constraints on export subsidies and total support can 
be met without immediate policy change. In the medium term, the constraint on the volume of 
exports which can be subsidized represents the most binding constraint and is likely to impact 
on CAP price decisions before the end of  the GATT implementation period (i.e. before 2000). 
The Agreement also mandates a change to the variable levy system for import protection, 
replacing it with tariffs.  This tariffication is  accompanied by  a special  safeguard mechanism 
which can be used in  cases of import surge or world price collapse.  The height of the new 
bound tariffs are such as to put little pressure on domestic market prices for the next few years. 
Moreover, for cereals a maximum duty-paid import price has been negotiated as a part of the 
EU'  s obligations. This implies a continuation of  a modified threshold price system, at least so 
long as world prices do not drop to very low levels. 
It would  however  be  a  mistake to  think  that  the impact  on  the  CAP  of the  GATT 
agreement is  small.  Even though it  does not mandate many  price and  policy changes in  the 
immediate future, it effectively constrains future decisions.  Specifically, it makes it difficult if 
not impossible to revert to the policy price levels that obtained before CAP reform. It makes it 
difficult to increase the level of compensation to farmers under  CAP reform, or to relax set-
asides,  without  incurring  the  risk  of challenge  under the  GATT.  It makes  it  impossible  to 
expand the use of  export subsidies beyond the limits agreed in the Schedules. And it obliges the 
Union to maintain  current access for specified  agricultural  products.  In  effect it locks in  the 
policy changes of the past few years,  and  makes any deviation from that path both politically 
and economically costly. 
The  enlargement  of the  EU  to  include  Austria,  Finland,  Sweden  and  when  ratified 
Norway, will not have a great influence on the CAP.  The new members taken together are net 
importers of most major farm  products, with the exception of milk products. Their accession 
will not add significantly to the budget, and will not cause any major disruption in agricultural 
markets. The two influences that can be expected are more subtle. First, the new members will 
have some influence on the political balance of the Union with respect to agricultural policy. 
This is likely to show up as strong opposition to price declines, at least if unaccompanied by 
compensating headage and hectarage payments. It will also be manifest in a stronger interest in 
the environmental impacts of intensive agriculture and in the pressure to recompense farmers 
for the scenic and recreational value of  their land (see below). 
In addition, the accession of  the EFT  A countries will establish precedents for the further 
enlargements to the East.  First, the fact that the Compensation payments under CAP reform 
were treated as a part of  the acquis communautaire sets a precedent which other new members 
may  be  able  to  follow.  In  effect,  the  Union  accepted  some  part  of the  financial  cost  of 50 
providing headage and hectarage payments for the EFT  A countries.  These payments would 
have been needed in any case to bridge the gap between their generally higher price levels 
(except in the case of  Sweden) and those of  the CAP. As the net budget contribution expected 
from  the  new  members  was  decided  by  negotiation,  the  transfers  under  the  MacSharry 
payments were not necessarily a (net) burden on the EU budget. Similarly, the cost of  the new 
programmes for Arctic regions are unlikely to be a heavy burden on the budget. 
The prospect of  the accession of  the Central European states is much more threatening 
to the stability of the CAP, and to its ability to live within financial  guidelines.  This central 
issue will be taken up below when discussing alternative policy options for the CAP. 
In addition to the market balance and budget cost constraints, other forces will be acting 
on the CAP in the next six years. These include the pressure to make sure that environmental 
goals are not violated by commercial agriculture. The addition of  new members highly sensitive 
to environmental issues will strengthen this trend. One would expect more concern over animal 
welfare, worker health and consumer quality and food safety issues.  By contrast, broad goals 
of  "rural development" not tied to these essentially urban concerns are unlikely to make much 
impact on the agricultural policy. 
In addition to environmental and health concerns, issues of  income distribution are likely 
to surface over the next few years, as the gap between those who receive large payments from 
the CAP and those that don't is increased. This could lead to pressures to limit payments, and 
to put other constraints on the significant amounts of money that now are paid directly to the 
farmer. This could in turn lead farmers to want to find  some other criteria for payment, such as 
stewardship of  natural resources and provision of  amenities. 
The combination of these two pressures could take the CAP down a path toward the 
personalization  of policy,  and  away  from  the  support  of commodity  prices  as  a  proxy for 
income maintenance.  Some part of the payments would be given for activities undertaken to 
preserve environmental amenities. But these payments would be in lieu of controls on farming 
practices,  and  hence  conform both with  the trend  to  using  market  mechanisms to achieve 
environmental aims and also be consistent with the notion of freedom of the farmer to chose 
his farming pattern and practice. Coupled with the GATT constraints on price policies, and the 
encouragement  to  use  other methods  to achieve  income  objectives,  one  could  well  see  a 
different mix of  policies in rural Europe by the end of  the century. 51 
6.2  Options for tbe CAP in tbe Medium Term 
Option 1: Minimal Changes to tbe CAP 
One reaction to all  these events is to try to preserve the policy as it exists, adapting to 
pressures in an ad hoc way. Such a strategy would avoid taking action to forestall crises.  This 
reactive  approach  to policy  developments  has  three  main  problems.  First,  such  a  strategy 
delays the necessary changes in policy which would in any case be in the inter:est of  the Union. 
These include the promotion of  a competitive agricultural industry that can sell goods on world 
markets without the need for subsidies, the provision of  raw materials for a food industry that 
also  is  competitive,  and  the removal  of the  artificial  incentives  to  keep  land  in  inefficient 
activities for the sake of  benefiting from support payments. 
European agriculture at the moment appears to add little or nothing to the GNP of the 
Union.  Net Value Added  in  the sector as a whole was about  110 billion ECU in  1991  (see 
Table 6.1).  This was 49 percent of the value of final  output. For the same year,  the OECD 
calculated that 68 billion ECU had been transferred to the sector through the CAP, a sum also 
equal to 49 percent of  the value of  sales for those commodities included. 1At the same time the 
OECD  reports total transfers including  those  by  national  governments  at  118  billion  ECU, 
somewhere in between the net and gross value added.2 In other words, the transfers through 
policy  are the same order of magnitude as  the excess of revenue over costs of inputs from 
other sectors (i.e.  value added). If this is the case, then the cost of purchased inputs must  be 
roughly  the  same  as  the  market  value  (without  policy  intervention)  of output.  Hence,  no 
appreciable value is being added to the inputs purchased from other sectors, and the industry as 
a  whole  contributes  little  or  nothing  to  GDP.  It  is  this  total  waste  of good  agricultural 
resources  and  the  skiJJs  of the farm  community  that  constitutes  the  biggest  reason  not  to 
continue with current policies. 
Second,  in  addition  to internal  economic  considerations,  there  are  other  reasons  to 
change policies before forced to by crisis.  A strategy of waiting for further crises to develop 
will  inevitably  increase  the  likelihood  of a  conflict  with  GATT  obligations.  It  will  also 
maximize the likely political cost of enlargement and of conforming with GATT obligations. 
By reacting to problems rather than anticipating them, the policy will be in a semi-permanent 
1  OECD, Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade, Paris, 1993, p.l31. 
2  Ibid, p.  160. Total transfers reported include those in the form of social policies.  Not all of these transfers 
tum up in Net Value Added. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the comparison of  these figures. 52 
Table 6.1:  Value Added in EC-12 Agriculture in 1991 
Billion ECU  Percent 
Final Agricultural Output  223  100 
Gross Value Added (Market Prices)  127  57 
Gross Value Added (Factor Cost)  138  62 
Net Value Added (Factor Cost)  110  49 
Source: OECD (1994d). 
state of crisis.  Those that  support the continuation of the  CAP  as  it  stands at present will 
always be seen to be at odds with those that are arguing for EU enlargement, for good trade 
relations with other OECD countries and with the developing world, and for a competitive EU 
agriculture which can support a competitive food industry and contribute to the economy. 
Third, the most important disadvantage of the minimal  change option in the context of 
preparing for accession by the CEECs is that it would essentially preclude the extension of  the 
CAP to the new entrants from Central and Eastern Europe. Such an extension would result in 
a situation which  is  not  sustainable for  budgetary  and  trade  reasons.  As  reported  above  in 
Chapter 5, we estimate the annual budget expenditure for market policies in the four Visegrad 
countries resulting from  price alignment with the CAP to be in  the order of magnitude of 9 
billion ECU in  1993  prices.  In the context of our discussion of policy options for the CEECs, 
this  expenditure was considered to be  spending out of government budgets in  the Visegrad 
countries. Once these countries have acceded to the EU, this expenditure turns into a burden 
on the EU budget. In addition to this expenditure for price support and  export subsidies the 
EU would have to finance MacSharry compensation payments to farmers in the CEECs if the 
CAP remains unchanged.  Of course it  could be argued that there is no  price decrease to be 
compensated in the CEECs, and hence that there is no need to extend MacSharry payments to 
them.  On  the  other  hand  a  precedent  was  set  in  accession  negotiations  with  the  EFT  A 
countries, where no doubt was raised over the right of  their farmers to receive compensation 
payments, out of  the Brussels budget, like any farmer in the EU-12. With an unchanged CAP, 
under which farmers in  all  existing member countries receive compensation payments out of 
the  Brussels  budget,  it  would  be  politically  rather  difficult  to explain  to the  much  poorer 
farmers  in  the CEECs why  they should be excluded  from  such payments,  while at  the same 53 
time being expected to compete with farmers from the rest of  the Union on an equal footing as 
far as market prices are concerned. 
If  MacSharry payments were indeed extended to CEEC farmers,  this would amount to 
an expenditure of  around 4.3 billion ECU for Visegrad country farmers alone (see Appendix I). 
Additional  sums  would  be required  for  market  policies  and  compensation  payments  in  the 
other  CEECs.  Total  additional  expenditure  for  extending  an  unchanged  CAP  to  the  six 
associated countries in Central Europe may well  be in the order of magnitude of 20 billion 
ECU or more (see Appendix 1).3 Expenditure under the FEOGA GuidanCe section would then 
increase by more than one third. Such a massive increase would not only be politically difficult 
to  accept.  It would  also  violate  the  principle  of budgetary  constraint  established  by  the 
guideline  for  the  _CAP,  which  links  agricultural  policy  expenditure  to  GDP  in  the  EU. 
Accession by the six CEECs would expand GDP of the then EU-16 by around 3 per cent.  A 
simultaneous  increase of CAP  expenditure by more  than  one third  would not appear to be 
consistent with that growth in GDP. 
Also, as discussed above in Chapter 5, the GATT commitments which the CEECs would 
bring to the EU do not provide scope for their adoption of the CAP.  If aggregated with the 
EU's GATT commitments, which at the time may hardly suffice to cover an unchanged CAP, 
they would certainly not be sufficient to allow for the CAP to be extended to the CEECs. It 
also  is  unlikely  that  the  EU would  find  acceptance  in  GATT  negotiations  under  Article 
XXIV: 6 that it  can adjust its Schedule commitments such that they would suffice to cover an 
unchanged CAP extended to the CEECs. 
In other words, the minimal change option for the CAP is not only undesirable frot;n  the 
perspective of  the current EU. It would simply be unsustainable if  extended to the CEECs. 
Option 2: Continuation of CAP Reform, Improve Coverage, Adjust Instruments 
An  alternative approach is  to attempt to continue the reform process started in  1993. 
This means at least two further stages in the reform process. The first is to complete the reform 
of sectors  other than the cereals  and  oilseeds  complex.  Reform  of the  dairy  industry  was 
shelved at the last minute in 1993, in order to get agreement on the cereals and oilseeds sector. 
At  that  time,  further  dairy  quota cuts were  contemplated,  along  with  price  cuts for  dairy 
products.  Some price cuts survived, but the dairy sector is still operating with prices far above 
world market levels. Reform of the dairy sector needs to be restarted. Price reductions could 
3  Various other studies have tried to estimate the budgetary implications of extending the CAP to the CEECs. 
A survey of some of these studies is provided in Directorate General II (1994). The maximum estimate, by 
Anderson and Tyers ( 1994 ), arrives at a figure of 40 billion ECU. 54 
be  compensated  by  the  issuance  of certificates  to  farmers,  as  suggested  in  the  original 
MacSharry reform paper. In addition to the cereal and dairy sectors, other sectors also are in 
need  of policy  modification  to become more efficient.  The sugar sector,  long  neglected  in 
reform discussions because of its small budget cost, is also among those that operate at price 
(and cost) levels well above the international competition. The wine sector, along with those 
for fiuits and vegetables could also be improved by inclusion in the reform process. 
The second step in this modest completion of  CAP reform is to reduce the incentive that 
currently exists for  farmers to continue to farm  hectares just in  order to get compensation 
payments. If  the farmer cannot make a profit from the production of  cereals and oilseeds at the 
market price, as supported by the threshold price (or maximum duty-paid price under GATT 
rules, in the case of  cereals) and the intervention price, then it is clearly a waste of  resources to 
insist that the land  is  used in  this way.  One might  wish to suggest a number of criteria for 
receiving the payments: use of  the land in an inefficient way should surely not be one of  them. 
From  the  point  of view  of CEEC  enlargement,  this  option  would  be  slightly  less 
problematic than the minimal change option. However, it would not fundamentally change the 
agricultural  policy  environment  to  which  the  CEECs  would  accede,  and  it  would  not 
sufficiently solve the problems which CEEC accession would create for the EU budget and for 
the GATT commitments of an enlarged EU. The crisis following CEEC enlargement might be 
less dramatic, but it  would be sufficiently severe to get into the way of a smooth process of 
assimilating the new countries of  Central and Eastern Europe. 
Option 3: Complete Reform Process to Give Competitive Agriculture 
The third  strategy is  to be proactive,  anticipating changes and adapting before a crisis 
occurs.  It  involves  going  considerably  further  than  the  present  reform  in  lowering  market 
prices and in paying compensation payments to those that are severely disadvantaged. 
In the case of the cereal  sector,  the  next  step would be to lower the market price by 
some significant amount, until close to expected medium-run world market prices levels.  The 
extra  compensation  payments,  as  well  as  compensation  payments  already  made  under  the 
MacSharry reform, would be paid in a different way than currently is the case. First, no further 
use of  land would be necessary to receive the payments. They should carry a termination date, 
say ten years, with a declining payment value, but be fully portable and transferable.  4 Set-asides 
4  The best way  to  make fully  decoupled payments portable and transferable is for the EU to  accept a finn 
commitment,  vis-a-vis each farmer  eligible  to  receive  payments,  to  make  these  payments  on  a  regular 
schedule  over  a  given  number  of  years.  Farmers should  then  be allowed  to  sell  their  rights  to  these 
payments on the capital market, like government bonds. For a full discussion, see Tangennann (1992). 55 
would be discontinued, as being unnecessary if  market prices are close to world market levels. 
Export subsidies would fall with the drop in market price, and so the level of  exports need not 
be constrained by set-asides. Moreover, if fanners are no longer required to farm land in order 
to receive  compensation  payments,  output  would  decrease.  Farmers  would  make  planting 
decisions based on the best use of their land rather than on the need to satisfy  programme 
requirements. 
In the case of the dairy  sector this  option  could  include  a  multi-year commitment to 
move  support  prices  towards  those  on  world  markets,  compensated  where  necessary _by 
payments not tied to continued milk production. The system of  dairy quotas .itself, as long as it 
is still necessary until prices have been sufficiently reduced,. needs to be overhauled, to allow 
the sale of quota rights  across member states.  Production of without-quota milk  should  be 
allowed by producers who wish to compete with overseas producers. Products made from this 
non-quota milk would not receive an export subsidy.  Over time such milk could replace quota 
milk  on  the  domestic market,  as  the quantity of quota milk  is  reduced  by  the  purchase of 
quotas  from  farmers.  These  quotas  would  not  be  reissued:  the  effect  would  be  to  gtve 
compensation to the farmer for loss of  the quota rents inherent in the supported market. 
The two central elements of  this option would be a reduction of  CAP support prices to a 
level close to world market prices, and a complete decoupling of  compensation payments from 
production and  use of resources.  Both elements could be  implemented  in  a gradual fashion, 
without a "reform of the (MacSharry)  reform"  having to be declared.  Price reduction could 
occur in annual steps, though it would be best to have a predetermined schedule of such price 
cuts over a number of years.  Decoupling of compensation payments could be implemented in 
an  incremental  fashion  by  gradually  increasing the  percentage of their  base  acreage  which 
farmers can voluntarily set aside without losing payments. As more and more acreage would be 
idled voluntarily in this process, the percentage of  mandatory set-aside could be simultaneously 
reduced. Similar schemes could be designed for livestock payments. 
Another  helpful  feature  of such  a change to the CAP  would  be  a  redefinition  of the 
approach to financial  solidarity in  EU agricultural  policy.  Once compensation payments are 
decoupled from production and resource use they will no longer distort production incentives 
and  become  pure income  transfers.  Under  the  subsidiarity  principle,  much  can  be said  for 
pursuing income  policies  at  the  level  of the member  states,  as  long  as they  do  not  distort 
competition across borders.  It would therefore be logical to hand financial  responsibility  for 
decoupled payments over to the member states. As this would significantly change the volume 
and direction of  financial and economic transfers among member states, lump sum adjustments 
would probably need to be made to member states' contributions to the EU budget. However, 
once initial  budget adjustments have been made  such that no  member state can  claim to be 56 
financially  disadvantaged,  member state governments  should  be happy to have flexibility  in 
granting income transfers to their farmers in line with their domestically felt needs.  !5 
An  important  advantage  of this  option  would  be  that  the  question  of whether 
compensation payments should be made to CEEC farmers is a non-issue. Governments of the 
CEECs  would  have  to  decide  for  themselves  whether  it  is  appropriate  to  grant  income 
payments.  In  all  likelihood  they  would  not  find  that  advisable.  The  historical  origin  of 
compensation payments in the EU is  the reduction of support prices agreed  as  part of the 
MacSharry refonn in 1992. Accession to the EU would not result in agricultural support price 
reductions in the CEECs, unless they were to move in the meantime to a level of  price support 
above that prevailing in the EU at the time of  accession. If  prices do not have to be reduced as 
a  result  of joining the  CAP  there  is  no  reason  to  offer  compensation,  and  hence  CEEC 
governments are unlikely  to see  any  need  for  such payments.  Indeed,  low CAP  prices  and 
nationally financed decoupled payments in a pre-accession EU would eliminate the temptation 
to raise the level of price support in the CEECs before accession just for the reason of being 
entitled to compensation payments from Brussels. The existence of potentially different levels 
of compensation payments in different member states of  the (enlarged) Union would not cause 
economic problems,  and  would  not  be  inconsistent with  a Single Market, if these payments 
properly decoupled as suggested here. 
6.3  Comparison of Options from the Viewpoint of the Present EU 
Casual  observation of the political  process suggests that the option most likely  to  be 
followed is that of  relative inaction until provoked by crisis. However the economic costs over 
the next few years of such a course may  well be high.  If yield  increases for the major crops 
continue at  1.5  - 2 percent a year,  the inaction strategy will  prove untenable.  Changes in  the 
CAP wilJ be forced by both the GATT Agreement and the budget. The changes will  be either 
of  the type outlined in options 2 and 3, in which case the delay will have been costly, or will be 
of  a less desirable nature. Similarly, if  world prices are seriously depressed then export subsidy 
expenditure  as  allowed  under  the  GATT  will  be  inadequate  to  remove  surpluses  off the 
domestic market. 
The most tempting ad hoc strategy for the relief of market surpluses is supply control, 
through greater set-asides or land  retirement schemes.  In the case of animal  products,  herd 
reduction schemes play the same role.  The problem comes in the distortion that such schemes 
!5  Major elements of this option for the CAP are similar to  those suggested by an Expert Group ( 1994}  in a 
report for DG II. 57 
imply for the allocation of resources within the farm sector (even if the total resources in the 
sector have been reduced by supply control). This distortion is also among countries, in  that 
supply control is likely to have differential effects in different member states, and among farms. 
Total costs will be considerably higher for the same level of output, and hence fann incomes 
will  be  less  for  the  same  supported  level  of receipts.  Moreover,  the  further  intrusion  of 
bureaucratic  controls  into  the  normal  farm  decisions  on what  to  plant  and  what  stocking 
density to maintain could cost both political support for the CAP (and for the EU) as well as 
add to the economic burden of the industry.  In  short, continuation of the current policy may 
have appeal but runs the risk of, at the least, costly delay in making needed changes and,. at the 
worst, the promotion of  supply control even though it is an undesirable direction for policy to 
take. 
The middle-ground option of a continuation of CAP reform is inherently more costly in 
political capital, but has certain advantages. First, the reduction in the market price for dairy, 
s1,1gar  and other newly reformed commodities offers to those sectors the advantages that the 
first stage of  reform did to grains and oil seeds. Lower consumer prices and lower prices for the 
.  processing industry would in  effect remove a tax that  curr~ntly holds back consumption and 
reduces competitiveness.  Compensation payments would preserve for some time the income 
streams  to  producers  until  they  were  able  to  switch  to  alternative  commodities.  GATT 
constraints  would  be  more  easily  met,  and  the  improved  international  climate  would  have 
beneficial consequences for exporters of  other products. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  a  problem  to  this  strategy.  It  may  not  prove  enough to avoid 
problems associated with the challenge of membership of the CEECs. Price levels would still 
be higher than can in the long run be sustained. It would require a long transition period (see 
below) to avoid the overstimulation of  agricultural output in the new members. 
The more positive policy change would not only complete the MacSharry reforms but lay 
the foundation for a competitive agriculture for a Union of  about twenty countries. This would 
include a truly single market over the area of the current Union, which would also be offered 
to new members from  the start.  It would comprise payments to farmers based on their past 
production of  supported commodities, as an ex-gratia compensation for expectations misled by 
government promises. It would allow farmers to make their own planting and livestock raising 
decisions. It would remove the artificial incentive to maintain high use of chemical inputs, and 
hence to put in jeopardy the environment. 
The benefits of  taking CAP reform to its logical limit would be considerable. First, the 
wastage of resources that currently go to produce goods that have no  commercial  markets 
would be reduced. Second, the food industry could develop on a pan-European basis with the 
lowest raw material costs possible. Third, it would give the EU a position in world trade which 58 
it has not had for years, in the forefront of those seeking to improve world markets.  Fourth, 
and most important, the assimilation of  the CEECs would be made both easier for the EU and 
less costly to the entrants. 59 
7  Post-Accession Transitional Arrangements Between the EU and the CEEC 
7.1  Transitional Arrangements in Previous Enlargements 
The  EU  has  had  considerable  experience  in  assimilating  countries  with  different 
agricultural policies and price levels into the CAP.  The accession of the UK in  1973  posed 
significant problems of a  political and economic nature.  On the political side,  public opinion 
labelled the EC as a bastion of  high food prices, in contrast to the price levels in the UK which 
for historic reasons had been governed by the state of  world markets. The UK dispensed with 
the  "deficiency  payments"  which  farmers  had  come  to  accept  as  the  main  instrument  of 
agricultural  policy.  It was also  considered a  food  policy,  in  so  far  as  it  allowed  consumers 
ready access to supplies at low prices. The reconciliation of this system with the CAP was to 
have a transition to the higher CAP prices,  along with the introduction of import levies and 
export subsidies.  The price gaps over the transition were offset by "accession compensatory 
amounts", added to or subtracted from the traded price. 
On reflection, a golden opportunity was lost at that time to make a radical adjustment to 
the  price  level  in  the  EC  to  which  the  UK  farmers  and  consumers  were  adjusting.  Had 
compensation payments been given to the farmers in the Six, the troubles of the CAP in  later 
years would not have been so great. It may have been difficult to do, however, in the climate of 
the time.  An extraordinary rise in world prices in the mid-1970's altered conceptions about the 
long run state of world markets.  As a result,  prices rose less fast in  the UK than they .would 
have done outside the EC, as they were effectively subsidized by other member states.  CAP 
prices were notched up in  lagged response,  and were left high and dry by the receding world 
market  prices.  These high  prices led  directly  to the budget and  trade problems of the next 
decade. 
Transition arrangements had to be  negotiated in  the second round of enlargements,  as 
well. Greece was given up to seven years to prepare its own markets for competition with EC 
produce. Portugal was granted an even longer period when it joined the EC, with a five year 
initial  phase  to  allow  Portuguese  authorities  to  modify  the  marketing  systems  to  allow 
implementation of  CAP regulations, followed by a further five years  to adopt EC price levels. 
Portugal had prices in  many cases higher than the EC, implying some adjustment problem for 
farmers.  A long transition was presumably desirable to allow time for this adjustment.  Spain, 
by  contrast was ready  to compete immediately,  but was deemed  to be a  threat to the EC 
market in such areas as wine, olive oil and fiuits and vegetables. As a consequence, Spain also 60 
had a transition period, though shorter than that for Portugal, which in effect allowed the EC 
to modify its policies in the area of  Mediterranean crops. 
The transition arrangements for the EFT  A countries were different  again.  The EFT  A 
countries had a history of price supports higher than in  the EC.  They also had  a history of 
closed markets, and had resisted attempts to open up ·agriculture among themselves as a part of 
EFT  A.  Agriculture was kept out of the EC-EFT  A bilaterals which were negotiated after the 
UK joined the EC.  Agricultural goods were also  kept out of the EEA, the Treaty which in 
effect gave EFT  A countries economic though  not political  membership of the Community. 
When the EFT  A countries came to apply f<?r membership, the anomaly of  agriculture had to be 
tackled. The normal assumption would therefore have been a long transition to allow farmers 
in these countries to adjust over time to the considerably lower farm prices. The exception to 
this would  have  been  Sweden,  where the  farm  support  prices  had  been  reduced  (with  the 
payment of  some compensation to farmers) in advance of membership application as a part of 
economic  restructuring.  But the  EFT  A countries  were  applying  to join  the  EU (i.e.  post-
Maastricht) and hence had  to adhere to the principle and to the practicalities of a borderless 
European Union. Accession compensatory amounts had been traditionally granted or collected 
at the border. In the spirit of  CAP reform, of  the GATT talks,· and of  their own attempts to get 
away from high market prices, the new members settled for instantaneous adoption of  policies 
and policy prices, with an overlay of compensation payments based on hectarage and headage 
and financed from both EU and national funds. 
7.2  Options for the Transition Period 
Option 1: Exclusion of Agriculture from Single EU Market 
Transition  arrangements  for  the  CEECs  could  follow  one of four  models.  First,  one 
could imagine an agreement for membership which  so circumscribed agricultural  trade flows 
that it  constituted a  de facto  exclusion of the sector from  the internal  market  between the 
existing EU and the new members. The analogy is with the treatment of  agriculture within the 
EEA. This virtual exclusion could take the form of strict quantitative restrictions on imports 
from the CEEC, or semi-permanent taxes on imports from  (and subsidies on imports to) the 
CEEC. The implication would be that the price levels need not converge, and the policies need 
not  be  harmonized.  The  internal  agricultural  market  in  the EU would  be  protected  from 
competition from the CEEC. Such a situation is more likely to obtain if  the CAP has not been 
reformed further (Option 1 for the EU, above) and if  the CEECs have not made a move to EU 
levels (Option 3 for the CEEC). Under such circumstances, the price gap could be wide.  The 
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This  would  have  a  number  of serious  economic  and  political  implications.  It would 
perpetuate the current imperfect market access of  CEECs into the EU. As a result, the CEECs 
would be denied benefits that other members enjoyed in the internal  market.  Politically,  this 
would  constitute  "second-class  citizenship"  for  the  CEECs.  From  the  point  of view  of 
European integration, it would imply a breach in  the principle that Single Market legislation 
applies to all  members.  It would in  effect represent a  mo~e to "Europe a  Ia  Carte".  Other 
countries may be tempted to have their own separate agricultural markets and policies. Lastly, 
it would postpone the removal of  border posts between the current EU and the CEECs, and 
hence represent a departure from the free internal market. All this would be just for the sake of 
avoiding inevitable decisions in agricultural markets. 
Option 2: Long Transition for Prices in the CEECs 
A second transition model would try to make the transition period as long as possible, as 
a way of  avoiding the political problems of  a permanent exclusion of agriculture from the free 
circulation of  goods within the Union.  One could imagine a long transition period, say fifteen 
years.  This again denies the new members immediate market access,  and  also gives them the 
option of keeping  prices low in  the  meantime.  Moreover,  it  does  not  obviate the need  for 
border  posts.  A  long  transition  period  would  inevitably  postpone  adjustments  in  CEEC 
agriculture. The problem with postponing adjustment is that necessary changes are delayed and 
the costs of being out of adjustment are borne for a longer period. There is a cost to keeping 
two different  price levels for  agricultural  goods in  the EU (or more,  if the CEEC have  not 
harmonized their own prices).  This cost is a misallocation of resources within the agricultural 
sector of the enlarged EU,  leading to higher  production costs and  ultimately to lower farm 
incomes.  But  there  will  be  benefits  to  a  delayed  adjustment  if the  end-point  is  itself 
unsatisfactory.  Adjustment to farm  prices which  are too high  has  its  own costs.  Too many 
resources  are  kept  in  agriculture,  to the  detriment  of other  sectors  and  the  economy  as  a 
whole. Delay in imposing these costs on the economy need not be a bad strategy. 
The economic cost of  this strategy may well revolve around the budgetary arrangements. 
If the CEECs are relieved of paying agricultural levies to the EU,  and  are denied  access to 
export subsidy funds,  then the appropriate price level  for agricultural products in  the CEECs 
will  be close to the expected  level  on  world  markets.  Higher price  levels  impose taxes  on 
consumers and necessitate export subsidies. If however the EC does collect revenue, over the 
long transition period, from  the (lower) level  of tariffs  applied  in  the CEEC; if the CEECs 
receive export subsidies from the EU for their third-country exports~ and if  there is no artificial 
ceiling on budget transfers from and  to the new members, then this makes the world market 
price in effect irrelevant. In that case the economic benefits will depend crucially on the market 
balance for agricultural products. For export products a rapid shift to higher EU prices will be 62 
advantageous. For imports it will impose an economic cost. On balance it would seem that a 
long transition is  likely to be against the interests of the CEECs if  they have a predominant 
export interest in agriculture and if  they are immediately drawn into the budget process. 
In any case the major distinction between excluding the CEECs from the CAP altogether 
and  a  long  transition  period  is  mainly  of a  political  and  optical  nature.  In  terms  of 
administrative arrangements the two options are very similar at least during the initial phase. 
Border  posts  would  have  to  be  maintained  just  for  agricultural  reasons  under  the  long 
transition  option,  and  the  Single Market would  not  apply  to agriculture.  In  spite  of these 
drawbacks,  if the  CAP  is  not  changed  before  accession  it  would  be  difficult  to extend  it 
immediately to the CEECs after their accession, for all the reasons discussed above. Hence the 
issues  of CAP  reform  and  design  of the  transition  regime  for  the  CEECs  are  closely 
interwoven. 
Option 3: "Single Market" without Competition 
A third option for transition allows for the impression of a common market without the 
reality.  If the CAP is not reformed before Eastern enlargement, if the appearance of a Single 
Market without border posts is considered an imperative, and if  the EU budget does not suffice 
to finance the market surpluses which application of the CAP would then tend to generate in 
the CEECs,  then this third  option can be implemented.  Production of all  major agricultural 
products  in  the  CEECs  can  then  be  made  subject  to  quotas,  like  sugar  and  dairy  quotas 
currently used in the EU.  With a rigid  quota system,  surpluses can be avoided in  the CEECs 
even though their farmers are paid the same high prices as farmers in the EU.  It is clear that 
this option would only look like a single market, as none of the effective competition which 
characterizes a truly single  market would be allowed to occur.  This option would  only be a 
plausible  choice if the EU were to avoid  any  further  proper reform  of the CAP  and  move 
towards more and more supply control instead. 
On  the  other  hand,  if market  forces  are  allowed  to  play  an  increasing  role  in  EU 
agriculture it would be both counter-productive and unfair to suggest that the CEECs need to 
subject their agricultural sectors to rigid supply controls. It would also be a particular ·irony to 
suggest that countries which have recently escaped from  central  planning,  and  are about to 
make the final  move towards the world of market economies by acceding to the EU,  should 
move all the way back to state controls in agriculture at the very time of  joining the EU. 
Option 4: Rapid· Transition to Common Prices 
A fourth  option  allows  for  prices  to  be  harmonized  rapidly.  The  desirability  of that 
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of the CEECs prior to accession.  Put simply, if the CAP is  not reformed then much of the 
urgency to move to full market integration in agriculture is lost. A quick transition would then 
not be beneficial either to new members of  to the existing EU. However, if  the CAP were to be 
further  reformed  in  the period  before  entry,  then  a  rapid  transition  period  would  be  both 
possible and desirable. Equally, a rapid transition to low common prices under a reformed CAP 
would be feasible for the CEECs only if they were to keep their support prices and level  of 
protection low until accession. If  the CEECs were to raise their level of  support and protection 
in the next few years while the CAP is reformed, then the CEECs need time to adjust to what 
after their accession would be a low level of  CAP prices relative to the prices the CEECs have 
reached in the meantime. An extended transition period would then also be needed. 
As argued above, the strategy of keeping price support low is rational for the CEECs in 
any  case.  If,  by the time of accession,  the CAP  has undergone further but still  incomplete 
reform, the strategy by the CEECs of  not moving soon to current CAP prices will have proved 
sensible. They would escape the cost of adopting a price level too high to be maintained. The 
new  men:t~ers would  risk building the expectations of farmers  and  incurring  obligations for 
compensation if  prices had to come down. The strategy of  maintaining price levels below those 
of the Union  until  membership  is  imminent  implies  a  cautious  policy  of preparing  CEEC 
agricultural sectors for membership, without overstimulation of  those sectors which only CAP 
membership is likely to make profitable. 
In the event that the CAP should undergo a complete reform  as  suggested above.  the 
best strategy for the CEECs will  also have been to have kept prices low.  This eliminates any 
false expectations of highly protected markets.  It avoids the pre-accession costs of increased 
price support.  And  it  reduces tensions arising from  GATT obligations which might otherwise 
constrain policy in the medium term. As important, it  minimizes the potential threat as seen by 
the EU, of  the disruption of  markets following accession. 
Under  a  reformed  CAP,  and  only  under that  policy,  the  issue  of how  to  deal  with 
agricultural transition after CEEC accession is  easily  resolved.  If CAP prices are low by the 
time of  enlargement, and if  the CEECs are wise enough to keep their prices low until that time, 
then  there  is  no  need  for  a  transition  period,  and  a  complete  Single  Market,  including 
agriculture,  can  be  established  immediately  following  accession.  There  is  no  problem  of 
"second-class  citizenship"  and  no  need  to  design  complicated  transition  arrangements  for 
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7.3  Trade and Budgetary Arrangements for the Transition 
Intra-EU flows after enlargement would be governed by the choice of  transition period. 
If  price levels are still different at accession, border tax adjustments such as have been used in 
the past would seem to be needed. If  the decision has been made to keep quantitative controls 
on CEEC imports,  more extensive monitoring will  be needed.  This raises the question as to 
whether there will be commercial borders between the EU and the new members. If  the only 
reason to have such  borders is  to regulate  agricultural  markets,  there will be considerable 
pressure to speed up  the process of policy and  price harmonization.  Given the tendency of 
border controls,  in  particular those of a  quantitative  nature,  to be used  as  hidden  form  of 
protectionism,  there is  much to be said  for removing such borders as  a  priority within the 
enlarged Union. This suggests that any price level  differences at the time of  accession should 
be compensated by means of payments directly to farmers (if  the price level is  higher in the 
acceding country) so  as  not to require interference with cross-border commerce.  The other 
aspect of  this is that CEEC farmers would benefit immediately from higher prices in the Union. 
Trade flows from outside the EU would under such arrangements be immediately subject 
to the same tariffs as  charged  on imports into other member states.  CEEC goods would be 
eligible  for  the  same  export  subsidies  as  other  members.  The  EU  might  under  these 
circumstances consider negotiating an increase in the allowed  exp~nditure on export subsidies 
under the GATT schedule, and the allowable quantities that can benefit from a subsidy. But as 
the CEECs did  not  have  significant  export subsidies in  the base period,  other countries may 
take the view that enlargement of the EU is  not a reason to create more problems for  other 
exporters.  In  this  case  the EU may  have  to  absorb  the  extra  exportable  surpluses  on  the 
domestic market. 
The budget arrangements for new members will no doubt be a matter for negotiation and 
compromise. The new members will be expected to contribute to the budget the tariff revenue 
on imports and  to be  reimbursed  for  intervention and export subsidy costs.  They should  be 
eligible for full  participation in EU structural programmes. How much additional funding will 
be forthcoming is a political decision. But the significance of  the method in which the transfers 
are made, mentioned above, should be emphasized. If  there is an effective agreement on the net 
transfer to the new members,  then at the margin they will  pay in effect for their own export 
subsidies and keep their own tariff receipts. They will therefore need to calculate benefits and 
costs of  price policies at world market prices, as representing the marginal cost of  imports and 
the marginal value of  exports. If  there is no effective limit on the net financial  contribution or 
disbursement then the marginal  cost of imports and  value of exports are the internal  policy 
prices. Under such circumstances, the acceding countries (as with existing members) have no 65 
incentive to keep  production in check,  as the Union membership as a whole underwrites the 
disposal of  surpluses and taxes any imports which might otherwise be available at world prices. 
The solution to this dilemma is to reduce the gap between the world price and the internal CAP 
price to minimize both budget transfers and misleading production signals. 66 
8  CEEC Policy Action for the Immediate Future 
When options for agricultural market and  trade policies in  the CEECs were discussed 
above (section 5), the conclusion was drawn that it is in the best interest of  the CEECs if  their 
level of  support and protection is as low as politically feasible until they join the EU. This may 
sound like a contradiction in terms because it is exactly a low level of support and protection 
which may not be politically feasible.  A number of  factors may argue for more rather than less 
support and  protection in  CEEC  agriculture.  In  particular,  agricultural  producer prices still 
tend to fluctuate widely on CEEC markets; farms are under economic and financial stress; farm 
incomes have fallen  significantly in real terms, and there may be serious income problems in 
parts  of CEEC  agriculture;  agriculture  is  hoped  to  act  as  a  buffer  against  higher  overall 
unemployment, and any additional shedding of  labour which may result if  the economic climate 
in agriculture does not improve is undesirable; imports of agricultural and food products have 
tended  to  rise  and  to  cause  problems  for  domestic  producers,  and  with  the  simultaneous 
decline in agricultural exports the balance of  trade has deteriorated. In a situation like that, is 
there any  alternative to raising levels of support and  protection? Indeed, there are alternative 
policies which can be brought to bear on such problems, and they create less problems in the 
longer run than protective market and trade policies in  agriculture which mainly rely on price 
guarantees, export subsidies and import tariffs. 
8.1  Market Stability 
As  far  as  market  stability  is  concerned  it  is  crucial  to  keep  in  mind  a  number  of 
fundamental facts.  First, some degree of price fluctuations over time is natural for agricultural 
markets, and it is very costly for the overall economy if  governments try to create completely 
stable markets in agriculture. Second, one should clearly acknowledge the distinction between 
price stabilization and  price support.  Governments which  strive to improve market  stability 
usually end up supporting prices at a level higher than the average of  the market prices which 
would  have prevailed in  the absence of their policies,  and this can become very costly,  too. 
Third, well functioning markets have a built-in tendency to reduce price fluctuations through 
private activities,  and  the optimal  policy for a government is  to create the conditions under 
which such private activities can operate satisfactorily, rather than substituting public policies 
for these private activities. 
Two major types of private activities which help to reduce price fluctuations over time, 
and to live with any remaining price instability, are storage and futures markets. It appears that 
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both types of  activities do not yet work very well in the CEECs, and that CEEC governments 
could  do a  lot  to improve their functioning.  For stock-keeping to work satisfactorily  one 
important prerequisite is  to have good price  infonnation systems  and  market transparency. 
Indeed, it is extremely important for the CEECs to create and improve the institutions and the 
infrastructure required to monitor market trends and price developments and to publicize that 
information.  Market  participants  who  do  not  have  reliable  price  infonnation  cannot  act 
rationally,  and  cannot respond  satisfactorily to price changes.  Moreover,  it is  important  to 
consider that market conditions can vary considerably across regions. There can be a shortage 
in one region and a glut in another region at the same time. Market StabilitY-can be very much 
enhanced if markets can arbitrage across regions.  For this to be possible,  price infonnation 
again is an extremely important ingredient, but transport facilities and marketing infrastructure 
are necessary as well. Also, it is particularly useful if  markets can balance across large regions, 
including regions in other countries. Hence international trading arrangements which allow this 
to  happen  make  an  important  contribution  to  market  stability.  More  open  borders  for 
agricultural  trade  among  the  CEECs  would,  therefore,  also  reduce  the  potential  for  price 
fluctuations. This issue will be taken up later in this section. 
Other prerequisites for successful stock-keeping activities, and hence for a full  utilization 
of the potential  for  private contributions to  market  stability,  are the physical  availability  of 
storage capacity and access to credit. CEEC governments may consider to make it easier for 
private farms  and traders to use  storage capacities  in  previously (or still  currently) publicly 
owned market agencies. For example, storage facilities in the big grain procurement agencies 
could  be  rented  to  private  agents.  Access  to  credit  could  be  improved  by  creating  and 
improving the institutional and legal conditions for using commodity stocks as collateral. Also, 
if credit subsidies are given at all,  in  spite of the economic drawbacks of these subsidies, it  is 
probably  better to  concentrate  them  on  credit  for  storage,  rather  than  for  investments  in 
machinery and buildings which in the longer run may tum out not to be productive. 
Futures  markets  have  been  used  very  successfully  in  countries  where  government 
interference with market forces did  not eliminate the scope for price movements. Commodity 
exchanges where futures  trading  can  take place  require  a  number of institutional  and  legal 
provisions and also the necessary infrastructure. They also require a given minimum size of  the 
market in order to operate successfully. CEEC governments may wish to study the possibilities 
of establishing the conditions for successful commodity exchanges and futures markets very 
carefully,  with  a  view  to  using  this  instrument  more  extensively  in  the  future.  Again, 
cooperation across several countries in Central Europe may be useful because it could help to 
create the market size required for a successful operation of such institutions. As a temporary 
alternative,  but also  as  a  step  in  the direction of creating well  functioning  futures  markets, 
government agencies could be allowed to engage in futures contracts, as long as they behave 68 
like private traders, i.e. with a tight budget and without the government covering any losses in 
these  activities.  Activities  of this  sort  are  less  distortionary  than  government  intervention 
buying. 
In addition  to price instability,  yield  fluctuations  can  contribute to instability of farm 
revenues. However, one must remember that on aggregate in a given market, yield fluctuations 
and price fluctuations have a tendency partially to cancel out. This is because in years with low 
yields and hence low supplies, prices tend to be higher and vice versa.  It has therefore often 
been observed that farm revenues have been more stable where prices were not stabilized by 
the government, even though prices by themselves may have fluctuated widely. In any caSe, for 
the individual farmer it is not necessarily the case that a low yield on his farm coincides with a 
high price on the market, and hence for the individual farmer yield risk can come on top of  the 
price risk.  Yield risk cannot be compensated through government market policies.  However, 
the government can help  to establish crop insurance schemes which farmers can then use to 
reduce yield risk. In Central Europe, where droughts can be a serious problem, as recent years 
have  shown,  crop  insurance  schemes  may  be able  to  help  farmers  reducing  liquidity  risks. 
However, in setting up such schemes, governments should be careful to design them such that 
they do not involve a large burden on the public budget. In other words, insurance premia and 
payments should be actuarially sound. 
8.2  Farm Incomes and Unemployment 
As  a  response  to  economic  and  financial  stress  in  agriculture,  measures  which  help 
farmers  to market their products more  successfully  and  to have  easier access  to credit  are 
superior to price support. Again, improving market infrastructure and market transparency can 
do  much.  Measures  in  this  category  include  the  creation  and  improvement  of wholesale 
markets;  price  recording  and  market  information  through  the  media;  setting  of product 
standards and quality criteria; support for export promotion agencies, and others. An extremely 
important  aim  is  to improve  competition  in  the  marketing  and  processing  sector,  because 
monopsonistic structures in that sector not only reduce efficiency in the sector itself, they also 
contribute to depressed farm gate prices and low farm incomes. 
In  the area of credit  for  agriculture,  much  remains  to be done  in  the CEECs.  As  a 
fundamental prerequisite for better access to credit, land registration and the elimination of  any 
remaining uncertainties about property rights need to be speeded up.  Jointly with measures 
required to improve the functioning of  land markets, for both buying and renting land, policies 
of  this nature help farmers to be able to offer collateral when applying for credit. At the same 
time, establishment of a well functioning institutional and physical infrastructure for banks in I 
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rural regions will help farmers to have access to credit and banking. Lack of  liquidity is one of 
the major problems in  CEEC agriculture,  and detennined effort are required and possible to 
overcome this problem. 
Low farm  incomes in  parts of CEEC agriculture will  not altogether disappear through 
such measures, nor through any other measures. However, the problem of low farm incomes 
needs to be seen in  a wider perspective.  Generally,  low incomes in  agriculture reflect low 
opportunity  costs of agricultural  labor,  i.e.  a  lack  of alternative  employment  and  earning 
opportunities.  There are  no  agricultural  policies  which can  solve  tha~ problem  at its roots. 
Support measures in agriculture, such as price support and protection, may appear to promise 
relief. But they can at best postpone some of  the problem, and often they do not even achieve 
that. Moreover, low incomes are generally not limited to agriculture, they are found in other 
parts of  society as well. The longer run solution to the problem of  low incomes is improvement 
of efficiency in the overall economy, and the best way to achieve that is to stimulate private 
e~onomic  activities,  by  creating  the  appropriate  economic  and  political  climate,  well 
functioning institutions and a good infrastructure. For solving the problem of low incomes in 
agriculture, which generally is equivalent to low incomes in rural regions, regional policies are 
required which create incentives for  profitable investments and  production activities in  rural 
regions in general, not only in agriculture. 
While such policies contribute to overcoming the low income problem in the longer run, 
measures are also required in the short run.  Such measures fall  in the category of social safety 
net policies.  Measures such  as  old  age  pension schemes,  illness  insurance,  insurance against 
accidents, unemployment benefits, tax and income policies for families with children contribute 
to improving social security. Apart from some institutional peculiarities of  agriculture (such as 
a possible lack of contributions to social  security  schemes among self-employed farmers  or 
members of cooperatives) there are not generally any  reasons why agriculture should have  a 
special status in these social policies. More generally,  low incomes are a problem of a general 
nature, and that problem should be tackled through general measures, rather than measures of 
a specific agricultural nature. Hence, even if that problem should be particularly pronounced 
among fanners, it is better to seek relief through measures which are generally available to all 
members of  society. In particular, it would be wrong to respond to any farm income problem 
through measures  such  as  agricultural  market  and  trade policies.  Not only  are the benefits 
resulting from  such measures not targeted to those people in  agriculture which suffer  most 
from  low incomes,  but  any  sector-specific policies  involve  the danger that the low income 
problem in that sector is  perpetuated because people remain in the sector where they receive 
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Similar considerations hold for the unemployment problem. Unemployment is a general 
problem  of the  overall  economy,  and  it  can  only  be  overcome  through  policies  which 
strengthen competitiveness of  the overall economy and improve the functioning of  the labour 
market.  Public  policies  which  distort  markets  may  provide  the  illusion  that  they  reduce 
unemployment  by maintaining jobs in  sectors which would  shed  labour in  absence of such 
government  policies.  However,  essentially  these  jobs  are  financed  through  income 
redistribution  from  other  sectors  of the economy,  rather  than  earning  their  own  incomes 
through  activities  which  are  productive  for  the  overall  economy.  AB  a  result  of such 
government  interference -with  market  forces  the  economy  on  aggregate  becomes -Tess 
productive and less competitive, and in the end loses jobs rather than creating them. Expressed 
in a different way, attempts at keeping workers in agriculture even though the market does not 
offer remunerative jobs for all of  them essentially means to disguise unemployment, rather than 
reducing  it.  From  a  social  point  of view,  such  disguised  unemployment  may  appear  less 
harmful than open unemployment. However, this short run relief has to be weighed against the 
longer run implication that a lower number of remunerative jobs is being made available in the 
overall  economy.  There is  no way around  acknowledging that the most  appropriate way to 
tackle  the  unemployment  problem is  to make the  economy  more  competitive,  and  that the 
social  problem  resulting  from  unemployment  is  best  solved  through  unemployment  benefit 
schemes. 
Both low incomes in agriculture and the shedding of  labour from the fanning industry are 
politically pressing problems in the CEECs. However, factual knowledge about the nature and 
magnitude  of these  problems  is  rather  limited.  Equally,  factual  information  on  ownership 
patterns in  agriculture, on farm  structures, on financial  conditions and  profitability etc.  is  not 
easily available.  Hence policies sometimes respond to perceived problems which may or may 
not be so real, and the extent to which policies pursued contribute to alleviating the perceived 
problems is  difficult to measure.  It is  therefore a great challenge for CEEC governments to 
improve their monitoring systems in  agriculture,  with  a particular view to collecting reliable 
information  on  social  conditions in  agriculture~ on  farming  structures and  on economic and 
financial well-being on different types of  farms. 
8.3  Agricultural Trade 
The worsening of the agricultural  balance  of trade  can  technically  be  halted  through 
higher import tariffs and export subsidies for agricultural products. However, such protective 
measures are a rather expensive and inefficient way of  improving the trade balance. One dollar 
of foreign  exchange earned  or saved  through  these  measures  costs  more than  one dollar's 
worth  of  domestic  resources.  The  more  promising  approach  is  again  to  improve 71 
competitiveness.  In  particular,  as  the  domestic  food  industry  becomes  more  efficient, 
competitive and quality-oriented it will be able to supply some of the more highly processed 
foods which have accounted for a good share of  the increase in agricultural and food imports 
into the CEECs in  recent years.  Equally,  with a more competitive food  industry and  more 
intensive export promotion,  agricultural and food exports from  the CEECs can recover.  As 
structural  and  financial  conditions  in  CEEC  agriculture  are  improved  and  the  decline  in 
agricultural output is halted, chances are good that the agricultural trade balance will improve 
in the CEECs even in the absence of  higher import tariffs and export subsidies. 
Another  area  for  immediate  policy  action  in  CEEC  agriculture  is  to  improve  the 
conditions for trade among the CEECs. Agricultural trading arrangements under the CEFT  A 
are far from creating free trade in agriculture between the Visegrad countries, and agricultural 
trade among the Visegrad countries and Bulgaria and Romania remains even more restricted 
through tariff barriers. As in many other "free" trade arrangements in other parts of  the world, 
agricultural trade is treated in a far less liberal fashion than trade in  other goods.  The major 
reason is that government policies in agriculture tend to interfere more with market forces than 
is  the case in  other sectors of the economy.  As  a corollary,  more  open trading  regimes  in 
agriculture among the partners of a free trade arrangement would threaten the viability of the 
national  market  and  trade  policies  in  agriculture.  Hence  a  significant  number  of trade 
restrictions in agriculture are usually maintained in  order to allow the national policy regimes 
to go unchanged. Looked at from the opposite angle, the more similar the agricultural market 
and  trade  regimes  can  be  designed  across  a  group  of countries  engaging  in  a  free  trade 
arrangement, the easier it is to include agriculture fully in the free trade zone. 1 
Agricultural  market  and  trade policies in  the CEECs  are far  from  being  homogenous. 
The nature of  measures employed differs from country to country, but more importantly levels 
of  domestic price support and import protection are also not equal. On the other hand, at least 
among the Visegrad countries the differences are less pronounced than, for example, they were 
among the six founding member countries of the European Economic Community when they 
began to devise a Common Agricultural Policy in the early 1960's. In this situation it should be 
seriously considered whether,  first,  the Visegrad countries,  and  later possibly also the other 
CQuntries having Association Agreements with the European Union, could not harmonize their 
agricultural market and trade policies amongst each other to the extent that fully free trade in 
agriculture within this group of  countries could be achieved. Indeed, one could eventually go a 
1  For a full  discussion of the treatment of agriculture in free  trade areas, and the implications for domestic 
policy, see Josling (1993). 72 
step further and consider the introduction of  a customs union in agriculture, if not a common 
agricultural policy among the CEECs.  2 
A move to free trade in agriculture among some or all of the CEECs should not create 
major difficulties, but it should be designed with care. Free trade requires primarily the absence 
of border policies  among the countries involved,  in  particular elimination of tariffs,  export 
subsidies and quantitative restrictions in trade among the members of the free trade area.  As 
demonstrated by existing free trade arrangements including agriculture, for example the North 
American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFT  A),  free  trade  does  not  require  a  complete 
harmonization of all agricultural policies across all  members of the free trade area,  though 
some  degree  of harmonization  will  be  necessary  for  some  types  of policy  measures.  3  In 
particular,  domestic policies which directly affect market prices must not diverge too much 
among the countries involved.  For example,  guaranteed prices (implemented through some 
form of intervention buying)  must not differ  by  more than transport cost because arbitrage 
would otherwise undermine the functioning of price guarantees. Also, in order to make good 
economic  sense,  and  to be politically  palatable  to  producers  in  all  countries  involved,  the 
playing field  should be as level  as  possible among the  partners of a free  trade arrangement. 
Hence trade distorting domestic subsidies should not differ too much among the participating 
countries. The distinction made in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture between less 
distorting forms of  domestic support ("green box") and other policies provides useful guidance 
in this regard. The establishment of  free trade, and the parallel harmonization of  those policies 
which  should  not  differ  too much  among  the  partner  countries,  does  not  have  to  happen 
overnight.  It can  be  achieved  gradually  over  a  given  time  horizon.  Also,  the  number  of 
countries participating can increase over time. Again, procedures adopted in similar cases, such 
as  NAFT  A,  can  serve as  an  example.  In  particular,  the  Visegrad  countries  could  begin  to 
establish free trade in agriculture among themselves, and other CEECs could be invited to join 
the club later. 
Free trade in  agriculture among some or all  of the CEECs would  have  a  number of 
important advantages. First,  a common agricultural market among the CEECs would have a 
relatively  large  size,  with  all  sorts of attractive  consequences.  As  mentioned  above,  price 
fluctuations  on that large unified  market would tend  to be smaller than on smaller national 
markets. Market institutions such as commodity exchanges and futures markets could be more 
easily  established.  Trading  companies  could  deal  with  larger  quantities,  and  realize  better 
2  Free trade in agriculture among the CEECs associated with the EU would establish a specific agricultural 
variant of the Association of Association Agreements (AAA) suggested by Baldwin (1994). 
3  For a discussion of the varying need for policy harmonization for different categories of policy measures, see 
Josling (  1993). 73 
pnces.  Regional  specialization  could  take  place,  with  a  better  utilization  of comparative 
advantages and the consequent improvement of  productivities. Enterprises in the food industry 
could more easily  sell  to aU  national  CEEC  markets,  and  would  therefore find  it  easier to 
establish a smaller number of  factories which can better use economies of size.  Second, CEEC 
governments would gain experience in dealing with a larger common market for agricultural 
and  food  products.  This  would  help  them  to  prepare  for  membership  in  the  EU  and 
participation in decision making under the CAP.  Third,  with a more harmonized agricultural 
policy across the CEECs, it would be easier for the CEECs to adopt a common position on 
agricultural  trade  matters  vis-a-vis  the  EU,  and  the  Union  could  deal  with  a  more 
homogeneous  group  of negotiating  partners,  rather  than  with  individual  countries  with 
divergent views. 
The  EU,  on  the  other  hand,  could  support  the  creation  of a  common  market  for 
agricultural  and  food  products among the CEECs in  various ways.  Not only  could  it  offer 
institutional  advice  and  assistance,  but  it  could,  in  agreement  with  the CEECs,  modify  the 
agricultural trade provisions under the Europe Agreements such that all  existing  preferential 
quotas are no longer specific to country of  origin but can jointly be utilized by all CEECs. On 
aggregate this should make it  easier for the CEECs to make full  use of the quotas,  many of 
which have not been fully used so far. 74 
9  EU Policy Action for the Immediate Future 
9.1  Restructuring Agriculture in the CEECs 
In order to facilitate the restructuring and transition process in the CEECs, the European 
Union could and  should  increase  its assistance to the CEECs substantially,  mainly  through 
PHARE. Measures in this category relate to those CEEC policies which were discussed above 
in Chapter 8. The EU should provide technical and financial assistance in four main areas. 
First,  the  EU should  help  to  develop  and  improve  the  agricultural  institutions  and 
infrastructure in the CEECs. In particular, the EU should assist improvements in the marketing 
sector,  thereby  helping  to  reduce  the  pressure  for  more  agricultural  policy  support  and 
protection. For example, institutions that monitor and report volumes and prices of  agricultural 
commodities in order to create market transparency have to be improved; market infrastructure 
needs strengthening, e.g.  in the area of wholesale markets, commodity exchanges and futures 
trading;  standards governing food  quality and  hygiene requirements need to be re-examined; 
marketing  agencies  need  to  be  established  and  strengthened;  export  promotion  can  be 
enhanced. Moreover, the EU should help restructuring and privatization in agriculture through 
a number of measures.  In particular, agricultural extension services have to be tailored to the 
new  economic environment;  rural  credit  needs fundamental  strengthening;  land  registration 
can be  speeded up  significantly.  The EU and its  members states have considerable expertise 
and  experience in  organizing and  operating these institutions within the CAP  and  in  national . 
policies,  and  this experience could readily be made  available to the CEECs, jointly with the 
financial  means  required  to  establish  and  strengthen  the  institutions  and  the  infrastructure 
required. 
Second,  the  EU  could  help  to  absorb  some  of the  adverse  employment  effects  of 
agricultural restructuring by supporting training programs for  displaced agricultural workers. 
T~s may involve the establishment of decentralized education centres and the preparation of 
vocational teachers for their new tasks.  Regional and Social Fund expenditure, together with 
the expertise built up over the years of operating such schemes in the EU would be useful to 
the  prospective  members.  At  the  same  time  the  EU should  step  up  efforts  to  establish 
monitoring systems which  provide better insights  into  the economic and  social  situation on 
farms  and  in  rural  regions  of the CEECs.  Experience  accumulated  in  EUROST  AT  can  be 
extremely useful in this area. I 
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Third, the EU could actively contribute to the transformation process by providing credit 
lines and investment funds for new or reformed enterprises in the CEECs.  In the agricultural 
and food sector, this financial assistance should be mainly directed towards agro-business and 
food processing companies, as these companies presently face severe shortages of  capital.  As 
stated above,  the success of such enterprises will be a major determinant of the ease with 
which the CEECs adapt to the single agricultural market as they join the EU. 
Fourth, as a matter of technical  assistance,  the EU should step up efforts to help  the 
CEECs to establish the institutional and legal conditions necessary to implement the CAP once 
they  have  joined  the  CAP.  The  Europe  Agreements  have  provisions  regarding  the 
"approximation of  laws", and these provisions need to be implemented. Even though it would 
not be desirable for the CEECs to adopt the CAP fully before they join the CAP (see above, 
Chapter 5),  there is  no  reason why  they  should  not begin to create much of the legal  and 
institutional framework which is needed to do  so at some stage in the future.  There is a very 
large body of legislation under the  CAP  and  there are very  specific  institutions involved  in 
implementing the CAP,  and  it  takes time and  efforts to establish all  this.  The EU has  ample 
experience in  this area,  and  it  can  also  make  available the necessary manpower to assist the 
CEECs  in  approximating  their  legislation  and  institutions  to  the  conditions  needed  to 
harmonize their policies with those of  the EU as the time of  accession approaches. 
9.2  Policy Towards CEEC Agricultural Trade 
Financial support and technical advice from the EU can help the CEECs in their internal 
transformation process. But more importantly, the EU could contribute most by providing an 
economic environment in  which these countries can develop a functioning  market economy. 
This would ideally involve the offer of free exchange of  goods and services on open markets, 
in  particular free  trade with the EU.  Given  the close  neighbourhood  with the EU and  the 
political and  economic attractiveness of being  more intensively integrated with EU markets, 
expanding trade relationships with the EU are one of the central ingredients of the process of 
strengthening CEEC economies. It has rightly been observed that the EU is "the trade anchor 
of the transformation process in  Central  and  Eastern Europe".4  Unfortunately,  some of the 
sectors in  the CEECs that are most capable of exporting and  earning much needed foreign 
exchange are also the ones that are the most "sensitive" and therefore regulated within the EU. 
The internal political resistance to liberalizing these sectors in the EU stands in direct conflict 
to the foreign policy and security goals of  stabilizing the emerging market economies in Central 
4  Inotai (1994), p.  139. 76 
and Eastern Europe. Agriculture is  a prime example of a sector where the CEECs seek and 
need better access to the EU market, but where the EU finds it politically difficult to be more 
liberal. 
In  order to adhere  to  the  broader  political  objective  of stabilizing  the  CEECs  and 
integrating them into the West, the EU has to give the CEECs the chance to participate in the 
benefits  of international  trade.  At  a  sectoral  level,  this  is  the  more  important  the  more 
pronounced  the  economic  difficulties  and  the  consequent  political  instabilities  are  in  the 
CEECs. Agriculture is  one such sector. For stabilizing the domestic political situation in the 
CEECs it would be most useful if their agricultural exports were granted better access to EU 
markets. Some of  the political heat in CEEC agriculture, which has become apparent in recent 
election results in more than one country in Central and Eastern Europe could be cooled down 
if a better market can be created  for  CEEC farm  products.  In principle these relationships 
between trade and political as well as economic stability have been acknowledged early in the 
EU.  In its  Association  Agreements  with  the  CEECs,  the EU has  made  an  important  step 
towards opening its markets up for exports by the CEECs, and these trade arrangements have 
been clearly embedded in  a political  process.  However,  in  agriculture market access for the 
CEECs still  remains narrowly restricted.  As  is  obvious from  the political background to the 
negotiations  of the  Association  Agreements  in  the  EU,  there  was  strong  resistance  from 
farmers'  groups  and  from  some  member  states  against  more  generous  preferences  for  the 
CEECs in agriculture. Strong fears were and are expressed in the EU as to the extent to which 
larger imports from the CEECs would threaten to depress prices on EU agricultural markets, 
or result in higher FEOGA expenditure. A cool look at the quantities involved suggests clearly 
that these fears are largely exaggerated. For nearly all agricultural products now included in the 
Europe Agreements, the quantities allowed in under preferential quotas are so small that they 
are likely to depress prices on EU markets of the products concerned by  less than  one per 
cent. s On aggregate, if all current preferential quotas under the Europe Agreements were fully 
utilized by the CEECs, the price impact  ~n EU markets would be such that EU agriculture 
would lose no more than 0. 3 per cent of  its revenue.  6 With such minute orders of  magnitude in 
mind it is difficult to argue that any further opening up of  EU agricultural markets for exports 
from the CEECs would seriously threaten market stability and farm  incomes in the EU.  The 
gains in  political  and economic stability in  the CEECs are light-years beyond the economic 
impacts in  the EU.  Hence the EU should  make  a determined  effort to open its agricultural 
markets up more extensively for expo~s  from the CEECs. 
s  Overberg (1994), pp.  10-12. The only major exception is goose meat. 
6  Ibid, p.  11. 
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Another  issue  which  is  hotly  debated  in  the  CEECs  is  the  subsidization  of EU 
agricultural exports. It is often argued in the CEECs that EU subsidized exports contribute to 
depressed prices on CEEC markets for agricultural products, thereby adding to the economic 
and financial stress from which CEEC farmers suffer. Moreover, the worsening trade balance 
in agriculture between the CEECs and the EU is  often attributed, among others, to the high 
subsidies which the EU grants on its agricultural exports. In this context, one of the reasons 
CEEC governments have given for their tariff increases in agriculture is export subsidization by 
the EU against which CEEC governments feel they have to protect th~  domestic producers. 
As  a  remedy  it  has  sometimes  been  suggested  that  the  EU  should  no  longer  subsidize 
agricultural exports to the CEECs. 
In discussing this issue it is useful to take a look at recent developments in EU exports of 
agricultural  and  food  products to the CEECs and  to distinguish between different types of 
products. Very often, when statements are made on "agricultural trade" between the EU and 
the CEECs,  the statistics  cited  report  aggregate  trade figures  for  all  agricultural  and  food 
products, including all sorts of  products which have little to do with the CAP. The commodity 
composition of EU agricultural and food exports to the CEECs (six countries) is  analysed in 
Appendix III.  In  particular,  commodities are grouped according to the extent to which EU 
exports are  subsidized.  After all,  even though export subsidization is  generally said to be a 
universal  phenomenon  of the  CAP  there  are  many  agricultural  and  food  products  where 
exports from the EU are either not subsidized at all or where export subsidies are so small that 
they probably have a minor impact  on  volumes traded.  Examples are fish,  flowers,  manioc, 
coffee and (since the MacSharry reform) oilseeds and their products. In order to gain a first 
impression, all products where EU export subsidies are zero or insignificant have been grouped 
together  (as  products  with  "no  export  subsidies")  and  distinguished  from  all  remaining 
agricultural and food products (products "with export subsidies"). The results, shown in Graph 
9. 1, indicate that subsidized exports from the EU to the CEECs are larger than exports without 
subsidies, but not very much so. Moreover, until 1992 the increase in exports without subsidies 
was nearly the same as the growth of subsidized exports (though the latter was more variable 
from year to year). The large increase of  subsidized exports in 1993 is mainly due to higher EU 
exports of  cereals to the CEECs, reflecting the low cereals crop in the CEECs due to drought 
iri that year. Graph 9.1: 
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EU Exports of  Agricultural and Food Products to the CEECs by 
Product Category: With and Without Export Subsidies 
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Another interesting distinction is  the degree of processing which agricultural and food 
products  have  undergone  when  they  are  exported  to  from  the  EU to  the  CEECs.  Three 
categories of products have been defined  in  this  regard,  i.e.  raw materials (e.g.  live animals, 
cereals, cocoa beans), lightly processed products (e.g. meat, butter, flour, cocoa powder), and 
highly processed products (e.g. confectionery, pasta, ice cream, chocolate). As shown in Graph 
9.2,  processed foods (aggregate of lightly  and  highly  processed) have a  larger share in  EU 
exports to the CEECs than agricultural raw materials. During the early stages of  the transition 
process, EU exports of highly processed foods have been particularly dynamic,  reflecting the 
strong  demand  for  high  quality  foods  (and,  as  a  matter of fashion,  probably  also  western 
products) on CEEC markets. Lightly processed foods have continued to have the highest share 
in EU agricultural and food exports to the CEECs.  Again the strong increase of raw material 
exports in  1993 mirrors mainly expansion of  cereals exports in that drought year in the CEECs. 
Shares which different types of  products have had in total growth of  EU agricultural and 
food exports to the CEECs (EU exports in  1993 compared to EU exports in 1988-90) can also 
be analysed at a more disaggregate level of  product groups (two digit CN groups). As is clear 
from Table 9.1, most of  the nine product groups which among them account for nearly three 
quarters of  the recent growth of  EU exports to the CEECs have relatively little to do with the 
CAP.  Product groups with highest  shares  in  EU export growth include food  preparations, 
tropical products such as citrus, bananas (included in edible fruit and nuts) and cocoa, tobacco, 
and beverages and spirits. The major CAP-related product category with a large share in total 
growth of  EU agricultural and food exports to the CEECs is cereals. 79 
Graph 9.1:  EU Exports of  Agricultural and Food Products to the CEECs by 
Product Category: Different Degrees of Processing 
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Table 9.1:  Share of Individual Product Groups in Total Growth 
of EU Agricultural and Food Exports to the CEECs 
Between 1988-90 and 1993 
Share in growth ofEU exports 
Product group  to the CEECs, 
1988-90 to 1993 
Miscellaneous edible preparations.  12.1o/o 
Edible fruit and nuts  11.5% 
Cereals  10.2% 
Residues from the food industry.  7.9% 
Tobacco  6.7% 
Edible vegetables  6.2% 
Cocoa and preparations  5.9% 
Animal or vegetable fats  5.6% 
Beverages. spirits  4.8% 
All other agricultural and food products  29.1%, 
Source:  Appendtx III. 80 
With this quantitative information in mind it is less clear that EU export subsidies have 
been the main driving force behind the growth in  EU agricultural  and  food  exports to the 
CEECs. This is not to say that EU export subsidies are not a potential threat to the stability of 
agricultural  markets  in  the  CEECs,  and  that  they  cannot  cause  significant  difficulties  on 
individual product markets where conditions are anyhow fragile  in  the CEECs (for example, 
dairy products). However,  it is  not really  clear whether a promise by the EU no longer to 
subsidize  exports to the CEECs would be the most  appropriate response.  7  As  long  as the 
CEECs would still import corresponding quantities, because there is import demand on their 
markets, such an elimination of  EU export subsidies would simply mean that the CEECs would 
import from other sources, possibly paying higher import prices. Any resulting deterioration in 
their terms of trade would amount to a corresponding loss to the overall  economies of the 
CEECs. A more appropriate option for the CEECs is to continue to collect duties on imports 
from  the EU which  receive  export  subsidies  by  the  EU.  In terms  of international  income 
distribution,  EU export  subsidies  then  amount  to  an  income  transfer  from  the  EU to the 
CEECs.  As far as detrimental impacts on CEEC farmers are concerned, CEEC import duties 
can compensate for the effect of EU export subsidies.  Viewed from  this perspective the EU 
should adopt a more understanding attitude towards attempts by the CEECs to guard against 
subsidized EU agricultural exports. This is not to say that all import tariffs in the CEECs are in 
their  own  economic  interest.  However,  as  long  as  the  EU continues  in  general  to  export 
agricultural  products with  export subsidies it would  not appear to make  economic  sense to 
exclude the CEECs from these subsidies. 
A  different  issue  is  EU  export  subsidization  to  third  countries  where  EU  exports 
compete with exports from  the CEECs, for example exports to the former  Soviet Union.  In 
these  third  country  markets,  EU  export  subsidies  generate  direct  economic  losses  to  the 
CEECs.  Any  reduction of subsidized  EU exports to  these  markets  would  directly  help  the 
CEECs,  both in  an  overall  economic  sense  and  in  the  sense  of making  it  easier for  CEEC 
farmers to find  markets for their products. Hence a commitment by the EU to reduce, if not 
eliminate,  subsidized  exports  of products  directly  competing  with  CEEC  exports  to  such 
markets should be seriously considered. 
Another form of assistance the EU could give the CEECs in the trade area would also 
relate to markets in the former CrvffiA countries. CEEC agricultural exports to these markets 
have  recently shown some increase  again,  and  they are now increasingly effected  in  money 
7  Another policy variant would be an arrangement whereby the EU reduces its export subsidies,  in parallel 
with an equivalent reduction of CEEC  import tariffs.  This variant has been suggested by  Nallet and van 
Stolk (1994), who have suggested that the EU should not subsidize below a price level equivalent to  "hard 
core" production costs in the CEECs. while the CEECs should not impose duties on such less subsidized 
exports by the EU. 81 
terms and  hard  currencies,  rather than as barter trade like in  the early  stages of transition. 
However, given the serious foreign exchange shortages in  particular among the countries of 
the former Soviet Union, export credits are an important ingredient in this trade. With capital 
shortage  in  the  CEECs,  the  availability  of export  credits  is  a  seriously  limiting  factor 
constraining the growth of their agricultural exports to these countries, and exports from the 
EU and from other western countries are often more successful because they are underpinned 
by  export credits which  these western countries can offer.  In this  situation the EU should 
consider  to  open  up  generous  credit  lines  and/or  to  offer  credit  guarantees  for  CEEC 
agricultural exports to the countries of  the former Soviet Union. The overall economic costs to 
the EU of  this specific form of  assistance to the CEECs would not be very large, but the help it 
would  constitute  for  CEEC  farmers  and  the  overall  economies  of the  CEECs  could  be 
substantial. 
As a last comment on measures in the trade area, it should be clearly seen that anything 
that helps the CEECs to strengthen their export performance is  not only of great and  direct 
economic use in the CEECs. Improvements in the trade area also have the advantage that they 
are the least distortionary measures one can think of,  that they help  the CEECs to generate 
income out of  their own resources and to become more economically self-reliant, and that they 
help to stem the tide of protectionist pressures in the CEECs.  In that sense the EU would be 
well  advised  if it  were to make  the fullest  use  of any  opportunity to  strengthen the export 
performance of  the CEECs. 
9.3  Better Implementation of the Association Agreements 
The "Europe Agreements" between the EC and the CEECs provide a framework for the 
liberalization of  agricultural trade in Europe. The Agreements call for the establishment of  free 
trade area over a maximum period of ten years.  But special arrangements limit the degree of 
EU agricultural market access for the CEECs. For most agricultural products the import duties 
and levies were reduced, but this reduction applies only to limited quantities of exports. The 
base periods for the determination  of the  reduced  levy  quotas were generally chosen to be 
periods of low EC-CEEC trade.  So  even  substantial  increases in  percentage terms of these 
quotas over time do not correspond to the true export potential in the CEECs. Furthermore, 
increased exports of the products which are most severely restricted in terms of EU market 
access (beef,  dairy,  cereals,  sugar) would  most greatly benefit the CEEC.  A revision of the 
"Europe Agreements"  in  accordance with  the  original  free  trade spirit  of these agreements 
might, therefore, be the most promising form of assistance for the ongoing economic reforms 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 82 
. At  the  same  time,  implementation  of the  preferential  trade  arrangements  under  the 
Europe Agreements could be changed such that a larger share of  the economic benefits is likely 
to flow to the CEECs, rather than to trading companies in the EU. In particular, where licenses 
are issued under preferential quotas, the current practice of allocating these licenses by  EU 
authorities to companies registered in the EU nearly certainly means that most, if not all of  the 
benefits resulting from levy and duty reductions flow to EU traders. Moreover, implementation 
of  the licensing procedures results in uncertainties which get in the way of  a full utilization of 
preferential quotas by the CEECs. Empirical research has shown that this is indeed the case.  8 
In addition,  problems also  exist where quota restrictions are not implemented through 
the issuing of  licences, but on a first-come-first serve basis, for example in the case for fruit and 
vegetables.  Because the EU does not  publish  information  on  the  extent  to which  existing 
quotas are already utilized at any particular point in time, EU importers and CEEC exporters 
do not know whether the preferential duty will apply for any particular transaction or whether 
the  full  MFN  duty  has  to  be  paid  on  importation  into  the  EU.  Indeed,  at  the  time  of 
importation into the EU the trader has  to pay  the full  MFN duty,  and  he  receives  a rebate 
equivalent to the preference somewhat later if it turns out that the preferential quota was not 
yet  fully  used.  As  a  consequence,  price  negotiations  between  EU  importers  and  CEEC 
exporters are based on the worst-case assumption that the full  MFN duty has to be paid.  The 
CEEC exporter then essentially gets the price he would also  have  received if no  preferences 
existed at all.  If  it then later turns out that the quota was not yet fully  used and that therefore 
the importer gets a rebate,  this  is  a windfall  profit to the EU importer,  of which  the CEEC 
exporter gets nothing. 
It should certainly not be the aim of  trade preferences for the CEECs that EU importers 
receive benefits. Preferences are thought to benefit the exporting countries. As a matter of  fact, 
the price advantage resulting from  preferential tariff reductions is  the potentially most useful 
economic benefit to the CEECs, generally more useful than small  additional quantities which 
can be shipped to the EU.  The reason is  that  a price  advantage resulting from  preferential 
tariffs  is  essentially  a  pure economic  transfer  to  the  exporting  country,  while  shipment  of 
additional quantities requires either more output in the exporting CEEC, and hence investment 
of more  resources  into  the  production  of the  commodities  concerned,  or--more  usually--
reduction of exports to other destinations and hence a loss of foreign exchange revenue from 
exports to other countries.  9 The EU should therefore make a determined effort to improve the 
implementation of agricultural preferences under the Europe Agreements.  One way of doing 
this would be to hand the allocation of preferential quotas over to the exporting countries. In 
8  See Overberg (1994). 
9  See Tangermann (1993a). 83 
the EU it should be seen that this amendment to the implementation of  the Europe Agreements 
can  improve  the  benefits  which  the  CEECs  receive,  without  harming  the  interest  of EU 
farmers. 84 
10  Conclusion 
Agricultural policies throughout much of  the world are undergoing change. This change 
typically  involves  a  decrease  in  market  support  prices  compensated  by  payments  tied  to 
something other that output. The advantages are that support can be tailored to farm families 
in  need,  that costly and  trade-disruptive surpluses are reduced,  and  that environmental  and 
other objectives  can be  made  consistent with  the freedom  of the farmer  to make  farming 
decisions. The EU has made a start in the same direction, as did the EFT  A countries before EU 
membership  became the dominant  force  behind  their  policy.  The CEECs did  not  have  the 
luxury of a leisurely debate on farm  policy changes.  Their policies changed swiftly with the 
change in  regime.  Nevertheless these countries are looking for the same outcome,  a viable 
policy which allows for the productive use of  farm resources and farmers' skills. It is likely that 
the end-point of EU CAP reform and the search for a long-term agricultural strategy in  the 
CEECs  would  eventually  have  been  similar  even  in  the  absence  of EU  accession:  with 
membership expected by the tum of  the centuty, the two processes are intimately joined. 
The  report  looked  at  the  present  state  of CEEC  agriculture  and  found  reason  for 
optimism  that  output will  recover  and  that  the  CEECs  will  be  able  to  export  agricultural 
products in competition with other countries.  This should be a cause for relief in  the current 
EU, as it implies less need for long-term transfers of funds to support markets and farmers  in 
these countries. However it will  also be viewed as  a potential threat, both in budgetary terms 
and  for  market balance.  If the CAP  is  in  its  present  partially-reformed  state,  the  additional 
output  from  the  CEECs  will  break  both  the  budget  constraints  and  GATT  obligations, 
throwing the EU into crisis. 
The conclusion of the report is that there are some options which would be expensive 
and  unwise.  For the  current  EU to  put  on  hold  reform  until  forced  by  budget  or trade 
considerations, and then to make minimal changes would lead to continued crises in the CAP. 
For the CEECs to yield to farmer pressures and to move in  advance of membership to these 
high CAP price levels would represent a costly misuse of  resources in the CEECs and generate 
a  quantity  of potential  exports  that  would  clash  with  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on 
Agriculture and threaten the stability ofEU markets. 
There are also  options which  would  appear to offer the benefits of change  with the 
comfort of stability.  The CEECs could start on a transition to the higher prices of the EU, 
aiming to arrive at those levels by the time of membership.  The EU could pursue a policy of 
continuing  to  reform  the  CAP  by  including  other  commodities,  but  with  only  minor 
improvements in  the workings of the CAP.  This comfortable alternative also  has  drawbacks. 85 
The EU will  eventually have  to complete  its  reform  or move  to more  severe  quantitative 
restrictions to control surpluses. CEEC farmers will be encouraged to produce to price levels 
which are not in the longer term viable.  Meanwhile,  CEEC governments will  be bearing the 
financial and economic cost of  CAP-like policies and prices in advance of  membership. 
The report strongly favours options which would be more in line with the desirable trend 
in agricultural policies in the past few years.  This would involve completing CAP reform, by 
extending compensated price cuts to other sectors, by delinking compensation payments from 
current  land  use,  by  allowing  farmers  to  make  output  decisions  unhampered  by  quota 
restrictions,  and  by  developing  an  expanding  agricultural  sector  that  competes  on  world 
markets without  subsidies.  This  option would  also  see the  CEECs as  keeping farm  prices 
down, at least until the moment of entry, to avoid the substantial financial  and economic cost 
of support.  Attention  instead  should  be  given  to  the  improvement  of infrastructure  and 
marketing  services  in  the  CEECs,  and  to  the  targeting  of assistance  in  ways  which  build 
capacity and increase productivity. 86 
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An Estimate of the Quantitative Implications of  Aligning Prices with the CAP in the 
Visegrad Countriest 
The estimate presented here is based on a quantitative model of supply and demand for 
various agricultural commodities in Central Europe and the EU. The model is part of  a larger 
model  which is  currently being constructed with the aim  of looking  into  agricultural  trade 
between  the  United  States  and  the  European  Union,  including  the  implications  of EU 
enlargement to include both EFT  A countries and  Central Europe.  This European Simulation 
Model (ESIM) is  being  developed  in  the Economic Research  Service (ERS) of the United 
States Department of  Agriculture (USDA}2,  with cooperation from outside academics.3 
The model includes some 20 agricultural products and some of  their first stage processed 
derivatives.  It has  a  relatively  rich  structure  regarding  cross-commodity  linkages,  including 
acreage  allocation  among  crops  and  price  responsive  composition  of livestock  feed.  The 
elasticity  matrices  used  are  synthetic,  but  exhibit  the  desirable  theoretical  properties  (in 
particular homogeneity  and  symmetry).  In  constructing the model,  emphasis was  placed on 
being  able  to capture,  in  considerable  detail,  the  effects  of the various  instruments  used  in 
market and trade policy, including CAP reform measures such as set-aside and compensation 
payments. The model can generate a time series of  annual supply and demand developments in 
all countries included, resulting from a predetermined scenario of  policies over that period. The 
base period used for calibration is 1989 to 1991. 
The  model  structure  is  still  under  development,  and  the  results  reported  here  are 
preliminary.  For  the  purpose  of analysing  the  potential  implications  of accession  of the 
Visegrad countries to the EU,  a simplified version of the model was used including only the 
EU and the three original Visegrad countries, i.e.  Czechoslovakia4,  Hungary and Poland, with 
exogenous world market prices.  More infonnation on the model structure, on data sources, 
and on parameters used will be made available in a paper which is in preparation. 
1  We  wish  to  thank  Wolfgang  MOnch  for  collecting  data,  doing  the calculations  and helping  with  the 
analysis. 
2  Contributors in ERS include Mildred Haley, Michael Herlihy, Martin Johnson, David Kelch, Peter Liapis, 
Bob Koopman, Steve Magiera, and Ralph Seeley. 
3  Tim Josling and Stefan Tangermann. 
4  For lack of sufficiently detailed data, the Czech and Slovak Republics are still treated as one country in the 
model. Appendix I I  2 
The scenario investigated here is option 2, described and discussed above in Section 5.3, 
i.e.  gradual price alignment with the CAP,  to reach expected (unreformed  post-MacSharry) 
CAP prices by the year 2000. The run begins in the model's base period, i.e. with quantities for 
the average of 1989 to 1991, and Visegrad country prices for 1991. For tl;te year 1993, actual 
quantities and prices reported for the Visegrad countries are inserted in the model.  For 1994 
and  1995  it is assumed that the Visegrad countries do not change their policy prices in real 
terms,  but adopt the institutional  price  structure of the EU (i.e.  intervention and threshold 
prices where they apply).  From 1996 onwards,  the Visegrad countries are assumed to align 
their policy prices gradually with post-CAP  reform prices,  to match EU prices in  the year 
2000. s From 2000 onwards, market prices in Central Europe are set equal to market prices in 
the EU. In order to gain a better insight into potential market developments, it is assumed for 
the time  being  that there are  neither  quotas  nor  set-aside  requirements  nor compensation 
payments in the Visegrad countries. 
Productivity of  agriculture in the Visegrad countries is assumed to develop such that the 
farming industry recovers from most of  the decline in output levels between 1989-91 and 1993 
within  a five  year period.  As  far  as  macro-economic  trends  in  the  Visegrad  countries  are 
concerned, it is assumed that purchasing power of consumers (in real terms) grows by 3% per 
year  over the  next  five  years,  and  by  2%  per year  thereafter.  Real  exchange  rates  of the 
Visegrad  countries'  currencies  are  assumed  to  stay  constant  over  the  forecasting  period.  6 
Population growth is extrapolated at current rates. 
The price trends in real terms in the Visegrad countries resulting from these assumptions 
are shown in Graphs AI.1 to AI. 7. A first interesting aspect to note is that price alignment with 
the CAP will not result in major price increases for grains (in the graphs shown for the case of 
wheat and barley),  except for  some increase in  Hungary.  This  may  appear to contradict the 
impression that grain prices in the Visegrad countries are below those in the EU. However, as 
a  result  of CAP  reform  EU grain  prices  will  have  dropped  significantly  by  the  time  the 
Visegrad countries align their prices with the CAP. On the other hand, sugar prices would have 
to increase significantly, by around 50%. It should be noted that in the absence of a reform of 
the EU sugar market regime no fundamental reduction in the EU sugar price has been assumed 
in this scenario. 
Large price increases would have to occur for dairy products, where prices on average in 
Hungary would have to increase by one third, in the Czech and Slovak Republics by 45%, and 
in.Poland by as much as  130o/o.  Even more pronounced would be the price rise for beef, with 
more than a doubling in Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and in Poland. For pork and 
poultry, the picture is more diverse. Given that prices for these products are less controlled in 
5  EU policy prices in the model follow the path determined by the CAP reform decisions of 1992, as amended 
since then. After CAP reform is completed in 1995/96, prices in the EU are assumed to decline by  1% per 
year in real terms. 
6  The real exchange rate of the ECU is kept constant throughout.  Since all  prices in the model are in real 
terms, no assumption on rates of inflation is necessary. Appendix I I  3 
the EU than prices for other products, market forces have a greater influence. With complete 
price alignment assumed to occur in the year 2000, there can be price jumps in that year on 
Visegrad countries' markets for these products.  However,  no  large overall  price increase is 
projected for grain based livestock products, though pork prices may increase somewhat. 
Output trends predicted on the basis of  these assumptions are presented in Graphs AI. 8 
and AI.9.7 For crops, a continuous upward trend in production is expected after 1993, in the 
first few years as a result of  recovering from the drop in productivity during the early stages of 
the transition process, and later fuelled by price adjustment towards the EU level.  No major 
change is forecasted in the proportions among individual types of  cereals. In percentage terms, 
the  increase  in  sugar  production  is  highest.  Differences  among  output  trends  are  more 
pronounced in the livestock sector. There is a relatively large increase in milk output and,  in 
percentage terms  even  higher,  in  beef and  veal  production.  Por~ production  may  increase 
noticeably, while output of  poultry products may not change very much. 
With limited expansion of domestic consumption, this growth of agricultural production 
in the Visegrad countries is likely to result in a significant (and of course proportionally much 
larger) increase of net exports from the Visegrad countries (Graphs AI.lO and AI. II). While 
the Visegrad countries on aggregate were a slight net importer of all  cereals taken together in 
1993, the exportable surplus of  grain in the Visegrad countries may be around 8 million tons by 
the year  2000.  At  the  same  time  there may  be  a  sugar surplus  of 1.8  million  tons.  In the 
livestock sector, there is a potential for significant net exports of beef and pork meat,  around 
0.6 to 1 million tons respectively. Equally, there is the possibility of  relatively large net exports 
of  dairy products, with the butter surplus alone running at 0. 4 million tons. 
With net exports of such magnitudes originating from the Visegrad countries, significant 
budget  expenditure  would  be  required  to  dispose  of these  surpluses.  In  the  year  2000, 
expenditure for  the major  products  included  (which  do  not  at  all  exhaust  the  list  of CAP 
products) would run at more than 3.3  billion ECU (Graph AI.l4).8  Major expenditure items 
are grains, sugar, dairy products and beef 
As  long  as  the  Visegrad  countries  have  not  yet  become  members  of the  EU,  this 
expenditure  has  to  be  financed  out  of their  own  domestic  budgets.  However,  as  soon  as 
accession takes place and the CAP  is  extended  to the  Visegrad  countries,  this  expenditure 
would have to come out of  the Union budget. Large as this expenditure estimate may appear, it 
7  In order to save space, the following graphs provide aggregates for the Visegrad countries, though results 
are calculated by country. 
8  Expenditure included in this calculation is only export subsidies (net of import levy receipts). Expenditure 
on intervention buying etc. comes on top of these budget figures. Expenditure on structural policies is not at 
all included. Appendix I I  4 
should be noted that it is below estimates presented in some other studies on the implications 
ofVisegrad accession for the CAP budget.9 
It should be noted that in this forecast  the assumption is  made that no  compensation 
payments are made in the Visegrad countries and that no set-aside is required. This assumption 
would probably not hold for the case in which the Visegrad countries join the CAP.  If they 
were then required to set  aside land  at the current- EU rate,  this  might  reduce the cereals 
surplus of the Visegrad countries by around 40 per cent.  Budget savings resulting from that 
surplus reduction may be no more than 40 million ECU. On the other hand, if  compensation 
payments are introduced at the same time, and if  they are paid at the current EU rate per base 
period  ton of yield,  total  expenditure  for  cereal  compensation  including  set-aside  in  the 
Visegrad  countries  would  run  at around  3.0 billion  ECU.  Moreover,. extension of oilseed 
compensation payments to farmers  in the Visegrad countries would add  another  1.1  billion 
ECU, and  headage payments for cattle would add another 170 million ECU.  On aggregate, 
including the Visegrad countries in the CAP regime of compensation payments and set-aside 
would  add  another 4.3  billion  ECU to the  3.3  billion  ECU in  export  subsidy  expenditure 
mentioned above. 
Moreover, in  estimating the budget implications of extending the CAP to the Visegrad 
countries, other market regime expenditure has to be considered. Since that expenditure is not, 
at the time being, included in the model used here, only rough estimates can be offered, based 
on expenditure proportions in the EU under the CAP.  For the products included in the model 
used  here,  expenditure  of around  1. 4  billion  ECU on intervention  buying  and  other CAP 
market  regime  measures  might  come  on  top  of expenditure  on  export  subsidies  and 
compensation payments. Also, the list of products included in the model does not exhaust the 
full  set products covered by  CAP  market regimes.  Considering the remaining CAP products 
might add another 4.3 billion ECU. Taken all this together, extension of  the (unreformed) CAP 
to the four Visegrad countries might result in  additional FEOGA expenditure of around  13.3 
billion ECU. 
Finally, a very rough estimate can be offered of expenditure which may be  necessary in 
Bulgaria and  Romania if these two countries were to be covered by  the CAP  as  well.  This 
estimate is based on the volume of agricultural production in these two countries, relative to 
production volume  in  the  Visegrad  countries.  Based  on this  estimate,  CAP  expenditure  in 
Bulgaria  and  Romania  may  be  of the  order of magnitude  of  6  billion  ECU.  Hence,  on 
aggregate inclusion of all  six CEECs in an unreformed CAP might add as much as nearly 20 
billion ECU to expenditure under the guarantee section of  FEOGA. Expenditure on structural 
policies (i.e. from the guidance section ofFEOGA) would come on top of  that sum. 
9  See Directorate General II (  1994 ). 2
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 Appeodixll 
The GATT Commitments in Agriculture of the Visegrad Couotries1 
In this  assessment of the  agricultural  parts  of the  Uruguay Round  Schedules of the 
Visegrad countries, the analysis is limited to around ten major commodities-(see tables).  The 
three major components of  the Schedules have been analysed, i.e. market access (in particular 
tariff bindings), domestic support commitments, and commitments regarding export subsidies. 
In addition to information about Schedule commitments and current policies, the analysis 
includes  the  implications  of two  alternative  scenarios  for  future  policies  in  the  Visegrad 
countries.  Scenario  1 is  constructed such that the Visegrad countries align  their prices with 
post MacSharry reform prices in the EU, beginning that price alignment in the year 1996 and 
completing  it  in  the  year  2000.  Policies  under  scenario  1 are  therefore  identical  to those 
described and discussed above as option 2 in section 5.3.  Scenario 2 assumes that current (i.e. 
generally 1993) policy prices in the Visegrad countries are kept unchanged in  real terms (i.e. 
policy prices are adjusted only for inflation). 
Results for quantities and prices under these two scenarios have been generated with a 
model of agricultural markets in  the Visegrad countries and the EU which is  currently being 
constructed,  in  cooperation  with  the  Economic  Research  Service  of the  USDA.  More 
information on that model is  provided in Appendix I. The results presented in Appendix I are 
used here for analysing the GATT implications of  scenario 1.  In the model used, the Czech and 
Slovak Republics are still treated as one aggregate, mainly because it is still statistically difficult 
to disaggregate quantities and  prices  for  the  two  now  separate countries.  Hence  results  of 
scenario  analyses  are  presented  here  for  the  synthetic  aggregate  of the  Czech  and  Slovak 
Republics,  where GATT commitments for these two countries have been aggregated where 
possible (i.e. in the cases of  domestic support and export subsidies). 
1  Tariff Bindings 
In Table 1 and Graphs 1 and 2, tariff bindings are reported. Tariff bindings of  the EU are 
included for comparison. All tariffs have been expressed as percentage ad valorem equivalents, 
1  We wish to thank  Wolfgang Miinch and Heruting Twesten for collecting data, doing the calculations and 
helping with the analysis. Appendix ll  I  2 
relative to 1993 world market prices.  2 As can be clearly seen in Graphs 1 and 2, tariff bindings 
differ  significantly  among  the  Visegrad  countries.  Hungary  and  the  Czech  and  Slovak 
Republics (the two latter countries generally having the same tariff bindings) have generally 
bound tariffs at a level significantly below that of  the EU, except for oilseeds where the EU has 
maintained its zero tariff bindings.  For poultry, tariffs bound in Hungary and the Czech and 
Slovak Republics are slightly above the ad valorem  equivalent of the EU binding.  Poland's 
tariff bindings  have  generally  been designed  to be similar  to those of the EU,  and  where 
specific tariffs  are bound in Poland they are expressed in  ECU.  As  a result,  Poland's tariff 
equivalents are of  the same magnitude as those of  the EU, though in some cases they differ due 
to the specific combination of ad valorem  and minimum  or maximum specific tariffs which 
Poland has chosen.  J 
In addition to Uruguay Round tariff  bindings, Table 1 also reports current policies (most 
recent  data available  to us,  i.e.  either  1993  or 1994}.  Both tariffs  currently applied  at the 
border (where applicable including import taxes and, in the case of  Poland, recently introduced 
"countervailing duties ") and the tariff equivalents of  the gap between current actual domestic 
market prices and world market prices are reported. In many cases, tariffs currently applied in 
the Visegrad countries are significantly below tariffs bound in the Urugu~y  .Round. Moreover, 
the  tariff equivalents  implicit  in  current  market  prices  are  in  most  cases  below the  tariffs 
actually applied to imports (suggesting that domestic market prices are below import parity 
prices and that there is a certain amount of  redundancy in current tariffs).4 
Table  2  and  Graphs  3  to  5  report  results  of our  scenario  analysis  regarding  tariff 
equivalents.  The  tariffs  shown are the implicit tariff equivalents  which  would  be  needed  to 
defend domestic prices, should price policies be pursued under the two alternative scenarios as 
described above. 5 Results of these scenario analyses suggest that price alignment with the EU 
by 2000 (Scenario  1) would not generally be consistent with tariff bindings in the Czech and. 
Slovak Republics as well as in Hungary, the tariffs required to implement such price alignment 
in  most  cases  being  significantly  above  bound  tariffs.  Even  maintaining  current  real  prices 
(Scenario 2) would in some cases tend to violate tariff bindings in these countries. In Poland, 
2  Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics have generally bound ad valorem tariffs.  For the products 
included in this analysis, the EU has generally bound specific duties (in the case of beef combined with an 
ad valorem tarifi). Poland has bound combinations of ad valorem and specific tariffs, often such that the 
. specific tariff is used as an upper or lower limit of the ad valorem tariff. 
3  In addition to its tariff bindings for cereals, the EU has committed itself not to apply tariffs above a level 
which would make duty-paid import prices exceed 155% of the EU intervention price. The implication of 
this clause in the EU Schedule has been incorporated in our analysis. 
4  However, there are also a few cases where current tariff equivalents calculated here are above current tariffs. 
This can have either of two reasons. First, world market and/or domestic market prices used in this analysis 
do  not  correctly  describe  the  market  situation.  Second,  in  addition  to  tariffs  there  is  protection  of the 
domestic market through non-tariffbarriers. 
5  These tariff equivalents have been calculated from the gap between domestic prices under the scenarios and 
world market prices.  In practice somewhat higher tariffs would be needed to defend the scenario policies, 
because the tariff equivalents shown here are only just sufficient to make the landed price of imports equal 
to the domestic market price. Appendix n  I  3 
on the other hand, price alignment with the EU would not be hampered by tariffs bound in the 
GATT.  Given that Poland has bound its tariffs essentially at  the same level  as  the EU this 
cannot come as a surprise. It  is only in the case of  butter that Poland's tariff binding would not 
quite suffice to cover price alignment with the EU. 
Domestic Support 
Under  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on  Agriculture,  the  domestic  support 
commitments  (expressed  in  AMS)  cover  the  aggregate  of the  whole  agricultural  sector. 
Because it was impossible to include all  agricultural commodities in the analysis,  this part of 
the assessment is  also  limited  to the major commodities included  in  the other parts of the 
analysis (see tables on tariffs and  export subsidies).  The assumption  made is that the AMS 
commitments  accepted by  the Visegrad  countries  apply  to  the  aggregate of the ten or so 
products included  in  the analysis.  Moreover,  the  analysis  has  been  confined  to the market 
support element  of the  AMS  (i.e.  excluding  direct  payments  and  other forms  of support). 
Hence, from the base AMS of each country,  as  reported in the supporting tables attached to 
the Schedules, that part has been extracted which applies to market price support for the ten 
products included in this analysis.  This sub-sector AMS  has then been treated like the overall 
AMS  is treated under the Agreement, i.e.  it has been assumed that it has to be reduced by the 
rate of  reduction ofthe overall AMS (i.e. by 20% between 1995 and 2000). 
The bound AMS  for the year 2000,  as  well  as  the AMS  calculated in  this analysis for 
1993  (using actual  1993  quantities and domestic prices) is  reported in Table 3.6 In that table, 
all  numbers  are  relative to the bound sub-sector AMS  for  1995,  which is  set equal  to  100. 
Differences among countries are striking.  Poland's AMS  in  1993  appears to have been very 
close to what its bound AMS for 1995 is. Hungary has exceeded its bound 1995 AMS already 
in  1993  by  far.  This is  largely due to the fact  that Hungary has  bound domestic support in 
national currency, while Poland has bound domestic support (and export subsidy outlay) in US 
$.  As  a result of significant  inflation  since the base  period,  AMS  has  grown dramatically in 
Hungary. In Poland, on the other hand,  1993  prices in US $equivalent were on aggregate not 
very far from base period prices in US $ equivalent. 
How the GATT will react to cases like those of  Hungary remains to be seen. There is no 
doubt that rules for calculating current AMS, as laid down in the Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture,  do not allow for a discount for inflation.  Everything has  to be calculated in 
nominal terms. On the other hand, Article 18:4 of  the Agreement suggests that in the review of 
6  The AMS  calculated for any year after the base period is very sensitive to  assumptions  made  regarding 
which products are covered by administered prices (since the domestic/world price gap is  included in the 
AMS only if  there is an administered price for the product concerned).  In our analysis we  have taken the 
following products as having administered prices: Czech and Slovak Republics--wheat, sugar, butter, skim 
powder,  cheese,  beef,  pork~ Hungary-wheat, corn, butter,  skim  powder,  beef,  pork~ Poland--wheat,  rye, 
sugar, milk,  pork~ EU--cereals, sugar, butter, skim powder, cheese, beef. Appendix ll I  4 
commitment  implementation,  under  the  auspices  of the  Committee  on  Agriculture,  "due 
consideration [shall be given] to the influence of excessive rates of inflation on the ability of 
any Member to abide by its domestic support commitments". It will be interesting to see how 
the Committee on Agriculture will interpret this rather vague clause.  In any case,  it appears 
unlikely that an automatic discount for inflation will be granted. 
Domestic  support  commitments  in  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  pose  another 
interesting problem. In the Schedules of  both countries available to us there is no market price 
support element in the base period AMS.  The base AMS  for both countries contains only 
direct payments and other forms of support. It is  not clear why this is the case. Possibly the 
assumption  was  made,  when  the  Schedules  were  originally  drafted,  that  there  were  no 
administered prices in Czechoslovakia during the base period (though this does not appear to 
be a very convincing assumption).  On the other hand,  there are certainly administered prices 
for a number of  products now, in both countries.  Bec~use there is no element of  market price 
support in the Schedules, there are also no supporting tables attached to the Schedules which 
would contain base period external reference prices (as is the case for other countries wherever 
there was market price support in the base period).  Because of that lack of "agreed" external 
reference prices in the Schedules it is  not clear how the current AMS  resulting from market 
price support will  be  calculated  in  future.  Presumably the countries concerned will  have  to 
provide statistical evidence, to the Committee on Agriculture, on what their external reference 
prices have been in the base period, and current market price support will be calculated on the 
basis of  those reference prices. Because of the uncertainties on how such cases will be treated 
in  the GATT,  an  AMS  has  not  been  calculated  here for  the Czech and  Slovak Republics. 
However,  like  Hungary the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  have  bound  domestic  support  in 
domestic currency. Hence they are likely to have a similar problem with inflation as Hungary. 
Moreover,  if future  market  price  support  is  included  in  the  AMS  calculation  though  base 
period  market  price  support  was  implicitly  zero,  there  is  an  additional  element  of excess 
support. The Czech and Slovak Republics are, therefore, also likely to exceed their domestic 
support commitment very much. 
Table  4  and  Graph  6  show the  results  of our scenario  analysis.  All  numbers  in  that 
analysis are expressed relative to the bound sub-sector AMS for the respective year (i.e.  1995 
or 2000), which is  set equal to  100.  With some further inflation assumed for Hungary (5% 
annual rate), Hungary has no chance whatsoever to honour its AMS commitment under either 
scenario. The situation is likely to be the same for the Czech and Slovak Republics. Poland, on 
the other hand,  having avoided inflationary pressure on its AMS commitment by binding it in 
US  $7,  can keep its current support close to its commitment, though only if it does not raise 
real support prices (i.e. under Scenario 2). On the other hand, ifPoland were to align its prices 
with the CAP (Scenario 1  ), it would exceed its AMS  commitment by 250 per cent in the year 
2000. 
7  In addition, Poland has engineered its AMS base in a rather interesting way. applying base period ( 1986-88) 
AMS percentages by commodity group to  1992 values of production to calculate the overall base AMS. Appendix ll  I  5 
Export Subsidies 
Schedule  commitments  regarding  export  subsidies,  both  quant1t1es  and  outlay,  are 
reported in Table 5.  It should be noted that commitments regarding export subsidies do not 
always come for the same types of  product groups in all countries (contrary to what the GATT 
Modalities document suggested). Thus, for example, rather than having separate commitments 
for beef meat and pork meat, Poland has one commitment regarding processed meat and one 
commitment regarding unprocessed meat (each of  them covering both pork and beef meat). In 
the analysis presented here, an attempt has been made to define product ·groups appropriately. 
However, results need to be interpreted with care. 
Results of  the scenario analysis are reported in Table 6 and Graphs 7 to 12. The extent to 
which export subsidy commitments constrain future  policies in the countries covered differs 
among products. In a number of cases the Visegrad countries have non-zero quantities and 
outlays bound in their Schedules (presumably because they exported with subsidies in the base 
period)  though  they  may  not  be  net  exporters  of the  products  concerned  in  the  future, 
depending on future policies. In other cases there are (implicit) zero bindings in the Schedules 
(simply  because  there  are  no  entries  for  the  products  concerned),  but  there  is  a  good 
probability that the countries may find they have a surplus of these products, and would need 
to subsidize exportation because domestic  prices  are above  world prices.  Equally,  there are 
cases where the Schedules would allow for only relatively small amounts of subsidized exports, 
though there is a probability that actual export availability may be significantly larger. 
Of course  this  latter  case  tends  to  happen  more  frequently  under  Scenario  1  (price 
alignment  with  the EU by  2000).  Cases  where  subsidized  exports  under  Scenario  1 (and 
sometimes even under Scenario 2) may not fit  into  Schedule commitments are wheat,  coarse 
grains,  sugar,  beef and  pork in  the  Czech  and  Slovak Republics8;  and  all  products  e~cept 
oilseeds in both Hungary and Poland.  9  It generally  is  the  case that both quantity and  outlay 
commitments are exceeded at the same time. 
Conclusions 
Based  on  this  analysis  it  appears  that  the  extent  to  which  their  Uruguay  Round 
commitments bind future agricultural price and trade policies in the Visegrad countries differs 
very much among countries.  In Poland,  tariff bindings would  not constrain price  alignment 
8  Under Scenario 2, the Czech and Slovak Republics tend to export more poultry than under scenario 1. This 
is because the  poultry/cereals  price  ratio  is  less  favourable  in  the  EU (Scenario  1)  than  currently  and 
projected for 2000 under Scenario 2 in the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
9  In order to gain a better impression of the "pure" effects of price alignment with the EU it has been assumed 
in the  Scenarios analysed  here  that  no  supply  quotas  are  imposed  on sugar and milk  in the  Visegrad 
countries. As a result, alignment with the rather high EU prices for sugar and milk leads to potentially large 
surpluses of  sugar and dairy products in the Vise grad countries. Appendix ll I  6 
with the EU. However, Poland would violate its commitments regarding domestic support and 
export subsidies if  it were to align its prices with the EU before becoming a member of the 
Union. For the Czech and Slovak Republics, tariff bindings are more restrictive than in Poland 
and  would  indeed  prevent  prices  from  being  aligned  with  the  EU.  Moreover,  for  some 
products export subsidy commitments might also get into the way of aligning prices with the 
EU. Hungary's tariff bindings would also prevent price alignment with the EU from happening 
smoothly for some products. Moreover, Hungary is  likely to run into difficulties with export 
subsidy commitments for nearly al products covered in this analysis should it aim to align its 
prices with those of  the EU. 
In Hungary and the Czech and  Slovak Republics,  it is  essentially impossible to honour 
the  domestic  support  commitments  in  any  case,  because  inflation  has  eroded  their 
commitments nearly completely. Whether the "excessive inflation" clause in Article 18:4 of  the 
Agreement on Agriculture may be a way out remains to be seen when the GATT Committee 
on Agriculture begins its work and is  confronted with such  cases.  In the Czech and  Slovak 
Republics there is also the issue of  which external reference prices to use in calculating current 
market price support. T
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Table 2: Scenario Analysis -Tariff Bindings 
GATT tariff binding  Scenario tariffs, 2000 
ad valorem equivalent  ad valorem equivalent 
1995  2000  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
%  OA,  %  % 
Hungary 
Wheat  50,0  32,0  12,4  -2,0 
Barley  41,0  32,0  58,8  16,9 
Rapeseed  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0 
Sunseed  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0 
Sugar  80,0  68,0  134,5  76,2 
Beef  112,0  71,7  78,6  -5,6 
Pork  61,0  51,9  32,7  -21,4 
Poultry  61,0  39,0  21,9  5,4 
Butter  159,0  101,8  147,1  111,4 
Skim powder  80,0  51,2  20,0  -30,6 
Czech + Slovak Republics 
Wheat  25,0  21,2  12,4  14,7 
Barley  25,0  21,2  58,8  54,4 
Rapeseed  72,7  60,0  0,0  0,0 
Sunseed  48,4  40,0  0,0  0,0 
Sugar  70,0  59,5  134,5  87,9 
Beef  41,7  34,0  78,6  7,0 
Pork  45,8  38,5  32,7  15,8 
Poultry  54,1  43,0  21,9  79,8 
Butter  81,5  68,0  147,1  122,7 
Skim powder  49,6  37,0  20,0  8,4 
Poland 
Wheat  120,6  77,2  12,4  6,8 
Barley  147,8  94,8  58,8  34,2 
Rapeseed  100,0  64,0  0,0  0,0 
Sunseed  15,0  9,0  0,0  0,0 
Sugar  208,4  169,1  134,5  52,4 
Beef  278,6  178,1  78,6  -13,0 
Pork  118,5  75,9  32,7  14,7 
Poultry  120,0  76,0  21,9  22,1 
Butter  160,0  102,0  147,1  -30,3 
Skim powder  208,1  133,1  20,0  -7,8 Table 3: 
EU 
Hungary 
Poland 
Czech+Siovak Rep 
Czech Rep. 
Slovak Rep. 
Appendix ll I  9 
GATI Schedules- Domestic Support Commitments, Selected Products 
1995 Bound AMS =  1  00 
ActuaiAMS 
1993 
74,37 
746,43 
110,98 
*** 
BoundAMS 
1995 
100,00 
100,00 
100,00 
*** 
100,00 
100,00 
BoundAMS 
2000 
80,00 
80,00 
80,00 
*** 
80,00 
80,00 
***·  Zero market price support  bound in GA  n -Schedule Table 4: 
EU 
Hungary 
Czech+Siovak Rep 
Poland 
Appendix II I  10 
Scenario Analysis - Domestic Support Commitments, Selected Products 
Bound AMS of the respective year =  1  00 
ActuaiAMS  Scenario AMS 
1993  1995  1995  2000  2000 
1995 bound=10  Scenario·1  Scenario 2  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
74,37  68,67  68,67  90,25  101,77 
746,43  905,62  905,62  4.276,84  1.920,46 
***  ***  ***  ***  *** 
110,98  112,01  112,01  362,27  113,64 
***·  Zero market price support  bound in GATT  -Schedule Appendix ll I  II 
TallieS:  ~TT  ScheckHs-&,adlublldles 
QuMIIy  of  &ublldlzed ec,ort., ..  t  OUiayon &,art8ublldiM  .....  1183  1115  2000  chqe  change  .....  1113  1- 2000  ch ...  chqe 
.a-t  .,.,..  bolnl  buP200  1883>2000  c..r.ncy  acUI  .,.,..  .,.,..  bue>2000  1193>2000 
WMat  w..t 
EU  t7,01  10,12  11,12  13,44  -21.~  32.74  ..  U.ECU  1,71  0,44  2.07  1,14  -38.~  157,:SO.. 
tb1py  1,44  0,00  1,31  1,14  .zo .....  o.~  U.HUF  Z.05  0,00  1,1S  1,32  -35 .....  o.~ 
Czech+SicMic Rep.  0,22  0,07  0,21  0,17  -21.~  151,a-..  Bm.Kcs  0,23  0,03  0,22  0,15  -38.~  331,4K 
Pollnd  0,00  0,00  0,00  0.00  o.~  o.~  U.USI  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  o.~ 
IIIMicRep.  0,14  0,00  0,13  0,11  -21.~  o.~  -Kcs  0,21  0,00  0,21  0.11  ...  ~  o.~ 
eo...Oran  C..  Grin 
EU  1Z.82  0,00  12.11  1,17  -21.~  o.~  U.ECU  1,31  0.00  1,30  0,11  -38.~  o.~ 
tUlpy(3)  1,45  0,00  1,24  0,11  .......  o.~  U.HUF  0,23  0,00  1,22  0,15  -31 .....  o.~ 
ez.ch+SicMic Rep.  0,00  0,21  0,00  0,00  o.~  -100,~  U.Kcs  0,00  0,30  0,00  0,00  o.~  -100.~ 
Pollnd  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  o.~  U.USI  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  o.~ 
814MicRep.  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  o.~  U.Kcs  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  o.~ 
Rapeued  RapeMecl 
EU  0,10  0,00  0,10  0,01  -21.~  o.~  U.ECU  0,03  0,00  0,03  0,02  -38.~  o.~ 
tulpry  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  o.~  U.HUF  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  o.~ 
Czech+Siowk Rep.  0,00  0,02  0,00  0,00  o.~  -too.~  811. Kcs  0,00  0,03  0,00  0,00  o.~  -100.~ 
Pol.nd  0,43  0,00  0,42  0,34  -21.~  0,00...  Bll. US$  0,02  0,00  0,02  0,01  -45,11 ..  0,00... 
llowkRep.  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00...  o.~  Bll. Kcs  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  o.~ 
&nlower Seeds  8l.rllloMr Seeds 
EU  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00...  0,00%  Bll. ECU  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o,oo-..  0,00'111 
"'-'Gary  0,09  0,02  0,09  0,07  -21,11'111  211,45'111  Bll. HUF  0,34  0,01  0,32  0,22  -38,01'111  3051,93'111 
Czech+SICMik Rep.  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00%  0,00%  Bll. Kcs  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00...  0,00% 
Poland  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00%  0,00%  Bll. US$  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00%  0,00% 
SICMkRep.  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00'111  Bll. Kcs  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00%  0,00... 
WtlteSugar  Wile  SUgar 
EU  1,62  0,00  1.56  1.28  -21,00'111  0,00'111  Bll. ECU  G,78  0,00  0,73  0,50  -35,89'111  O,Oft 
tMgary(3)  0,17  0,06  0,14  0,03  -10,72'111  .-.6,67'111  Bll. HUF  0,23  1,01  0,22  0,15  -38,18'111  -85,24'111 
Czech+Siowk Rep.  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,01  -21,00'111  0,00'111  BIJ. Kcs  0,10  0,00  0,10  0,06  -38,00%  0,00'111 
Poland  0,13  0,00  0,13  0,10  -20,97'111  0,00'111  BIJ. US$  0,05  0,00  0,05  0,03  -38,00'111  O,Oft 
SlcMkRep.  0,01  0,00  0,00  0,00  -21,00'111  0,00'111  BIJ. Kcs  o.oa  0,00  o,oa  0,05  -38,00..  0,00'111 
Beef  Beef 
EU  1,03  0,25  1,12  0,82  -21,00'111  224,79'111  811.  ECU  1,97  0,58  1,90  1.26  -36,00'111  116,18'111 
Hw1gary  0,04  0,00  0,04  0,03  -22,22'111  0,00'111  811.  HUF  1,57  0,00  1,47  1,00  -35,97'111  0,00'111 
Czech+Siowk Rep.  0,10  0,00  0,10  0,01  -20,97'111  0,00'111  811. Kcs  0,48  0,00  0,46  0,31  -36,00'111  0,00'111 
Poland (1)  0,10  0,00  0,10  o.oa  -21, 11'111  0,00'111  Bll. US$  0,19  0,00  0,18  0,12  -35,98'111  0,00'111 
SICMkRep.  0,04  0,00  0,03  0,03  -21,00'111  0,00'111  Bit. Kcs  0,29  0,00  0,28  0,18  -36,00'111  0,00'111 
Pork  Porlc 
EU  0,51  0,51  0,49  0,40  -21,00'111  -21,78'111  Bll. ECU  0,18  0,32  0,17  0,12  -35,89'111  ~.85'111 
tMgary  0,12  0,00  0,11  0,09  -20,87'111  0,00'111  811. HUF  4,74  0,00  4,45  3,03  -38,00'111  0,00'111 
Czech+Siowk Rep.  0,02  0,00  0,02  0,01  -21,06'111  259,33'111  Bll. Kcs  0,11  0,01  0,11  O.D7  -35,82'111  488,22'111 
Poland 
SICMkRep.  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,00  -21,00..  0,00...  BIJ. Kcs  0,05  0,00  0,05  0,03  -36,oo-..  0,00.. 
PoUtry  PO&fty 
EU  0,37  0,31  0,44  0,29  -20,98'111  -7,45'111  Bll. ECU  0,14  0,15  0,14  0,09  -38,03'111  -40,39'111 
H\.wlgary  0,14  0,15  0,14  0,11  -21,28'111  -27,13'111  811.  HUF  5,48  2.25  5,18  3,51  -38.~  58,05'111 
Czech+Siowk Rep.  0,04  0,01  0,04  0,03  -20,88'111  512,37'111  Bll. Kcs  0,37  0,11  0,34  0,23  -38,00'111  122,05'111 
Poland  0,02  0,00  0,02  0,01  -20,73'111  o.~  Bit. US$  0,02  0,00  0,01  0,01  -38.~  0,00'111 
SICMkRep.  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,01  -21,00'111  0,00'111  Bll. Kcs  0,11  0,00  0,17  0,11  -38.~  0,00.. 
Butter and Butterol  a...  and Butterol 
EU  0,46  0,67  0,45  0,37  -21,00'111  -«.98 ..  Bll. ECU  1,33  1,57  1,25  0,15  -36,00'111  -45,85'111 
Hw1gary  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00%  Bll. HUF  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  0,00'111 
Czech+Siowk Rep.(2)  0,09  0,00  0,09  0,07  -21,01'111  0,00'111  Bll. Kcs  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00..  0,00'111 
Poland  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  o.~  811.US$  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00'111 
SlcMtRep.  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,01  -21,00'111  0,00'111  811. Kcs  0,31  0,00  0,38  0,24  -36,oo-..  0,00'111 
Slltinmed Wk Powd•  8Nmnled Wk Powd• 
EU  0,31  0,00  0,30  0,24  -21,01 ..  0,00...  Bll. ECU  0,37  0,00  0,35  0,24  -35,88'111  0,00... 
Hwlgary  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00'111  BII.HUF  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00'111 
Czech+Siowt Rep.  0,10  0,00  0,10  0,01  -21,01 ..  0,00...  Bit. Kcs  1,15  0,00  1,13  1,25  -36,00..  0,00... 
Poland  0,05  0,00  0,05  0,04  -20,94 ..  0,00...  •.  US$  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,01  -35.83'1'  0,00... 
SICMtRep.  0,02  0,00  0,02  0,02  -21,00'111  0,00...  811. Kcs  0,42  0,00  0,41  0,27  -36.~  0,00.. 
Cheese  a.  .... 
EU  0,39  0,13  0,41  0,31  -21,00..  135,71'111  Blt.ECU  0,44  0,32  0,51  0,28  -38,00'111  -11,94 .. 
Hungary  0,00  0,00  0.00  0,00  -21,00'111  0,00'111  Bit HUF  0,05  0,00  0,05  0,03  -35,68'111  0,00'111 
Czech+Siowk Rep.  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00'111  811. Kcs  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.~  0,00.. 
Poland  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00...  BII.US$  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00... 
SlcNik Rep.  0,00  0,00  0.00  0,00  0,00'111  0,00'111  BIJ. Kcs  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  o.on.  0,00% 
(1) Beef and Pork 
C2) Butt• and DUy Products 
(3) Front loading (Base: 1981·92) T
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The Commodity Composition of  EU Agricultural and Food Exports to the CEECs1 
The  analysis  presented  here  aims  at  providing  information  on  the  nature  of EU 
agricultural and food exports to the six CEECs associated with the EU. The background is that 
EU agricultural and food exports to the CEECs have grown substantially since the beginning 
of  the transition process. The major focus of  this analysis is the commodity composition of  EU 
exports and any changes of  it that may have taken place in recent years. 
Data on export values in ECU have been analysed for the period  1988 to 1993.2  Total 
agricultural and food exports have been defined, as usual, to be those under CN headings 01  to 
24.  The upper part of Table AIII.1  presents information on EU exports at the two digit CN 
level.  All information in that table relates to changes between the average of 1988-90 and the 
most recent year for which data are available,  1993. 
There are three blocs of columns  in  Table  Alii. 1.  In the first  bloc,  percentage growth 
rates of export values from  1988-90 to  1993  are given.  Total EU exports of agricultural and 
food products to the six CEECs have grown by  13 5 per cent from  1988-90 to 1993.  Among 
the Vise  grad countries, growth of  EU exports to the Czech and Slovak Republics (aggregated 
in this analysis) was highest, with a 243  per cent increase,  while exports to Poland increased 
least, at a rate of  91  per cent.  Growth rates of EU exports differ significantly among product 
groups. In percentage terms, growth was highest for malt, starches, inulin (CN group 11), with 
an increase by nearly 1700 per cent, while EU exports of meat (CN 02) stagnated and exports 
of  vegetable materials (CN 14) decreased. 
The second bloc of  columns in Table Alii. I gives shares of  product groups in total1993 
EU export value. The largest single item in EU exports to the CEECs as a group in  1993 was 
cereals  (CN  10).  However,  in  1993  EU cereals  export  to  the  CEECs  were  above  trend, 
because of  the drought in some of  the CEECs. Other product groups with large export values 
include  edible  fruit  and  nuts  (CN  08),  residues  from  the  food  industry  (CN  23),  and 
miscellaneous edible preparations (CN 21 ). 
In the third bloc of  columns in Table Alii. I, the composition of  the overall growth of  EU 
agricultural and food exports to the CEECs from  1988-90 to 1993  is given by product group. 
1  We  wish to thank Alfred Gerken and Bernhard Overberg for doing the calculations and helping with the 
analysis. 
2  EUROST  AT, EEC External Trade, CD ROM Version, var. issues. Appendix ill  I  2 
More  than  12  per  cent  of the  increase  in  EU  exports  from  1988-90  to  1993  was  in 
miscellaneous edible preparations (CN 21 ). The two other product groups with a more than 10. 
per cent share in export growth are edible fruit and nuts (CN 08) and cereals (CN 10). 
In order to gain a better impression of the nature of changes in EU exports,  products 
were also grouped according to two criteria. First, three groups were defined regarding the 
level  of processing  which  the  commodities  concerned  have  undergone  before  export.  In 
forming these categories, treatment of  different products under the CAP could be used as one 
criterion.  Basic products in  CAP market regimes,  but also  other unprocessed commodities, 
were classified as "raw materials". Examples of. these products are live animals,  cereals,  and 
cocoa beans. Other products covered in Annex ll  of  the Treaty of  Rome, and other products of 
a similar character, were classified as "lightly processed products". Examples are meat, butter, 
flour,  and  cocoa  powder.  Non-Annex ll products  were  classified  as  "highly  processed 
products". Examples are confectionery, pasta, ice cream, and chocolate.  Second, two product 
categories were defined according to the extent to which the EU subsidizes exports. Products 
where export subsidies are either not granted at all  or are insignificant relative to the product 
value  were  classified  as  "products  without  export  subsidies".  Examples  are  fish,  flowers, 
manioc,  coffee  and  (since  the  MacSharry  reform)  oilseeds  and  their  products.  All  other 
products were classified as "products with export subsidies".  The grouping according to both 
processing  and  export  subsidization  was  done  at  the  four  digit  CN level,  and  data  were 
analysed at that level. The allocation of  products to categories is shown in Table AIII.2. 
In  the  lower  part of Table  AIII.1,  some  results  of this  analysis  of different  product 
categories are presented.  As far  as  processing goes,  the strongest growth in  EU agricultural 
and  food  exports to the CEECs was  in  the category of highly  processed  products,  with  an 
increase of  220 per cent from 1988-90 to 1993. With regard to export subsidization, exports of 
subsidized products have grown less (by 121  per cent) than exports of  products with subsidies 
(158 per cent). On the other hand, of  the total increase in export value from  1988-90 to 1993,. 
products with export subsidies had a larger share (59 per cent) than products without export 
subsidies (  41  per cent). 
If classifications according to processing and  export subsidization are combined,  there 
are six groups of products. For these six product groups, Graphs AIII.1  and AIII.2 show the 
changes in EU exports to the CEECs between 1988 and  1993.  The most significant changes 
visible at this level of aggregation are an increase of the share of highly  processed products 
with subsidies,  and a decrease of the  share of lightly  processed products with subsidies.  In 
Chapter 9 above, Graphs 9.1  and 9.2 show changes at the more aggregate level of subsidized 
versus not subsidized products, and for the three different degrees of  processing. T
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 Appendix ill  I  6 
Graph AIII.l: EU Ag. Exports to CEI;Cs 
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